Langdeau v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 26 February 1907 |
| Citation | 194 Mass. 56,80 N.E. 452 |
| Parties | LANGDEAU v. JOHN HANCOCK MUT. LIFE INS. CO. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
John F. Malley and Daniel J. O'Connor, for plaintiff.
Leary & Beattie, for defendant.
The answer among other defenses specifically alleged that under the application the representations of the insured that he never used intoxicating liquors, or, if so, that he never used them to excess, and that he had not been rejected or 'postponed' by any other insurance company, or society, were false, and being either fraudulently made or material to the risk avoided the policy. Rev. Laws, c. 173, § 27. Kidder v. Supreme Commandery Order of the Golden Cross, 192 Mass. 326, 78 N.E. 469. The admissibility of these representations depends upon the correctness of the ruling, that the proposal for insurance formed no part of the application, a copy of which under Rev. Laws, c. 118, § 73 unless attached to the policy cannot be considered as forming a part of the policy or introduced in evidence. Considine v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 165 Mass. 462, 43 N.E. 201; Johnson v. Mutual Life Insurance Co., 180 Mass. 407, 408, 62 N.E. 733, 63 L. R. A. 833. This requirement was not a rule either of construction or of evidence at common law, but 'the object of the statute is to prevent companies from holding persons bound by a contract in writing of which they have no copy.' Holden v Prudential Ins. Co., 191 Mass. 153, 157, 77 N.E. 309. In the policy furnished, which purported to have attached a correct copy of the application, the proposal was wholly omitted, and only the questions and answers attested by the medical examiner, and the statement of the applicant that these representations and answers should form the basis and become a part of the contract of insurance were annexed. While an oral contract for insurance is valid, it is universally customary to embody the terms of the contract in the policy, which usually does not recite the conditions upon which it is issued, but incorporates them by a general reference to a separate paper, usually termed either the declarations or proposal, or application of the party desiring insurance. Holmes v. Charlestown Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 10 Metc. 211, 214, 43 Am. Dec. 428. When completed such negotiations are supposed to include all the essential terms of the proposed contract, of which they form a part. Scammell v. China Mutual Insurance Co., 164 Mass. 341, 342, 41 N.E. 649, 49 Am. St. Rep. 462. And although the general designation by which they are incorporated may vary accordingly to the practice adopted by different companies, yet to ascertain the material provisions of the contract the inquiry is the same, namely; what did the insured offer to which reference is made, and how far has this offer been accepted by the company? Daniels v. Hudson River Fire Ins. Co., 12 Cush. 423, 59 Am. Dec. 192; Miles v. Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 3 Gray, 580; Harris v. North American Ins. Co., 190 Mass. 361, 77 N.E. 493, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1137. Omitting all reference to memoranda which neither party claims to be material, these preliminary negotiations are found on the first and second pages of a paper referred to in the exceptions as Exhibit J. The first page purports to be a proposal for insurance 'on the whole life plan,' at a special weekly premium, signed by the insured, who is referred to under his signature as 'the person to be insured,' while the second page, signed by him as 'the applicant' is designated as an 'Application for Insurance.' In the policy this language is found, 'in consideration of the statements, and the application herefor which are hereby referred to, and as warranties made a part of this contract, and of the premium * * * to be paid' upon the death of the insured if the policy is in force the company agrees to pay the amount of insurance to the beneficiary, if living, last nominated 'whether in the proposal herefor, or in any written amendment thereto filed with or approved by the company.'
It is manifest from a comparison of the contents of this paper exclusive of the medical examination, that all the material portions designated as the proposal were by repetition incorporated in the part called the 'application' which was made the basis of the contract, even if the name of the beneficiary appeared only in the proposal. When the insured received the policy with a copy of this application annexed he was put in possession of the entire contract with this exception, but as the exception in no wise affected any essential element of the contract upon which the right of the company to avoid it depended, and of which the insured was entitled to a copy, the statute was satisfied, and the ruling admitting the application in evidence as a part of the contract was correct. Until the death of the insured his designation of a beneficiary being subject to change with the consent of the insurer was ambulatory, and constituted a mere expectancy, but there having been no appointment subsequent to the proposal, upon the happening of this event the interest of the plaintiff's assignor, who had been designated, became vested, and by assignment passed to the plaintiff. Tepper v. Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum, 59 N. J. Eq. 321, 45 A. 111; Spengler v. Spengler, 65 N. J. Eq. 176, 55 A. 285; Hopkins v. Hopkins, 92 Ky. 324, 17 S.W. 864; Union Mutual Aid Association v. Montgomery, 70 Mich. 587, 38 N.W. 588, 14 Am. St. Rep. 519; Fidelity Mutual Life Association v. Winn, 96 Tenn. 224, 33 S.W. 1045; Martin v. Stubbings, 126 Ill. 387, 18 N.E. 657, 9 Am. St Rep. 620. Compare Rawson v. Milwaukee Mutual Life Ins. Co., 115 Wis. 641, 647, 92 N.W. 378. See, also, Pingrey v. National Life Ins. Co., 144 Mass. 374, 382, 11 N.E. 562; Bank of Washington v. Hume, 128 U.S. 195, 9 S.Ct. 41, 32 L.Ed. 370, 375, 376. By reason of privity of title, if the insurance had been payable to the insured, upon suit by his administrator or executor, the record evidence of his plea of guilty to the charge of drunkenness, made before the application was presented to the company, would have been competent. Noyes v. Morrill, 108 Mass. 396; Stockwell v. Blamey, 129 Mass. 312; Fellows v. Smith, 130 Mass. 378. But while the plaintiff claims under the beneficiary his right to recover like that of his assignor is derived from the insured, and rests upon the validity of the contract. Rev. Laws, c. 173, § 4; Andrews v. Tuttle Smith Co., 191 Mass. 461, 78 N.E. 99; Fidelity Mutual Life Association v. Winn, ubi supra; Smith v. National Benefit Society, 123 N.Y. 85, 25 N.E. 197, 9 L. R. A. 616; Van Frank v. Masonic...
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