Langdon v. Langdon, No. 2001-CA-01077

Decision Date09 September 2003
Docket Number No. 2001-CA-01315., No. 2001-CA-01077
Citation854 So.2d 485
PartiesCharles Kent LANGDON, Appellant, v. Helen Crocker LANGDON, Appellee.
CourtMississippi Court of Appeals

Arnold F. Gwin, Greenwood, attorney for appellant.

Charles R. Brett, Tupelo, attorney for appellee.

Before SOUTHWICK, P.J., BRIDGES and CHANDLER, JJ.

CHANDLER, J., for the Court.

¶ 1. The Chancery Court of Humphreys County granted Helen Crocker Langdon (Helen) a divorce from Charles Kent Langdon (Kent) on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. Kent has appealed, arguing that the chancery court erred by failing to grant him a divorce on the ground of adultery, by erroneously dividing the parties' assets, and by awarding Helen attorney's fees and court reporter's fees. Prior to the divorce, Kent appealed from an order of the Chancery Court of Humphreys County finding him in contempt of a temporary order. The two appeals have been consolidated.

FACTS

¶ 2. Kent and Helen were married on December 18, 1983. They had three children, all boys. At the conclusion of trial in this matter, one child was age 15 and two were age 12.

¶ 3. The parties separated on or about December 28, 1998. On March 4, 1999, Helen filed for a divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment or irreconcilable differences. Kent answered and counterclaimed for a divorce on the same grounds. Helen amended her complaint to add the ground of adultery. Kent amended his counterclaim to add the ground of adultery.

¶ 4. Helen requested temporary relief. After a hearing, the chancery court awarded Helen temporary custody of the children, temporary child support, and temporary alimony. The court ordered Kent to make the monthly mortgage payments on the parties' former residence, and to retain the hospitalization and medical insurance on Helen and the children that was in force at the time of the order. The court restricted Kent from selling any asset. Subsequently, Kent failed to make the mortgage payments. The court found Kent in willful contempt and entered a judgment against him for the amount of the missed payments, $5,513.92. The court ordered his incarceration if he did not pay the amount within four days. Kent failed to pay and was incarcerated. He was released upon posting a supersedeas bond pending appeal. See M.R.A.P. 8.

¶ 5. After a three day trial, the chancery court entered an order granting Helen a divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment, awarding her custody of the two youngest children, and awarding Kent custody of the oldest child. The court determined child custody and visitation, divided the parties' assets, and awarded Helen attorney's fees and court reporter's fees. Further, the court ordered Kent to pay Helen $525 per month in child support and $300 per month in alimony.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 6. This Court reviews the facts of a divorce decree in the light most favorable to the appellee. Fisher v. Fisher, 771 So.2d 364, 367 (¶8) (Miss.2000). In domestic relations matters, this Court will not reverse the findings of a chancellor unless the findings are manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or if the chancellor applied an incorrect legal standard. Henderson v. Henderson, 757 So.2d 285, 289-90 (¶19) (Miss.2000). We may reverse a chancellor's findings of fact only where there is no "substantial, credible evidence in the record" to justify the findings. Id.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

I. DID THE CHANCELLOR ERR IN AWARDING HELEN A DIVORCE ON THE GROUND OF HABITUAL CRUEL AND INHUMAN TREATMENT RATHER THAN AWARDING KENT A DIVORCE ON THE GROUND OF ADULTERY?

¶ 7. Kent argues that the evidence of his habitual cruel and inhuman treatment was insufficient to support the chancellor's finding that Helen was entitled to a divorce on that ground. The ground for divorce on the basis of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment must be proven by a preponderance of the credible evidence. Chamblee v. Chamblee, 637 So.2d 850, 859 (Miss.1994). "The conduct which evinces habitual cruel and inhuman treatment must be such that it (1) endangers life, limb, or health, or creates a reasonable apprehension of such danger and renders the relationship unsafe for the party seeking relief, or (2) renders the marriage revolting to the non-offending spouse because it is so unnatural and infamous, and makes it impossible to carry out the duties of the marriage, therefore destroying the basis for its continuance." Mitchell v. Mitchell, 767 So.2d 1037, 1041 (¶14) (Miss. Ct.App.2000) (quoting Daigle v. Daigle, 626 So.2d 140, 144 (Miss.1993)). Generally, the conduct must be shown to have been systematic and continuous. Daigle, 626 So.2d at 144. However, a single incident may be of sufficient severity to prove the ground. Ellzey v. Ellzey, 253 So.2d 249, 250 (Miss.1971). There must be a causal connection between the treatment and the separation. Daigle, 626 So.2d at 144.

¶ 8. In her order, the chancellor recited the evidence of Kent's habitual cruel and inhuman treatment of Helen. Helen testified that Kent began abusing her six months after the parties' wedding. She stated that Kent threw a snake in the bathtub with her when she was pregnant with their youngest child. Helen testified that, in 1989, Kent beat her about the head and the resulting injuries caused her to be hospitalized for approximately one week. Three of Helen's family members testified that on that occasion they witnessed Helen's head and facial injuries, bruises on her neck and arms, and scratches, and that they knew of the hospitalization. Kent admitted that on this occasion he hit Helen with an open hand two or three times, but denied causing injury.

¶ 9. Helen testified that, during Christmas 1998, Kent hit her in the head and choked her. Helen admitted taking a handful of pain pills prior to this incident and that she "lost it" and destroyed the family's Christmas tree. Helen's sister testified that after this incident she witnessed Helen with bruises on her neck and arm and a bruised and bloody ear. Kent denied striking Helen on this occasion, and stated that Helen's head injuries occurred when she fell and hit her head on the kitchen table. It was uncontested that Helen moved out shortly after this incident.

¶ 10. Kent testified that Helen bruises easily. He further testified that, after the parties' 1998 separation, he periodically had to restrain Helen by holding her down. Helen's sister testified that she saw bruises on Helen's arm and neck in the summer of 1999. Helen testified that she sought psychiatric and psychological treatment due to Kent's abuse.

¶ 11. Our review of the record indicates that the Langdons had a tumultuous relationship. During the marriage, Kent filed for divorce one time and Helen filed twice, though the parties reconciled. Helen testified that, in December 1995, she and Kent fought and he hit her in the neck and chest areas. She presented pictures of the arm bruises and stated that the altercation incited her second filing for divorce. No other witnesses testified about that incident. Helen also testified that Kent continually insulted her appearance in front of the children and others. That testimony was corroborated by several witnesses.

¶ 12. The chancellor stated that the testimony was sufficient to prove that Helen was entitled to a divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. We find sufficient evidence in the record to support the chancellor's finding that Kent engaged in habitually cruel conduct. Helen testified about three occasions during the marriage when Kent hit her and caused injuries. These were instances of conduct endangering "life, limb or health," creating a reasonable apprehension of danger. Daigle, 626 So.2d at 144. It is apparent from the testimony that the Christmas 1998 incident caused Helen's departure from the marital home. Id.

¶ 13. Kent contends that the chancellor's finding amounted to manifest error because Helen's testimony lacked sufficient corroboration. Kent admitted to having struck Helen on one of the three occasions; he only contested the severity of the injury inflicted. Other corroborating evidence was the testimony of Helen's family members that they witnessed her injuries after two of those occasions, and the photographs of the injuries from the third occasion. Because there were no eyewitnesses to any of the alleged abuse, the chancellor had to render her decision based on the parties' competing versions of events and the available corroborating evidence. See Labella v. Labella, 722 So.2d 472 (Miss.1998)

. The chancellor's finding was not manifest error.

¶ 14. Kent argues that the chancellor should have granted a divorce to him on the ground of adultery. At trial, Helen admitted that she had sexual relations with someone approximately sixteen months after the parties separated. The chancellor found that Helen had committed undenied, uncondoned adultery, but that Helen's adultery did not precipitate the cause of action for divorce. Helen filed for divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment on March 4, 1999, and the adulterous behavior did not occur until the spring of 2000.

¶ 15. The case of Garriga v. Garriga, 770 So.2d 978 (Miss.Ct.App.2000), cited by the chancellor, parallels this case. In Garriga, the chancellor found that Mr. Garriga proved the ground of adultery and Mrs. Garriga proved the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. Id. at (¶22). The chancellor implicitly found that Mr. Garriga's habitual cruel and inhuman treatment of Mrs. Garriga made the continuation of the marital relationship impossible. Id. at (¶15). After the Garrigas separated, Mrs. Garriga committed undenied, uncondoned adultery. Id. at (¶22). The chancellor granted the divorce to Mrs. Garriga on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. Id. at (¶14).

¶ 16. This Court affirmed the chancellor's resolution. Id. at (¶24). We stated, "[t]here can be only but one divorce...

To continue reading

Request your trial
9 cases
  • Horn v. Horn
    • United States
    • Mississippi Court of Appeals
    • 25 de janeiro de 2005
    ...habitual cruel and inhuman treatment and the parties' separation. Sproles v. Sproles, 782 So.2d 742, 747(¶ 16) (Miss.2001); Langdon v. Langdon, 854 So.2d 485, 489(¶ 7) (Miss.Ct.App. 2003). Jason posits that the parties constructively separated in October 2001 when Karen told Jason that she ......
  • Spahn v. Spahn
    • United States
    • Mississippi Court of Appeals
    • 26 de setembro de 2006
    ... ... The award of attorney's fees is left to the discretion of the trial court. Langdon v. Langdon, 854 So.2d 485, 495 (¶ 40) (Miss. Ct.App.2003) (citing Labella v. Labella, 722 So.2d ... ...
  • Kumar v. Kumar, No. 2006-CA-01140-COA.
    • United States
    • Mississippi Court of Appeals
    • 11 de março de 2008
    ...when the parties continue to cohabit, but it may be condoned if the parties resume their relationship after a separation. Langdon v. Langdon, 854 So.2d 485, 490-91(¶ 18) (Miss.Ct.App.2003). "However, where condonation has occurred, if the cruel conduct subsequently occurs, the previous offe......
  • Larue v. Larue
    • United States
    • Mississippi Court of Appeals
    • 15 de maio de 2007
    ...assuming the chancellor follows the appropriate standards. Creekmore v. Creekmore, 651 So.2d 513, 520 (Miss.1995). In Langdon v. Langdon, 854 So.2d 485, 495-96(¶ 40) (Miss.Ct.App. 2003), we "The general rule is that if a party is financially able to pay his attorney fees he should do so, th......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT