Lane v. Wal-Mart Stores East, Inc., CIV. CCB-99-763.

• Decision Date: 01 September 1999
• Docket Number: No. CIV. CCB-99-763.,CIV. CCB-99-763.
• Citation: 69 F.Supp.2d 749
• Parties: Renee LANE v. WAL-MART STORES EAST, INC.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

Page 749

69 F.Supp.2d 749

Renee LANE v. WAL-MART STORES EAST, INC.

No. CIV. CCB-99-763.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

September 1, 1999.

W. Robert Donovan, Jr., Ashcraft & Gerel, Baltimore, MD, for Plaintiff.

Todd Horn, Venable, Baetjer & Howard, LLP, Whitney Head, Litigation Department, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Bentonville, AR, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

BLAKE, District Judge.

Renee Lane has sued defendant Wal-Mart Stores East, Inc. ("Wal-Mart"), alleging discrimination based on an actual disability, discrimination based on a perceived disability, and failure to provide training in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Wal-Mart has filed a motion to dismiss. Because both parties have submitted materials outside the pleadings, the motion will be treated as one for summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). No hearing is deemed necessary. See Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons stated below, Wal-Mart's motion to dismiss will be denied.

BACKGROUND

As this is being treated as a summary judgment motion, the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are as follows. Throughout her life, Renee Lane has suffered from specific learning disabilities. At age three, she was placed in an Early Childhood Education Program for the development of her cognitive abilities. Thereafter, educators placed Lane in special education classes and developed an Individualized Educational Program to accommodate her learning disability of "Seriously Emotionally Disturbed." Lane finally enrolled in home schooling, and, at the age of 20, was still working towards her high school diploma. Compl. ¶ 11.

In September 1995 Renee Lane applied for a job as a sales associate at a Wal-Mart store located in Glen Burnie, Maryland. Compl. ¶ 12. Lane advised her interviewer, Craig Lowry, that she had a learning disability which affected her ability to comprehend things as quickly as an average person. Lane informed Lowry that she might need instructions repeated to her, and might need to be shown how to do certain tasks. Compl. ¶ 13. Following the interview, Lane was hired as a sales associate. Compl. ¶ 14. Although all employees of Wal-Mart are required to complete a computerized training program shortly after being hired, Lane was never given the opportunity to complete the training. Compl. ¶ 15.

Lane took a leave of absence from Wal-Mart for the first three months of 1996. When she returned in April 1996, Wal-Mart placed her in the Seasonal Department. Compl. ¶¶ 17, 18. Again, Wal-Mart refused to allow Lane to participate in the computer training. Compl. ¶ 19. She received good performance evaluations, however, during this time. Compl. ¶ 20. In January 1997 Wal-Mart fired Lane, stating that her termination was due to lack of work in the department, as the holiday season had ended. Compl. ¶ 21. Within the next two days, however, an associate from another department — than whom Lane was more or equally qualified — filled her position in the Seasonal Department. Compl. ¶¶ 22, 23.

In June and July, 1997, Lane called the EEOC several times to allege that her termination from Wal-Mart was due to her learning disability. Pl.'s Opp'n Ex. 1 ¶ 1 (Aff. of Renee Lane). In response, the EEOC mailed an ADA Information Form to Lane; she completed and returned it to the EEOC on August 1, 1997. Pl.'s Opp'n Ex. 3 (EEOC Mail Log). Later in August, Lane again called the EEOC to check on the status of her complaint. The EEOC official she spoke to assured her that the Commission had received the Information Form, and that the next step for Lane was to be patient. Pl.'s Opp'n Ex. 1 ¶ 3. On November 5, 1997, the EEOC sent a letter to Lane, asking her to come into the office on December 15, 1997, for an interview with an EEOC official. Pl.'s Opp'n Ex. 4. At the December 15, 1997 appointment, Lane filed her Charge of Discrimination. Pl.'s Opp'n Ex. 5.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:

[Summary judgment] shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

A genuine issue of material fact exists if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir.1994). In making this determination, the evidence of the party opposing summary judgment is to be believed and all justifiable inferences drawn in her favor. Halperin v. Abacus Tech. Corp., 128 F.3d 191, 196 (4th Cir.1997) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505). The non-moving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials in her pleading, however, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Allstate Fin. Corp. v. Financorp, Inc., 934 F.2d 55, 58 (4th Cir.1991).

ANALYSIS

I. Untimely EEOC Filing

Wal-Mart alleges that Lane's action should be dismissed as untimely for two reasons: (1) she failed to file an EEOC charge within the statutorily prescribed period and (2) the regulation allowing defective charges to be cured is inapplicable to her situation. While Lane concedes that her sworn charge was not filed within the statutorily prescribed time period, she contends, and this Court agrees, that the EEOC regulation allowing defective charges to be cured is applicable in this situation.

In a deferral state such as Maryland, an EEOC charge must be filed within 300 days of the date of the alleged unlawful employment practice. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)(1994); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Hansa Products, Inc., 844 F.2d 191, 192 n. 3 (4th Cir.1988). This charge must be "in writing under oath or affirmation." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). Additionally, within the Fourth Circuit, filing "a sworn charge of discrimination with the EEOC is a mandatory prerequisite to the validity of the charge." Balazs v. Liebenthal, 32 F.3d 151, 156 (4th Cir.1994).

In this case, both Lane and Wal-Mart agree that Lane did not file a verified complaint within the prescribed time period. See Def. Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 2; Pl.'s Opp'n at 3. The date of the last alleged unlawful employment practice was January 9, 1997, the day Wal-Mart terminated Lane. While Lane submitted an unverified ADA Information Form to the EEOC Baltimore District Office on August 1, 1997, within the 300 day period, she did not file the verified Charge of Discrimination until December 18, 1997, which was 40 days after the November 5, 1997 deadline. Such an untimely filing, however, is not fatal to Lane's case.

Under an EEOC regulation, "a charge may be amended to cure technical defects or omissions, including failure to verify the charge .... Such amendments ... will relate back to the date the charge was first received." 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b) (1988). The Fourth Circuit has upheld the validity of this regulation, holding that "a reasonable construction of the EEOC's regulation would simply allow charges to be verified and to relate back ... so long as the charge is a viable one in the EEOC's files." Balazs, 32 F.3d at 157.

While the Balazs court did not apply the regulation because the plaintiff attempted to amend his charge after a right to sue letter had been issued and the lawsuit had been instituted, the court did recognize the application of the regulation to situations in which the claim was still active with the EEOC when the verification was made.

At least one Maryland district court has applied the regulation. In D'Anna v. M/A-COM, Inc., 903 F.Supp. 889 (D.Md.1995), Judge Legg held that a plaintiff's amendment to his original claim should relate back to the date the first charge was filed because the EEOC file was "open and viable" when the amendment was filed. Id. at 892. In dicta, the Fourth Circuit has also approved of the construction of the regulation similar to that urged here by Lane. See Tinsley v. First Union Nat. Bank, 155 F.3d 435, 439 n. 2 (4th Cir.1998). While finding it unnecessary to apply the regulation because the plaintiff had filed her formal charge within 300 days, the court remarked that in failing to allow a later-filed sworn statement to relate back to the earlier filing of an unverified charge, the district court "inexplicably ignored the applicable EEOC regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b), which explicitly allows such an amendment." Id. The Fourth Circuit went on to characterize the district court's actions as "ignor[ing] the recent conclusion of this Circuit approving the very use of the regulation that Tinsley, joined by the EEOC, urges: allowing her verified claim to amend and relate back to the date her unverified claim was filed." Id. It is therefore clear that the relation back doctrine is accepted in this Circuit; an unverified charge filed within the 300 day filing period can be remedied by the subsequent filing of a verified charge.

Wal-Mart argues, however, that even if the relation back doctrine is recognized in this Circuit, it is inapplicable to this case, because the ADA Information Form filed by Lane does not qualify as a "charge" that can be amended. See Def.'s Reply at 2-3. The relevant EEOC regulation states that "a charge is sufficient when the Commission receives from the person making the charge a written statement sufficiently precise to identify the parties, and to describe generally the action or practices complained of." 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b) (1988). When examining this question, the Eighth Circuit has held that intake questionnaires do not satisfy the statutory requirements of an administrative charge. See, e.g., Shempert v. Harwick Chemical Corp., 151 F.3d 793, 796...