Langdeau v. State of South Dakota, 71-1149.
| Decision Date | 30 June 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 71-1149.,71-1149. |
| Citation | 446 F.2d 507 |
| Parties | Victor LANGDEAU, Appellant, v. STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA and Its Agents, et al., Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Gary J. Pashby, Sioux Falls, filed brief for appellant.
Gordon Mydland, Atty. Gen., Pierre, S. D., and Roger Schiager, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., William J. Srstka, Jr. Asst. Atty. Gen., filed brief for appellee.
Before LAY, HEANEY and BRIGHT, Circuit Judges.
This is a post conviction appeal from a denial by the federal district court of habeas corpus to a state prisoner in South Dakota. The petitioner raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether the requirement of a $3,000 cash bond was in violation of the defendant's "constitutional right to bail," and (2) whether the defendant's plea of guilty was involuntarily entered.
The defendant was arrested on or about July 10, 1964, and charged with the crime of indecent molestation of a child in violation of S.D.C. § 13.1727 (Supp.1960) now S.Dak.Comp.Laws 22-22-7 (1967). A $3,000 cash bond was required pending trial. As an indigent he was unable to post the bail required. On July 15, 1964, petitioner was appointed trial counsel. On November 18, 1964, he was brought to trial. This resulted in a hung jury.1 Thereafter, he was returned to jail until January 4, 1965, when he asked leave to withdraw his previous plea and enter a plea of guilty to the charge. He was sentenced to 10 years in the South Dakota penitentiary.
Petitioner has exhausted his state remedies. He was given a full evidentiary hearing in the state court. The decision denying him post conviction relief was affirmed by the South Dakota Supreme Court. Langdeau v. State, S. D., 179 N.W.2d 121 (1970).
Petitioner asserts that he pled guilty because of the conditions of his confinement in the Hughes County Jail. The evidence shows that the jail was not segregated by separate cells, that it was crowded beyond its normal capacity, that petitioner was harassed (primarily because of the nature of the charge pending against him), and that the petitioner did not like the food that was being given to him. At the time petitioner pled guilty he made known to the trial court his overall discontent with the jail conditions. The court then examined petitioner in detail as to whether he was entering his plea solely because of these conditions or whether he knowingly and voluntarily wanted to do so. The trial judge who accepted the plea was the same judge who heard the evidence at petitioner's trial. We have reviewed this evidence. As the trial court commented in accepting the guilty plea, the evidence clearly substantiates petitioner's guilt of the crime charged. In view of petitioner's confinement under the conditions of which he complained, before accepting the plea of guilty the state trial court offered to impanel a jury and give the petitioner an immediate trial. The petitioner then answered that this would not be necessary because he wanted to enter his plea. Petitioner stated at the state post-conviction evidentiary hearing that his appointed counsel had told him that if he pled guilty he would get a reduced sentence. Although there is nothing of record demonstrating any plea bargaining, the statement of the trial judge indicates that the defendant did receive a reduced sentence by reason of his guilty plea.
Our analysis of the record leads us to conclude that petitioner's discontent with his preconviction existence in the community jail2 served only as a circumstance, perhaps at best motivating the timing of his decision to plead guilty. Petitioner's distaste for his jail food is no more a factor than his interest in obtaining a reduced sentence. As taught in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970), such factors serve only as...
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