Lane v. Moore
| Decision Date | 26 February 1890 |
| Citation | 151 Mass. 87,23 N.E. 828 |
| Parties | LANE v. MOORE. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
W.A. Pew, Jr., and E.T. Burley, for plaintiff.
H.F Hurlburt and Wm. S. Knox, for defendant.
The only question argued is as to the competency of the declarations made by the plaintiff's intestate after the time of the alleged gift to the defendant. Where the mental condition of a person at a particular time is in issue, his appearance, conduct, acts, and declarations, after as well as before the time in question, have been held admissible in evidence, if sufficiently near in point of time, and if they appear to have any tendency to show what that mental condition was. The question has usually arisen in cases involving the validity of wills; but the principle is the same where the validity of a gift is questioned and where responsibility for crime is to be determined. Shailer v. Bumstead, 99 Mass. 112, 122, 123; May v. Bradlee, 127 Mass. 414, 420; Lewis v. Mason, 109 Mass. 169; Potter v. Baldwin, 133 Mass. 427, 429; Whitney v. Wheeler, 116 Mass. 490; Com. v. Pomeroy, 117 Mass. 143, 148; Com. v. Damon, 136 Mass. 441, 448. So, where the question was whether a testator, by canceling a will, intended to revive a former will, it was considered that his subsequent declarations were competent for the purpose of showing what his intention was. Pickens v. Davis, 134 Mass. 252, 257, 258, and cases there cited. In all such cases the evidence is received merely for the purpose of throwing light upon the state of mind of the person at the time in question, and not as tending to establish the truth of any facts which may have been stated by him.
There are certain proper limitations to the admissibility of such evidence. One is that the matters testified of should be sufficiently near in point of time so that the testimony may be of value in determining the question which is directly in issue. Another proper limitation is that the testimony should appear to have some natural bearing upon the mental condition of the person, or his intention, at the particular time which is immediately involved in the issue. It is contended by the defendant that some portion of the testimony which was admitted against his objection failed to conform to the letter of the requirements above mentioned, and that the judge erred in allowing it to go to the jury. Ordinarily questions of this character must, in the first instance, be determined by the presiding judge as questions of fact; and, if his determination is in favor of admitting the testimony, it then goes to the jury, for them to decide as to its weight. For example, the judge will determine whether the time is so remote, or whether the circumstances have so changed, that declarations then made would not be deemed satisfactory evidence tending to show the person's condition at the earlier period. Evidence was excluded for this reason in Davis v. Davis, 123 Mass. 590, 598, and in White v. Graves, 107 Mass. 325. Where, in determining a preliminary question of this description, there is no erroneous application of any principle of law, it is difficult for us, upon a bill of exceptions which merely presents questions of law, to reconsider and reverse the decision. The matter necessarily rests chiefly in the discretion of the presiding judge. Usually the question is not strictly a legal one. The judge determines chiefly as a question of fact, whether, under all the...
To continue reading
Request your trial