Lane v. Sources
| Decision Date | 13 December 2010 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:10-cv-389 |
| Parties | William L. Lane, Plaintiff, v. Wexford Health Sources, (Contreator), et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
This matter is before the Court on the motion of defendants Wexford Health Sources, Inc., and Pamela Redden, M.D., for summary judgment. In addition, plaintiff William L. Lane has filed a memorandum of law in support of his motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. For the following reasons, the Court will recommend that the motion for summary judgment (#21) be granted and the motion for TRO and preliminary injunction (#31) be denied.
Mr. Lane, an Ohio prisoner, filed this civil rights action seeking unspecified relief against defendants Wexford Health Sources, Dr. Pamela Redden, and Ms. Sawyer for their alleged deliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment. Mr. Lane alleges in his complaint that Wexford is a private contractor providing medical care for inmates at the Noble Correctional Institution where he was confined at all relevant times. Dr. Redden is an employee of Wexford.
Mr. Lane states that he has experienced increased discomfort over the years stemming from various ailments involving his left leg. He has arthritis in his lower knee and his left leg isshorter than his right. He also has a bullet in his leg which pushes against the bone. He is unable to participate in sports and must wear special shoes. He has problems lifting objects and walking up stairs. He cannot walk in the cold. Mr. Lane maintains that his disabilities are permanent and are reflected in his medical file.
The complaint further alleges that Dr. Redden knew that his medical conditions made going up and down stairs painful, but despite that knowledge he was denied a first-floor dorm and moved to a prison dorm with steep steps. On December 31, 2009, he injured himself carrying one end of a locker box up the stairs. Mr. Lane reports that he was again moved up the stairs on February 18, 2010, at 10:30 a.m. He injured himself a second time trying to carry the locker box. On both occasions, an officer completed an inmate accident report.
Mr. Lane claims that he sought medical treatment on February 18, 2010, but was refused such treatment for more than two weeks. He asserts that Ms. Sawyer, the Health Care Administrator at NCI, knew of his problems, but did nothing. On March 9, 2010, Dr. Murray Thomas, who is not a defendant in this case, gave him a low-range dorm assignment and a cane based on his disabilities.
Summary judgment is not a substitute for a trial when facts material to the Court's ultimate resolution of the case are in dispute. It may be rendered only when appropriate evidentiary materials, as described in Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), demonstrate the absence of a material factual dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc., 368 U.S. 464 (1962). The moving party bears the burden of demonstratingthat no material facts are in dispute, and the evidence submitted must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970). Additionally, the Court must draw all reasonable inferences from that evidence in favor of the nonmoving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654 (1962). The nonmoving party does have the burden, however, after completion of sufficient discovery, to submit evidence in support of any material element of a claim or defense on which that party would bear the burden of proof at trial, even if the moving party has not submitted evidence to negate the existence of that material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). Of course, since "a party seeking summary judgment... bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, " Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, the responding party is only required to respond to those issues clearly identified by the moving party as being subject to the motion. It is with these standards in mind that the instant motion must be decided.
To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner must show that he or she has a serious medical condition and that the defendants displayed a deliberate indifference to his or her health. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991). In Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 839 (1994), the Court adopted "subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law" as the appropriate definition for deliberate indifference. It held that "a prison official cannot be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of anddisregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety...." Id. at 837. Officials must be aware of facts from which they could conclude that a substantial risk exists and must actually draw that conclusion. Id. Prison officials who know of a substantial risk to the health or safety of an inmate are free from liability if "they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted." Id. at 844.
Because an Eighth Amendment medical claim must be premised on deliberate indifference, mere negligence by a prison doctor or prison official with respect to medical diagnosis or treatment is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. §1983. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; see also Brooks v. Celeste, 39 F.3d 125 (6th Cir. 1994).
Wexford Health Sources and Dr. Redden first argue that Mr. Lane's Eighth Amendment medical claim must fail because he cannot establish a prima facie case of medical malpractice on their part. They submit that the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has twice held that a plaintiff's failure to establish a claim of medical malpractice is necessarily fatal to a claim of deliberate indifference based upon the same medical care. The two cases which these defendants cite for this proposition are, however, unreported district court opinions, not appellate decisions. See Simon v. Miami County Incarceration Facility, No. 3:05-CV-191, 2006 WL 1401645 (S.D. Ohio May 12, 2006); Stanley v. Wilson County, No. 3:03-0284, 2007 WL 2471693 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 24, 2007). As such, the decisions are not binding on this Court, and in any event, it is not necessary to decide this legal issue because Mr. Lane's claim fails for other reasons.
In addition to their first proposition, Wexford Health Sources and Dr. Redden contend that "an inmate who complains that delay in medical treatment rose to a constitutional violation must place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of the delay in medical treatment to succeed." Napier v. Madison County, Ky., 238 F.3d 739, 742 (6th Cir. 2001)(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Because Mr. Lane has not placed any verifying medical evidence in the record, the defendants maintain that he cannot establish the objective component of an Eighth Amendment that "the alleged deprivation is sufficiently serious." Id. There are exceptions to this requirement, however. As the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently clarified, where the serious need for medical care would be obvious even to a layman, a plaintiff need not present verifying medical evidence. Blackmore v. Kalamazoo County, 390 F.3d 890, 899-900 (6th Cir. 2004). Again, this is an issue which need not be resolved here.
Finally, Wexford Health Sources and Dr. Redden argue that Mr. Lane cannot satisfy the subjective component of his Eighth Amendment claim. To prevail on this type of claim, a plaintiff must show that a defendant actually knew of a serious risk to the inmate's health and consciously disregarded that risk. Loggins v. Franklin County, 218 Fed.Appx. 466, 472 (6th Cir. 2007). Such indifference is tantamount to an intent to punish. Id. The defendants maintain that Mr. Lane cannot establish, and does not even allege, that they bore him any ill will, hatred, or intent to punish. They also contend that Mr. Lane has offered no evidence that their actions or omissions were the proximate cause of his injuries. They posit that the Affidavit of Andrew Eddy, M.D. is the sole evidence on this issue and that Dr. Eddy concluded, based on his education, experience, and training as a physician and based on his review of plaintiff's medical records, that the care and treatment provided by Wexford Medical Sources and its physicians did not cause or contribute to any injury to Mr. Lane.
In response to the defendants' motion, Mr. Lane merely states that there are genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment and that he has not failed to produce expert testimony to support his claim of deliberate indifference. He also asserts that he is able to make out a prima facie case of medical malpractice and that he has evidence to establish both the subjective component of his claim and the element of causation. Finally, Mr. Lane attacks the competency and credibility of Dr. Eddy as an expert witness on the grounds that he is a physician, not a bone specialist, and that he is an employee of Wexford Health Sources.
Mr. Lane bears the burden of proof regarding his Eighth Amendment claim. Consequently, Wexford Health Sources and Dr. Redden can meet their burden of...
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