Lane v. Wainwright

• Docket Number: 1:20-CV-00453-DCN
• Decision Date: 20 January 2022
• Parties: DEMARIO LANE, Plaintiff, v. WARDEN LYNEAL WAINWRIGHT, Defendant,
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio

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DEMARIO LANE, Plaintiff, v. WARDEN LYNEAL WAINWRIGHT, Defendant,

No. 1:20-CV-00453-DCN

United States District Court, N.D. Ohio

January 20, 2022

DONALD C. NUGENT UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

ORDER

CARMEN E. HENDERSON U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I. Introduction

Petitioner Demario Lane, seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C § 2254. Lane is an Ohio inmate currently serving a twenty-year sentence for involuntary manslaughter and aggravated robbery. Lane asserts one ground for relief. (ECF No. 1). This matter was referred to me under Local Rule 72.2 to prepare a report and recommendation on Lane's petition and other case-dispositive motions. Because Lane's claim is barred by the statute of limitations, I recommend that the Court dismiss his petition and not grant him a certificate of appealability.

II. Relevant State Procedural History

A. Indictment

On January 30, 2013, Lane was indicted for:

Two counts of Aggravated Robbery in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 2911.01(A)(1), a first-degree felony, with one -year and three-year firearm specifications.

One count of Aggravated Robbery in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 2911.01(A)(3), a first-degree felony, with one-year and three-y ear firearm specifications.

One count of Kidnapping in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 2905.01(A)(2), a first-degree felony, with one-year and three-y ear firearm specifications.

Two counts of Having Weapons Under Disability in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 2923.13(A)(2), a third-degree felony.

One count of Aggravated Murder in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 2903.01(A), with one-year and three-year firearm specifications.

One count of Aggravated Murder in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 2903.01(B), with one-year and three-year firearm specifications.

One count of Murder in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 2903.02(A), with one-year and three-year firearm specifications.

Two counts of Murder in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 2903.02(B), with one-year and three-year firearm specifications.

One count of Attempted Murder in violation of Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2923.02, 2923.02(A), a first-degree felony, with one-year and three-year firearm specifications.

One count of Felonious Assault in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 2903.11(A)(1), a second-degree felony, with one-year and three-year firearm specifications.

Two counts of Felonious Assault in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 2903.11(A)(2), a second-degree felony, with one-year and three-year firearm specifications.

(ECF No. 10-1, PageID #: 69-92).

B. Guilty Plea

On July 11, 2013, Lane pled guilty to:

One count of Aggravated Robbery in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 2911.01(A)(1), with a three-year firearm specification

One count of Involuntary Manslaughter in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 2903.04(A), with a one-year firearm specification

(ECF No. 10-1, PageID #: 94). On December 18, 2013, the trial court sentenced Lane to a total of twenty years imprisonment and five years of post-release control supervision. (ECF No. 10-1, PageID #: 95).

C. Delayed Direct Appeal

Nearly six years later, on August 19, 2019, Lane filed a pro se notice of appeal. (ECF No. 10-1, PageID #: 86). He filed a motion for leave to file a delayed appeal. (ECF No. 10-1, PageID #: 105). Lane alleged that he did not file a timely appeal because:

Defendant-Appellant states under oath that before and after he accepted the plea agreement, he was “never” advised by his attorney, [n]either was he advised by the judge that he could in fact appeal the sentence after pleading guilty as stated in Crim.R. 3 2(B)(2) an d Crim.R. 3 2(B)(3). The Defendant-Appellant states that he was sentenced contrary to law as it speaks in R.C. 2941.25(A) and he was never allowed allocution pursuant to Crim.R. 32(A)(1). Defendant-Appellant states under oath that he was advised of these rights on 8/12/19 by Jail-House Litigants while being confined at the Marion Correctional Institution. Therefore, by the Defendant-Appellant being deprived of such, this also violates his Constitutional Rights as explained in the 14th Amendment section (1) - due process.

(ECF No. 10-1, PageID #: 108). On September 25, 2019, the Eighth District Court of Appeals of Ohio summarily denied Lane's motion for leave to file delayed appeal. (ECF No. 10-1, PageID #: 121).

D. Appeal to Ohio Supreme Court

On October 8, 2019, Lane filed a notice of appeal in the Ohio Supreme Court. (ECF No. 10-1, PageID #: 125). Lane's memorandum in support of jurisdiction raised the following propositions of law:

I. The trial court denied the Appellant his Constitutional Right of Allocation per Crim. R. 32(A)(1) II. The Appellant's sentence conform [sic] with the provisions of law as it speaks in R.C. 2941.25(A)

III. The trial court nor defendant's appointed attorney advised defendant of his right to appeal after entering a guilty plea which violates Crim. R. 32(B)(2) and (B)(3)

IV. The Defendant-Appellant's sentence in CR-13-571165-A violates the 14th Amendment Section (1) - Due Process Clause

(ECF No. 10-1, PageID #: 131-32). On January 21, 2020, the Supreme Court of Ohio declined to accept jurisdiction of the appeal pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. 7.08(B)(4). (ECF No. 10-1, PageID #: 136).

III. Federal Habeas Corpus Proceedings

On February 19, 2020, Lane petitioned pro se that this Court issue a writ of habeas corpus. (ECF No. 1). Lane asserted one ground for relief:

Ground One: Crim. R. 32(A) Allocution, Petitioner was told to shut up

Supporting Facts: Petitioner has a right under the 14th Amend. to allocutions before sentencing. Petitioner was not advised of his right to appeal after entering a guilty plea, Petitioner's sentence fails R.C. 2941.25(A)

(ECF No. 1). Respondent filed the return of writ on August 7, 2020. (ECF No. 10). Lane filed a traverse on October 13, 2020. (ECF No. 13).

IV. Legal Standard

A. Jurisdiction

District courts may entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus “on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). A state prisoner may file a § 2254 petition in the “district court for the district wherein such person is in custody or in the district court for the district within which the State court was held which convicted and sentenced him.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d). The Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas sentenced Lane, and Cuyahoga County is within this Court's geographic jurisdiction. Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction over Lane's § 2254 petition.

B. Cognizable Federal Claim

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), a state prisoner may challenge his custody “only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” A petitioner's claim is not cognizable on habeas review if it “presents no federal issue at all. ”Bates v. McCaughtry, 934 F.2d 99, 101 (7th Cir. 1991). Thus, “errors in application of state law . . . are usually not cognizable in federal habeas corpus.” Bey v. Bagley, 500 F.3d 514, 519 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Walker v. Engle, 703 F.2d 959, 962 (6th Cir. 1983)); see also Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (“[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions.”). A federal habeas court does not function as an additional state appellate court; it does not review state courts' decisions on state law or procedure. Allen v. Morris, 845 F.2d 610, 614 (6th Cir. 1988) (citing Oviedo v. Jago, 809 F.2d 326, 328 (6th Cir. 1987)). Instead, “federal courts must defer to a state court's interpretation of its own rules of evidence and procedure” in considering a habeas petition. Id. (quoting Machin v. Wainwright, 758 F.2d 1431, 1433 (11th Cir. 1985)). Moreover, “the doctrine of exhaustion requires that a claim be presented to the state courts under the same theory in which it is later presented in federal court.” Wong v. Money, 142 F.3d 313, 322 (6th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).

C. AEDPA Standard of Review

28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (“AEDPA”), provides in relevant part:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim - (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

To determine whether relief should be granted, the Court must use the “look-through” methodology and look to the “last explained state-court judgment” on the petitioner's federal claim. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991) (“The essence of unexplained orders is that they say nothing. We think that a presumption which gives them no effect-which simply ‘looks through' them to the last reasoned decision-most nearly reflects the role they are ordinarily intended to play.”); Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S.Ct. 1188, 1193 (2018) (“We conclude that federal habeas law employs a ‘look through' presumption.”).

“A decision is ‘contrary to' clearly established federal law when ‘the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.'” Otte v Houk, 654 F.3d 594, 599 (6th Cir. 2011) (alterations in original) (quoting Williams v....