Landro v. Great Northern Railway Co.
| Decision Date | 26 April 1912 |
| Docket Number | 17,480 - (45) |
| Citation | 135 N.W. 991,117 Minn. 306 |
| Parties | OLE LANDRO v. GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
After the former appeal reported in 114 Minn. 163, the action was tried before Grindeland, J., and a jury which returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff for $12,500. From an order denying defendant's motion for a new trial, defendant appealed. Affirmed.
Damages excessive.
A verdict for $12,500 in this case held excessive, and reduced to $8,000, consent to which reduction is made a condition for denying a new trial.
Evidence.
The exhibition of plaintiff's person to the jury, and the experiments conducted therewith, referred to in the opinion as well as the cross-examination of defendant's expert witnesses in the manner referred to, criticized, but held under the circumstances of this case, not to be prejudicial error.
Remarks of counsel not prejudicial.
Certain remarks of counsel in his address to the jury held not to constitute prejudicial error.
J. D. Sullivan, for appellant.
G. Halvorson, Julius J. Olson and Charles Loring, for respondent.
The first trial of this case resulted in a verdict of $6,500, which this court held so excessive that it could not be accounted for, except on the ground of passion and prejudice. Landro v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 114 Minn. 162, 165, 130 N.W. 553. The second trial resulted in a verdict of $12,500, and this appeal is from an order denying a new trial.
Defendant admits liability in some amount, but insists that the verdict is grossly excessive, and that there were prejudicial errors on the trial. The facts as stated in the decision on the former appeal need not be restated. The second trial was in June, 1911; the accident, in February, 1909. The lapse of time between the accident and the trial is alone sufficient to make the case different from the case presented on the first trial, had before it was possible to judge whether plaintiff's injuries were permanent, or whether they could be cured or helped by treatment.
As the record now stands, a clean question of fact is presented, both as to the nature and as to the probable duration of plaintiff's injuries. Medical experts of high repute gave their opinion that plaintiff was suffering from a partial dislocation of the sacro-iliac joint, and that it was permanent. Medical witnesses of equally high standing were positive that there was no dislocation. But clearly the evidence is such that the verdict of the jury is final on this question. We must accept it as established, therefore, that there is this dislocation, that it has been and will be to some extent painful, and that it probably cannot be cured. But there is no visible deformity. Plaintiff weighs practically as much as before the accident, his appetite is perfect, and he sleeps well. He cannot walk much, and his capacity for certain lines of employment that require physical exertion has been seriously impaired. In short, accepting, as we must, the testimony of plaintiff and his witnesses, the injury is a serious one, and entitles plaintiff to substantial compensation.
But we cannot avoid the conclusion that $12,500 is considerably more than fair compensation. Giving full weight to the verdict, and to the decision of the trial court refusing to disturb it, we still feel that the amount is excessive, and that we ought to make an effort to correct the injustice that has been done, and at the same time, if possible, end the case. Another trial will be an additional expense to both parties, and the result might be even less satisfactory than the verdict here. We think that $8,000 will be ample compensation to plaintiff, and that it is the limit that should be permitted on the evidence before us.
It is this desire to end a vexatious litigation, and the fact that there must ultimately be a recovery in some amount, that leads us to the conclusion that the errors alleged were not so plainly vital and prejudicial as to require a new trial but we must not be...
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