Lang v. General Ins. Co. of America, 39156
| Decision Date | 10 April 1964 |
| Docket Number | No. 39156,39156 |
| Citation | 268 Minn. 36,127 N.W.2d 541 |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
| Parties | Herbert C. LANG, Appellant, v. GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
Syllabus by the Court
Parties to a contract are free to assigntechnical meanings to the words they employ. Where there has been a meeting of minds in an insurance contract and no ambiguity exists, the courts are required to interpret the language of the parties as they have intended. It is clear from the language of the policy in the instant case that the word 'automobile' was defined in a technical sense as a 'land motor vehicle' and, as such, included a motor scooter.
Altman & Grossman, Minneapolis, for appellant.
Altman & Grossman, Minneapolis, for Paul, for respondent.
Appeal from a declaratory judgment adverse to plaintiff in an action brought by him pursuant to the provisions of Minn.St. c. 555.
The judgment entered adjudged and decreed that a policy of insurance issued to plaintiff by defendant did not cover the operation of a motor scooter at the time and place of the accident involved herein and that defendant is not obligated to defend any action or to pay any judgment that may be entered against plaintiff.
The material facts are as follows: On October 14, 1959, defendant issued its Homeowners Policy No. HO 944334 to plaintiff effective for a 3-year period commencing on that date. The policy covered premises described as 100 Ardmore Drive, Golden Valley, Minnesota, the home of plaintiff, and also covered appurtenant structures, and unscheduled personal property against loss by fire, windstorm, and other named perils. In addition it provided comprehensive personal liability insurance and coverage of medical expenses for injury sustained on the premises or 'caused by the activities of an insured.'
On May 25, 1962, plaintiff was the owner of what has been referred to in the proceedings as a motor scooter. A 1962 model manufactured by Harley-Davidson Motor Company the motor scooter was a two wheel vehicle, operated by a gasoline motor and so constructed that one passenger could ride immediately behind the operator. Plaintiff had made application for a 1962 motor vehicle license for the scooter and received license plates.
On May 25, 1962, Stephen J. Lang, plaintiff's son, then 14 years of age and a resident of plaintiff's household, was operating the motor scooter with one Tim Dahl as a passenger. While Stephen was crossing Highway No. 55 at its intersection with Ardmore Drive, about 2 blocks from plaintiff's home, the motor scooter collided with another vehicle. Tim was seriously injured and due notice of the accident was given to defendant. In answer thereto defendant informed plaintiff that the policy would not cover claims arising out of the accident. The declaratory-judgment action followed. 1
The policy in question defined 'Insured' as--
'* * * (1) the Named Insured, and (2) if residents of his household, his spouse, * * * and any other person under the age of 21 in the care of an Insured, * * *.'
An endorsement attached to the policy contained a provision with respect to personal liability coverage (coverage 'E') under which defendant agreed:
'To pay on behalf of the Insured all sums which the Insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury, * * * including death at any time resulting therefrom, sustained by any person, and as damages because of injury to or destruction of property, including the loss of use thereof.'
With respect to medical payments (coverage 'F'), defendant agreed:
'To pay all reasonable expenses incurred within one year from the date of accident for necessary medical, surgical, X-ray and dental services * * * to or for each person who sustains bodily injury * * * caused by accident,
'(a) while on the premises with the permission of an Insured, or
'(b) while elsewhere if such injury * * * (1) arises out of the premises or a condition in the ways immediately adjoining, (2) is caused by the activities of an Insured, * * *.'
The endorsement also provided that with respect to such insurance as was afforded by coverage 'E' the company would defend any suit.
The endorsement defined 'automobile' as--
'* * * a land motor vehicle, trailer or semitrailer other than crawler or farm-type tractors, farm implements and, If not subject to motor vehicle registration, any equipment which is designed for use principally off public roads.' (Italics supplied.)
Under the 'Special Exclusions' in the endorsement, the following language appeared:
'Section II of this Policy Does Not Apply:
'(b) under Coverages E. and F, to the ownership, maintenance, operation, use, loading or unloading of (1) automobiles while away from the premises or the ways immediately adjoining * * *.'
It is conceded that the collision did not occur on the premises or the ways immediately adjoining them.
The trial court found that the motor scooter involved in the accident is an automobile within the definition contained in the policy and that the policy did not cover the operation of the motor scooter at the time and place at which the accident occurred. A memorandum accompanying its order for judgment stated:
This appeal presents but a single issue, i.e., whether liability insurance is provided for bodily injury resulting from the use of a motor scooter under the policy.
The Minnesota law with respect to the obligation to defend and with respect to the construction of insurance policies has been clearly set forth by this court in the recent case of Bobich v. Oja, 258 Minn. 287, 293, 104 N.W.2d 19, 24, as follows:
'1. In the first place, an insurer, under an agreement to defend such as we have...
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