Langdeaux v. State

• Decision Date: 25 April 2012
• Docket Number: No. 10–1625.,10–1625.
• Citation: 817 N.W.2d 31
• Parties: James William LANGDEAUX, Applicant–Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Respondent–Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Court of Appeals

817 N.W.2d 31

James William LANGDEAUX, Applicant–Appellant,

v.STATE of Iowa, Respondent–Appellee.

No. 10–1625.

Court of Appeals of Iowa.

April 25, 2012.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HEREAppeal from the Iowa District Court for Dickinson County, David A. Lester, Judge.

James Langdeaux appeals from the denial of his application for postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Bradley M. Bender, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

James W. Langdeaux, Clarinda, pro se.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Thomas S. Tauber, Assistant Attorney General, Jason Carlstom, County Attorney, and Charles Thoman, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee State.

Considered by VAITHESWARAN, P.J., and DOYLE and DANILSON, JJ.

DOYLE, J.

The applicant, James Langdeaux, appeals from the district court's denial of an application for postconviction relief filed nearly twenty years ago. We affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

James Langdeaux stabbed and killed a man in a bar in 1987. He was charged with first-degree murder under alternative theories of premeditation and felony murder, based on the predicate felony of willful injury. SeeIowa Code § 707.2(1), (2) (2011).¹ At his jury trial, Langdeaux testified in his own defense and claimed he stabbed the man in self-defense. Other witnesses disputed that claim. Langdeaux also raised an intoxication defense. The jury found Langdeaux guilty as charged. He was sentenced to life in prison without parole.

Langdeaux appealed, claiming trial counsel was ineffective for failing to (1) raise a timely objection to the felony-murder jury instruction and (2) challenge one of the jurors for cause. This court rejected his claims and affirmed his conviction and sentence. See State v. Langdeaux, No. 88–852 (Iowa Ct.App. Aug.23, 1989).

Langdeaux then filed an application for postconviction relief, asserting trial counsel was ineffective for failing to demand the State reveal the underlying felony it was relying on in charging him with first-degree murder. We affirmed the district court's denial of this application, finding it was evident trial counsel was aware before trial the State was relying on willful injury as the underlying felony. See Langdeaux v. State, No. 90–1160 (Iowa Ct.App. Nov.26, 1991).

Langdeaux filed his second, and current, application for postconviction relief in May 1992. The State filed a motion to dismiss, which was summarily granted by the district court without notice or hearing. Langdeaux appealed. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions to set the State's motion for hearing. See Langdeaux v. State, No. 92–0982 (Iowa Apr. 5, 1993).

On remand, Langdeaux attempted to amend and recast his application to add several new grounds for relief. The district court denied Langdeaux's motions to amend, believing it could not address new matters raised after the remand. After a hearing, the court granted the State's motion to dismiss. Langdeaux appealed. We reversed and remanded, finding the court erred in limiting its review to Langdeaux's original claims. See Langdeaux v. State, No. 93–1557 (Iowa Ct.App. Jun.27, 1995).

In the years since our remand, Langdeaux has filed numerous motions for discovery and sanctions, as well as motions to amend. Our supreme court also decided State v. Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d 549, 558 (Iowa 2006), which overruled precedent existing at the time of Langdeaux's conviction and held “if the act causing willful injury is the same act that causes the victim's death, the former is merged into the murder and therefore cannot serve as the predicate felony for felony-murder purposes.” Langdeaux redoubled his efforts to overturn his conviction after Heemstra and filed several more amendments, seeking retroactive application of the decision.

Following a summary disposition ruling disposing of some of the claims and a hearing on the ones remaining, the district court entered an order denying Langdeaux's application for postconviction relief. This appeal followed.

II. Scope and Standards of Review.

We normally review postconviction proceedings for errors at law. Everett v. State, 789 N.W.2d 151, 155 (Iowa 2010). But when there is an alleged denial of constitutional rights such as ineffective assistance of counsel, we conduct a de novo review. Id.

III. Discussion.A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims.

Langdeaux claims trial counsel performed deficiently in the following areas: (1) failing to investigate a witness's statement, (2) providing inadequate advice about a plea offer from the State, (3) failing to challenge a juror for cause, and (4) failing to object to prosecutorial misconduct. To prevail on these claims, Langdeaux must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel failed to perform an essential duty and prejudice resulted. Id. at 158. A reviewing court need not engage in both prongs of the analysis if one is lacking. Id. at 159.

1. Failure to investigate witness's statement. We begin by addressing Langdeaux's assertion that his trial counsel failed “to pursue evidence relevant to the character of [the victim] which was referred to in a statement given by ... Sheriff Robert Rolfes to DCI Agent Lubkeman.” The statement Langdeaux is referring to reads as follows:

Sheriff Rolfes stated that he had never had trouble with Duane [the victim] and knew him quite well. He stated that Duane could be aggressive if he wanted to and he wouldn't back down from a fight. Rolfes also stated that Duane didn't go out looking for fights, however. Rolfes also stated that Duane was good at “bullshitting” with people. He stated Duane was a good worker. He further stated that there were a few family problems in Duane's family, but those weren't anything serious.... Rolfes stated that Duane was a typical Iowa kid with a typical background.

Langdeaux argues trial counsel should have interviewed or deposed the sheriff in order to further explore his opinion about the victim's aggressive nature. If this had been done, Langdeaux posits the sheriff's testimony “would have challenged the very core of the State's case and would have supported Langdeaux's self-defense claim .”

The problem with this argument is that one of Langdeaux's trial attorneys testified at the postconviction hearing that he did interview the sheriff and, after speaking with him, decided not to call him as a witness because the sheriff would have testified Langdeaux was a troublemaker. We will not second-guess counsel's strategic decision, which was made after a reasonable investigation, to not call the sheriff as a witness. See State v. Heuser, 661 N.W.2d 157, 166 (Iowa 2003) (“An ineffective assistance of counsel claim generally does not lie for the exercise of judgment.”); State v. Polly, 657 N.W.2d 462, 468 (Iowa 2003) (“Generally, the decision not to call a particular witness ... implicates a reasonable tactical decision.”).

2. Inadequate advice about plea offer. Langdeaux next claims trial counsel failed to inform him of the felony-murder rule in advising him about the State's offer of a plea bargain to second-degree murder. He asserts that if he had been told about the rule, he “most definitely” and “absolutely” would have accepted the State's offer. We agree with the district court that Langdeaux did not prove the prejudice prong of this claim.

The prejudice inquiry in an ineffective-assistance claim arising out of the plea process “ ‘focuses on whether counsel's constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process.’ “ Kirchner v. State, 756 N.W.2d 202, 205 (Iowa 2008) (citation omitted). Thus, in order to prove prejudice, “an applicant who previously rejected a plea offer in favor of going to trial ‘must show that, but for counsel's advice, he would have accepted the plea.’ “ Id. (citation omitted). “The applicant ‘must present some credible, nonconclusory evidence that he would have pled guilty had he been properly advised.’ “ Id. (citation omitted). Self-serving statements by themselves are not sufficient to make this showing. Id. at 206; see also Wanatee v. Ault, 101 F.Supp.2d 1189, 1204 (N.D.Iowa 2000).

Defense counsel testified at the postconviction hearing that Langdeaux “was convinced he didn't do anything wrong.” He remembered Langdeaux was angry “that he would have to plead guilty and have a mandatory sentence.... He was firm that he didn't want to do it.” Counsel also believed Langdeaux would have been unable to establish a factual basis for a plea to second-degree murder, testifying, “He wouldn't admit ... that he killed Mr. Krogman without some provocation by the decedent. And the plea, in my opinion ... would have been a shambles.... [H]e was just adamant that he didn't do anything wrong.” See Wanatee, 101 F.Supp.2d at 1201 (stating in determining prejudice, the court must consider whether the applicant could have performed the agreement if it had been accepted). Other evidence in the record supports counsel's recollection of Langdeaux's stance in rejecting the plea offer.

Before, during, and after the trial, Langdeaux maintained his actions in stabbing the victim were justified. Immediately after his arrest, Langdeaux told police he stabbed the victim in self-defense. He repeated this story to a friend who had been with him that night, embellishing the details of the victim's supposed precipitating attack on him.² Langdeaux admitted at trial the story he told his friend was a lie. He also lied to police about where he got the knife from and about the victim's friend ripping his shirt in order to support his claim of self-defense. Cf. id. at 1206 (considering fact defendant did not lie to avoid liability in determining whether he established he would have pleaded guilty had he been properly advised). And in a letter to the court after trial, Langdeaux stated, “I did stab Mr. Krogman out of fear for myself, because he was coming after me, and I perceived Mr. Johnson on the other side of me, blocking my path. I...