Lang v. Jones
| Decision Date | 26 July 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. C--698,C--698 |
| Citation | 191 Colo. 313,552 P.2d 497 |
| Parties | Anna S. LANG et al., Petitioners, v. Edward J. JONES and Shirley J. Jones, Respondents. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Fred R. Rehmer, Aurora, for petitioners.
Myrick & Newton, P.C., Barrie G. Sullivan, II, Denver, for respondents.
This case involves a dispute over the right of the petitioners to use a road, referred to as Trail B, which passes through the respondents' property located in the mountains of Jefferson County. The trial court ruled that the respondents had the legal right to block public use of Trail B by placing a locked gate across the road. Petitioners Delio and Schmiedbauer were excepted from the ruling. The court ordered that they be given keys to the locked gate and the right to use the road. An appeal was perfected to the court of appeals, which affirmed the trial court. We granted certiorari to review Lang v. Jones, Colo.App., 535 P.2d 242 (1975). We affirm.
The respondents (Joneses) own two five-acre parcels of land, located at the intersection of Trail B and Richmond Hill
Road several miles south of U.S. Highway 285 in Jefferson County. An approximate unscaled depiction of the area is set forth below:
NOTE: OPINION CONTAINS TABLE OR OTHER DATA THAT IS NOT VIEWABLE
Petitioners own property in the vicinity of respondents' two tracts of land. They seek to open up Trail B for public use so that the public can pass southeasterly through respondents' land thence north to U.S. 285 via Richmond Hill Road and also northwesterly through respondents' land to U.S. 285 via Elk Creek Road.
The evidence showed that from the 1920's to 1968 or 1969 there was an Unlocked gate across Trail B at a point slightly west of the respondents' land. In 1968 or 1969 the gate was removed.
This present dispute began several years ago when the respondents constructed a fence on both sides of Trail B, as it passed through their property. The fence restricted the width of the road to twelve feet. Subsequently, they placed a locked gate at the point where Trail B left their parcel number two to continue in a northwesterly direction to connect with Elk Creek Road.
Petitioners assert two grounds of appeal. First, they claim that Trail B is a public road by reason of adverse use. C.R.S.1963, 120--1--1(3). Second, they claim that they have a legal right to use Trail B by virtue of a reservation in a prior deed.
Petitioners rely on C.R.S.1963, 120--1--1(3) 1 to support their claim that Trail B is a public road by reason of adverse use. That section provides:
'The following are hereby declared to be public highways:
'(3) All roads over private lands that have been used adversely without interruption or objection on the part of the owners of such lands for twenty consecutive years.
. . ..'
The trial court found that '. . . for substantial periods of time, during a fifty year period, trail B was blocked by a gate' which was not locked. The court determined that the gate precluded the use of the trail from ripening into prescriptive rights and, therefore, concluded that Trail B was not a public road under the statute.
The trial court accurately stated the applicable law. We have held that the use of a road is not adverse where free travel along the road is obstructed by gates across the road, even though they are not locked. People ex rel. Mayer v. San Luis Valley Land & Cattle Co., 90 Colo. 23, 5 P.2d 873 (1931). The use of a road under such conditions is permissive.
There was sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court's findings of fact regarding the gate, and, therefore, they will not be disturbed upon review. Linley v. Hanson, 173 Colo. 239, 477 P.2d 453 (1970); Whatley v. Wood, 157 Colo. 552, 404 P.2d 537 (1965).
In 1927, Albert Carr Brown conveyed to John A. Brown a parcel of land, with the following reservation:
'Right of way for road through this said property is granted at all times to Albert Carr Brown (seller), his heirs and assigns forever.'
Petitioners assert that they are assignees of Albert Carr Brown and that respondents are assignees of John A. Brown. Therefore, petitioners claim that the benefit of the reservation clause is attached to their land and that they have the right to use Trail B under this reservation.
The real question before the trial court was whether the 'ro...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
McIntyre v. BOARD OF COUNTY COM'RS, 02SC803.
...the use permissive only, no public prescriptive right was established. Id. at 141-42, 365 P.2d at 250. Similarly, in Lang v. Jones, 191 Colo. 313, 552 P.2d 497 (1976), the road was consistently blocked by a gate, although the gate was not locked. Id. at 315, 552 P.2d at 499. The public's ac......
-
Board of County Com'rs of Saguache County v. Flickinger
...placement of a gate to obstruct free travel along a road will ordinarily render public use of the road permissive only, Lang v. Jones, 191 Colo. 313, 552 P.2d 497 (1976); Martino, 148 Colo. 136, 365 P.2d 247; People ex rel. Mayer, 90 Colo. 23, 5 P.2d 873, the placement of the gate does not ......
-
Brown v. Faatz
...is not deemed adverse where free travel along the road is obstructed by a gate, even if the gate is not locked. Lang v. Jones, 191 Colo. 313, 315, 552 P.2d 497, 499 (1976); Martino v. Fleenor, 148 Colo. 136, 141-42, 365 P.2d 247, 250 (1961); People ex rel. Mayer v. San Luis Valley Land & Ca......
-
Board of County Com'rs of Delta County v. Ogburn
...period was not conclusive that the public's use was of a permissive nature or that it lacked the necessary continuity. See Lang v. Jones, Colo. 552 P.2d 497 (1976); Sprague v. Stead, 56 Colo. 538, 139 P. 544 (1914). See generally Annot., 52 A.L.R.3d 9 Thus, although the nature of the public......