Lane v. Dist. of Columbia

Decision Date30 September 2016
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 14-1316 (RDM)
Citation211 F.Supp.3d 150
Parties Ella LANE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

211 F.Supp.3d 150

Ella LANE, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 14-1316 (RDM)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed September 30, 2016


211 F.Supp.3d 157

Alec George Karakatsanis, Civil Rights Corps, Phil Telfeyan, Equal Justice Under Law, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

Joseph Alfonso Gonzalez, Office of Attorney General, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

RANDOLPH D. MOSS, United States District Judge

This is one of a series of cases pending before this Court seeking damages from the Metropolitan Police Department ("MPD") and individual officers for allegedly searching private homes without probable cause.1 The common thread in each case is an attack on the MPD's practice of seeking search warrants based on an averment that the investigating officer "knows" based on his or her "training and experience" that individuals suspected of certain crimes—typically involving the illegal distribution of drugs or unlawful possession of a gun—are likely to have evidence of their unlawful activity in their homes. In each case, the plaintiff alleges that the officer who submitted the affidavit in support of the warrant knew, or should have known, that just the opposite is true—that, in fact, people who are arrested outside their homes on drug or gun charges rarely keep evidence of their illegal activity in their homes.

Although all of these cases rely on this common theme, each is also unique. Some involve drug arrests, some guns, and some both. Some involve little or no evidence of a nexus to the residence searched, while others involve a more substantial connection. And most involve additional allegations of police misconduct, separate from the alleged deficiencies in the warrant or supporting affidavit. As a result, just as a magistrate must "make ... practical, common-sense decision[s] [based on] all of the circumstances set forth in the affidavit," Illinois v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), the Court must independently evaluate the particular circumstances presented in each of these cases.

The present dispute began when the investigating officer found a handgun in the pocket of a jacket left by one of three men on the top step of a walkway leading from the street to the house where one of the three men (Terrence Crossland) lived with his mother (Adrian Crossland) and grandmother (Ella Lane). That discovery led to Terrance Crossland's arrest (along with the other two men), a brief warrantless search of the Crossland/Lane home, the subsequent issuance of a warrant to

211 F.Supp.3d 158

search the home for various items relating to the ownership and use of firearms, and a second, more extensive search of the home. No evidence of illegality was found in either search of the home, and the MPD ultimately declined to bring any charges against Terrance Crossland. Following these events, Terrance Crossland, Adrian Crossland and Ella Lane brought this action, challenging the legality of virtually all of the actions of the police officers that day, from their initial interaction with Terrance Crossland on the steps outside his home through their second search of the Crossland/Lane home later that evening. Their complaint names the officer who submitted the affidavit in support of the search warrant, five other named officers, an unspecified number of unnamed officers, and the MPD itself.

The MPD, the District, and the individual officers (collectively, the "District") have moved to dismiss the complaint, principally on the grounds that the officers' conduct was lawful; that, in any event, the individual officers are protected by qualified immunity; and that the plaintiffs have failed to allege a claim against the MPD under Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York , 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Dkt. 9. For the reasons explained below, the Court will GRANT the motion in part and DENY it in part.

I. BACKGROUND

For purposes of the defendants' motion to dismiss, the following allegations from the complaint are taken as true.2 See, e.g. , Hishon v. King & Spalding , 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984). In addition, the search warrant and supporting affidavit are attached to the complaint and are thus properly before the Court for purposes of resolving the defendants' motion. See EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch. , 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (explaining that when considering a motion to dismiss, a court may "consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint and matters of which we may take judicial notice.").

According to the complaint, MPD officers John Wright and Timothy Haselden, along with an unnamed third officer, were patrolling in a cruiser in northeast Washington, D.C., on October 27, 2012, when they saw three men sitting on the steps outside the Crossland/Lane home. Compl. ¶ 16; Dkt. 1–1 at 2. Wright saw one of them smoking a "hand-rolled cigar," which he believed to be marijuana. Compl. ¶ 17. He "also observed a [s]tyrofoam cup, which he [later] asserted ‘is often used by people when they drink alcohol.’ " Id. (quoting Dkt. 1–1 at 3). He pulled over to question the men. Id.

On the steps were Darrell Boatwright, Terrance Crossland, and Benjamin Crutchfield. Dkt. 1–1 at 2. Crutchfield was smoking the "cigar." Id. Crossland and Crutchfield were both wearing jackets; Boatwright was not.3 Id. The styrofoam cup was next to Boatwright's left foot. Id. at 3. After exiting the cruiser, Wright "immediately ... ordered the men to stay where they were." Compl. ¶ 50. Although Wright later averred in an application submitted for a warrant to search the Crossland/Lane

211 F.Supp.3d 159

home that the three men then consented to a search, see Dkt. 1–1 at 3, the complaint disputes that assertion, alleging that the officers "immediately searched the men," a search that "include[ed] putting their hands into the[ir] pockets." Compl. ¶ 50. That search did not yield any contraband from any of the men. Id. ¶ 51. Wright then asked the three men for identification and asked whether they lived at the house. Id. ¶ 18. Crossland said he did, and he handed over his identification, which listed an address matching the house. Id. Wright also asked Crutchfield to put out the "cigar." Id. Crutchfield complied but explained that he was smoking "Scoobie Snacks," a synthetic marijuana, and not "real weed." Id. ; Dkt. 1–1 at 3. Boatwright and Crutchfield also provided their identification. Dkt. 1–1 at 3. Having found nothing warranting further action, Wright granted the three men permission to move to the front porch. Compl. ¶¶ 20, 51.

According to Wright's affidavit, Boatwright "neglect[ed] to pick up [a] red jacket that was next to him" when the men got up to move. Compl. ¶ 51; Dkt. 1–1 at 3. Wright claims he then told the group that they had left the jacket behind, but "[t]he three collectively denied ownership of the jacket." Dkt. 1–1 at 3. A bottle of Hennessy (a cognac) was apparently protruding from one of the pockets of the jacket, and, according to Wright, he told the three men that he would keep it if none of the men claimed the jacket. Id. At that point, according to Wright's affidavit, Crossland responded, "yeah man, it's my jacket[;] I got it." Id. The affidavit adds, however, that Wright "found this to be strange because [Crossland] was already wearing a jacket and ... Boatwright was the only individual in the group to not have a jacket on." Id. Wright, accordingly, told Boatwright to sit back down. Id. Wright then searched the red jacket and found a handgun. Id. at 3–4. Wright called for backup after finding the gun, and five more officers arrived at the scene. Id. at 4. They placed all three men under arrest for carrying a pistol and possessing an open container of alcohol. Id. This latter charge was based on the officers' belief that the liquid in the styrofoam cup smelled like Hennessy.4 Crutchfield was also charged with "Possession of Other in reference to the synthetic marijuana." Id.

The complaint tells a different story than the affidavit, and it is that story that is controlling for purposes of the pending motion to dismiss. See Hishon , 467 U.S. at 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229. Instead of Wright threatening to keep the bottle of Hennessy, the complaint alleges that Wright "threatened to smash the glass alcohol bottle on the steps of the property if the men did not take the jacket." Compl ¶ 51. And instead of Crossland saying "it's my jacket," the complaint alleges that Crossland merely responded to Wright's demand that someone take the jacket to avoid Wright's threat to break the bottle on Crossland's walkway. Id. Plaintiffs agree in their complaint that Wright then searched the red jacket and found the handgun. Id.

Overhearing the commotion outside, seventy-one year-old Ella Lane emerged from the house and took pictures of the officers as they searched and then arrested the

211 F.Supp.3d 160

three men, including her grandson. Compl. ¶ 52. After placing the men under...

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