Lane v. Travelers Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn.

• Decision Date: 04 August 1941
• Docket Number: 45454.
• Citation: 299 N.W. 553,230 Iowa 973
• Parties: LANE et al. v. TRAVELERS INS. CO. OF HARTFORD, CONN., et al.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

299 N.W. 553

230 Iowa 973

LANE et al. v. TRAVELERS INS. CO. OF HARTFORD, CONN., et al.

No. 45454.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

August 4, 1941

Appeal from District Court, Crawford County; R. L. McCord, Judge.

Suit in equity to establish interests in land as contingent remaindermen. The trial court held that the interests of the adult plaintiffs were barred by the statute of limitations but established the interests of the two minors. The defendant, Travelers Insurance Company, appeals.

Reversed.

William P. Welch, of Logan, Eugene O'Sullivan, of Omaha Neb., and J. H. O'Connor, of Vail, for plaintiffs-appellees.

Carroll O. Switzer, of Des Moines, and Floyd E. Page, of Denison, for appellant.

GARFIELD, Justice.

Patrick Lane, through the will of his father, Edmund Lane, acquired a life estate in the 160 acre farm in controversy with the right to mortgage it for not more than $2,400. What is conceded to be a contingent remainder was devised to the legal heirs of Patrick at the time of his death. The plaintiffs are the five daughters and one son of the life tenant, two of whom were still minors when this suit was started.

In 1896, one year after his father's death, Patrick mortgaged the land for $2,400. This mortgage was paid off and satisfied in 1917. In 1906, Patrick mortgaged this and other land for $6,775. Foreclosure of this mortgage was instituted and the land went to sheriff's deed in 1910. The grantee of the sheriff's deed, a few days after acquiring the same, conveyed the land to one Nora Kinney who, in 1913, quitclaimed to Margaret Lane, wife of Patrick, the life tenant.

In January, 1923, an action to quiet title was instituted in the name of Margaret Lane, naming as defendants her husband, Patrick, and her six children (plaintiffs in the present suit). The trial court, in the present suit, found that notice of the title quieting action was served upon all defendants to that action. A guardian ad litem was appointed in the 1923 suit, who filed answer alleging, among other matters, that Patrick Lane never mortgaged the real estate for $2,400, but did mortgage it for $6,775. On February 10, 1923, a decree was entered quieting the title in Margaret Lane. The decree appears to have been largely based on the false allegation in the answer of the guardian ad litem that no mortgage for $2,400 covering this land had been executed; that therefore the $6,775 mortgage was valid at least to the extent of $2,400, and that since it covered other land and no attempt at redemption from the foreclosure sale had been made, title should be quieted in Margaret.

In April, 1926, Margaret and her husband, Patrick, mortgaged the 160 acres to defendant-appellant, Travelers Life Insurance Co., for $12,000. This mortgage was foreclosed and a sheriff's deed issued to appellant on February 3, 1938, when it took possession. The amount of the debt when this deed issued was approximately $16,000.

On the same day the sheriff's deed was issued to appellant, this suit was instituted. The trial court found that plaintiffs living at the time of the death of Patrick Lane would be entitled to the real estate, unless they had been divested of their rights by the title quieting decree of February 10, 1923. We quote from the decision of the trial court: " Plaintiffs claim that such decree is voidable because the proceedings were fraudulent. The guardian ad litem in that case said in his answer, among other things, that Patrick M. Lane never gave the $2400 mortgage which he was authorized to give. The record shows that he did give such a mortgage. The decree quieting title appears to have been largely based upon the thought that such mortgage had not been given. Even a cursory examination of the record would have disclosed the fact that such mortgage had been given. This allegation in the answer of the guardian ad litem constituted a constructive fraud entitling the wards on timely application to have the decree set aside. The four adult plaintiffs, however, have not made timely application. They have slept on their rights while the statute has run and no relief can be given them. The two minor plaintiffs are in a different situation. The statute has not run against them. They are entitled to have their interest established as prayed, contingent, of course, upon their surviving Patrick M. Lane."

The principal contention urged upon us by appellant is that the rights of the two minor plaintiffs are barred by Code section 11024, which, so far as material, reads as follows:

" No action based upon any claim arising or existing prior to January 1, 1920, shall be maintained, * * * in any court to recover any real estate * * * or to recover or establish any interest therein or claim thereto, * * * against the holder of the record title * * * in possession, when such holder of the record title and his grantors * * * are shown by the record to have held chain of title * * * since January 1, 1920, unless such claimant, by himself, or by his attorney or agent, or if he be a minor or under legal disability, by his guardian, trustee, or either parent shall within one year from and after July 4, 1931, file in the office of the recorder of deeds * * * a statement in writing, * * * definitely describing the real estate involved, the nature and extent of the right or interest claimed, and stating the facts upon which the same is based. * * *

Any person who holds title * * * under any * * * sheriff's deed, shall be deemed to hold chain of title the same as though holding by direct conveyance."

It was stipulated that Patrick and Margaret Lane, together with their children who were living in the home, occupied the land in question for twenty years up to March 1, 1936, when a tenant occupied it until appellant acquired sheriff's deed on February 3, 1938. It is conceded that no written statement contemplated by the above statute was ever filed on plaintiffs' behalf.

The general statute of limitations fixes ten years as the time for bringing actions to recover real property and to set aside a decree quieting title. Section 11007 (Pars. 6 and 8). Section 11015 extends the time in favor of minors and insane persons until one year after the termination of such disability. Accordingly, the rights of the...