Lane v. Derocher

• Decision Date: 14 July 1976
• Citation: 360 A.2d 141
• Parties: Dorothy E. LANE et al. v. Alix DEROCHER and Paul J. Derocher et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 141

360 A.2d 141

Dorothy E. LANE et al. v. Alix DEROCHER and Paul J. Derocher et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

July 14, 1976.

Law Offices of James G. Palmer by H. Denton Bumgardner, James G. Palmer, Brunswick, for plaintiffs.

Marshall, Raymond & Beliveau by John V. Bonneau, John G. Marshall, Lewiston, for Alix Derocher.

Murray, Plumb & Murray by Peter L. Murray, Myer M. Marcus, Portland, for Paul Derocher.

Before DUFRESNE, C. J., and POMEROY, WERNICK and ARCHIBALD, JJ.

WERNICK, Justice.

Plaintiffs, Dorothy E. Lane, Samuel Holbrook, Walter C. Hinds, Mary A. Hinds, Sumner Holbrook and Donald Watson, and defendants, Alix Derocher and Paul J. Derocher, are owners of lots of land in Blackstone Park, so-called, on Mere Point in the Town of Brunswick, Maine.

On July 17, 1972 plaintiffs instituted a civil action against defendants in the Superior Court (Cumberland County). The complaint alleged that defendants had constructed buildings on particular land and utilized said land and buildings for the commercial purposes of operating a marina and store in violation of restrictive covenants established

'in accord with a common scheme or plan of development . . .'

which subjected the land at issue to the

'. . . restriction that no buildings shall be erected . . . (thereon), and further . . . (it shall be) use(d) . . . for park and pleasure purposes only.'

Plaintiffs asked issuance of a permanent injunction: (1)

'preventing Defendants from maintaining or carrying on . . . commercial activities'

and (2)

'requiring . . . Defendants to remove . . . buildings or permanent structures . . ..'

The complaint also asked for damages in the amount of $50,000.00.

Defendants filed an answer and subsequently amended it with the permission of the Court. The case was heard by a Justice of the Superior Court, the parties having waived jury trial in respect to any matters triable of right to a jury.

Concluding that:

'any present . . . (violation) of restrictions applicable to Defendants' land . . . (as here in controversy) is of such long standing that the doctrine of laches prevents any granting of equitable relief',

the Court denied issuance of an injunction and also ordered the complaint dismissed.

In their appeal from the judgment dismissing the complaint plaintiffs assert, as a first point of appeal, that the presiding Justice erred in ordering the entirety of the complaint dismissed solely on the basis of a finding of laches. Defendants argue that laches is a legitimate bar to plaintiffs' case only as it addressed the equity, rather than the law, jurisdiction of the Superior Court. Plaintiffs maintain that their complaint, and the evidence in support of it, raised matters within the law, as well as the equity, jurisdiction of the Court and, therefore, the presiding Justice erred in holding the entirety of plaintiffs' case defeated by his finding of laches.

Plaintiffs claim to have addressed the Superior Court's jurisdiction at law by allegations and proof that defendants had 'caused' an excessive use of an easement, in the nature of a right of way, owned in common by plaintiffs and defendants.

We find this claim without merit.

The complaint identifies the real property which plaintiffs allege to be in issue, as wrongfully used by defendants, as that land

'. . . which extend(s) from the avenue as shown on . . . (a) plan (recorded in Cumberland County Registry of Deeds, Plan Book 11, Page 69) to the waters of Mere Point Bay.'

The complaint avers that (1) this land is subject to restrictive covenants against the erection of buildings and use for other than park and pleasure purposes and (2) the wrongfulness of defendants' 'commercial' use of this land is that it was in violation of the restrictive covenants.

At the hearing the parties entered into stipulations which further pinpointed the real property interests of plaintiffs which plaintiffs were claiming defendants had violated. One stipulation was that the 'avenue' mentioned in the complaint is a private way never accepted as a public way by the Town of Brunswick. As to this private way, the parties further stipulated that: (1) plaintiffs and defendants are 'owners of lots . . . on the northwesterly side of the way and also owners of land in front of their lots between the way and the water';

(2)

'the land between the way and the water was conveyed . . . subsequent to the original conveyance of the cottage lots . . . on the inland (northerly) side of the way';

and (3) it is the

'. . . lots between the way and the water . . . (which) are subject to the restrictions'

asserted in the complaint of plaintiffs.

Applying the aforesaid stipulations to the allegations of the complaint, the presiding Justice was warranted in concluding that the conduct of defendants alleged by plaintiffs to be violative of property rights of plaintiffs was confined to (1) defendants' use of that land owned by defendants between the way ('avenue') and the sea and (2) alleged wrongfulness in defendants' use derived from its being in contravention of restrictive covenants applicable to that land.

From such justifiable conclusion the presiding Justice correctly proceeded to the further view that the allegation that defendants' 'commercial uses' of defendants...