Mayers v. Washington Adventist Hosp., CIV. A. AW-99-3549.

• Decision Date: 27 February 2001
• Docket Number: No. CIV. A. AW-99-3549.,CIV. A. AW-99-3549.
• Citation: 131 F.Supp.2d 743
• Parties: Hala O. MAYERS, Plaintiff, v. WASHINGTON ADVENTIST HOSPITAL et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

131 F.Supp.2d 743

Hala O. MAYERS, Plaintiff, v. WASHINGTON ADVENTIST HOSPITAL et al., Defendants.

No. CIV. A. AW-99-3549.

United States District Court, D. Maryland, Southern Division.

February 27, 2001.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Dennis A. Baird, Carlotta P. Jarvis, Silver Spring, MD, for Plaintiff.

Jeffrey Jules Pargament, Andrew P. Hallowell, Frank Charles Gulin, Piliero, Mazza & Pargament, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WILLIAMS, District Judge.

Plaintiff, Hala Mayers, brings the instant action alleging that her discharge by Washington Adventist Hospital ("Washington Adventist"), Adventist Healthcare, and Fred Morgan (collectively "Defendants") was based upon her race, national origin, and disability in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"), the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (the "ADA"), and the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1324b (the "IRCA") and in breach of an implied employment contract. Currently pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [26-1]. The basic premise of Defendants' motion is that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. The motion has been fully briefed by all parties. No hearing is deemed necessary. See Local Rule 105.6. Upon consideration of the arguments made in support of, and opposition to, the motion, the Court makes the following determinations.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was employed as a reimbursement specialist by Defendants from March 29, 1999 through June 21, 1999 when she was terminated. It is undisputed that regular attendance was an essential function of Plaintiff's employment. At the beginning of her employment, Plaintiff informed her employer that she suffered from asthma and allergies. For the six months prior to her employment, Plaintiff's asthma was under control. She had been off all asthma medications since December 1997. However, her condition can be aggravated by seasonal changes, extreme environmental conditions, and dust. At times, she uses an inhaler and a variety of other medications to alleviate the symptoms of her asthma. (Mayers Dep. at 85) In instances of high levels of heat or pollen, she may also wear a face mask to assist her breathing. (Mayers Dep. at 86)

Plaintiff began her employment on March 29, 1999 and performed without incident. On April 29, 1999, Plaintiff experienced an asthma attack at work. The attack was attributed to the cold air emanating from a vent over her work station. Under doctor's orders, Plaintiff was not to return to work until Saturday, May 1, 1999. She returned to work on the following Tuesday, May 4, 1999. On May 10, 1999, Plaintiff was absent again for reasons unrelated to her asthma. There is some dispute as to whether Plaintiff properly complained as to the location of her work station. Defendants argue that she never complained to Fred Morgan or Ken Harvey, her supervisors, as required by the employee handbook. Plaintiff maintains she complained to John Farley, the Lead Reimbursement Specialist. Mr. Farley denies ever receiving such a request. Nevertheless, Plaintiff's work station was moved away from the vent on May 13, 1999.

From June 7-8, 1999, the air conditioning of the building failed. The equipment failure caused Plaintiff's workplace to become very hot and humid. On June 8, 1999, Plaintiff suffered another asthma attack. Her doctor stated that the attack was caused by the heat and dust. Defendants maintain that the building was adequately maintained by a cleaning service. According to Plaintiff, the office was so dusty that her co-workers vacuumed the workplace themselves. Her doctor advised Plaintiff not to return to work until June 21, 1999. When she returned to work on that day, Fred Morgan terminated her employment for excessive absenteeism. Plaintiff was absent for 20% of her scheduled work days. According to Defendants' employment policy given to Plaintiff, absenteeism in excess of 3% is considered excessive. In November 1999, Plaintiff initiated this instant suit.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment will be granted when no genuine dispute of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Haavistola v. Community Fire Co. of Rising Sun, Inc., 6 F.3d 211, 214 (4th Cir.1993); Etefia v. East Baltimore Comm. Corp., 2 F.Supp.2d 751, 756 (D.Md.1998). The court must "draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, including questions of credibility and of the weight to be accorded to particular evidence." Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 501 U.S. 496, 520, 111 S.Ct. 2419, 115 L.Ed.2d 447 (1991) (citations omitted). Entry of summary judgment is proper, "after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Cray Communications, Inc. v. Novatel Computer Systems, Inc., 33 F.3d 390, 393 (4th Cir.1994).

B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Defendants assert that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies on all of her claims. On June 26, 1999, Plaintiff filed out an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") intake questionnaire for ADA claims. On August 1, 1999, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. The charge only alleged discrimination based upon disability. Plaintiff asserts that these filings are sufficient to satisfy the exhaustion requirement as to all of her discrimination claims.

Title VII and the ADA require civil rights plaintiffs to file timely charges of discrimination before pursuing a private claim in state or federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); Edelman v. Lynchburg College, 228 F.3d 503, 506 (4th Cir.2000). In a deferral state like Maryland, the charge must be filed with the EEOC, or the applicable state or local agency, within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Similarly, the IRCA requires a claimant to file a charge with the Office of Special Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair Employment Practices before pursing a private action against the employer. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(d)(2). A plaintiff's EEOC charge defines the scope of her subsequent right to institute a civil suit. Smith v. First Union Nat. Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 247 (4th Cir.2000). "Only those discrimination claims stated in the initial charge, those reasonably related to the initial charge, and those developed by reasonable investigation of the original complaint may be maintained in a subsequent Title VII law suit." Evans v. Technologies Applications & Service Co., 80 F.3d 954, 963 (4th Cir.1996). Applying these principles, the Court shall consider whether Plaintiff satisfied the exhaustion requirements of the respective statutes.

1. Count I (Discrimination Based on Race) and Count II (Discrimination Based on National Origin)

A review of Plaintiff's EEOC charge reveals that nowhere in the charge did she raise any claims or allegations related to discrimination based upon race or national origin. The charge rather specifically limits its scope to discrimination based upon disability. None of the facts alleged in the charge reasonably relate to claims of discrimination based upon race or national origin nor would such claims be reasonably expected to arise from an EEOC investigation. Accord Williams v. Little Rock Mun. Water Works, 21 F.3d 218, 223 (8th Cir.1994); Harris v. American Protective Services of New York, Inc., 1 F.Supp.2d 191, 195 (W.D.N.Y.1998). There is no evidence that any charge of discrimination upon national origin was filed with the Office of Special Counsel. As a result, Defendants have established that there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to Plaintiff's failure to exhaust her administrative remedies on her allegations of discrimination based upon race or national origin. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Counts I (race) and II (national origin).

2. Count III (Discrimination on the Basis of Disability)

On the ADA claim, it is undisputed that Plaintiff did file a timely charge of discrimination based upon disability. Rather, Defendants maintain that Plaintiff's ADA claim is limited to the specific allegations of misconduct listed in the formal EEOC charge. In the charge, Plaintiff stated that "I believe I was discriminated against because my employer regarded me to have a disability, in violation of the [ADA]." (EEOC Charge of Discrimination dated Aug. 1, 1999) (emphasis added). According to Defendants, this language precludes Plaintiff from asserting that she was discriminated against due to an actual disability or its failure to provide reasonable accommodations.

On the question of the amount of detail required in the charge, the Court finds the general allegation of disability discrimination is insufficient to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. There is, simply, no factual predicate in the EEOC charge to support a reasonable accommodation claim. Plaintiff's EEOC charge succinctly describes the timing and circumstances of her discharge. The charge specifically confines the dates of the alleged discrimination to the day of Plaintiff's termination, setting the earliest and latest dates at June 21, 1999. The charge is completely devoid of any reference to her alleged request for accommodation in May 1999. Under these circumstances, the Court cannot find that the EEOC charge encompassed a claim for failure to make reasonable accommodations. Accord Jones v. Sumser Retirement Village, 209 F.3d 851, 853 (6th Cir.2000); Rankin v. Greater Media, Inc., 28 F .Supp.2d 331, 339-40 (D.Md. 1997...