Lange Cable Tool D. Co. v. Barnett Petroleum Corp., 11041.

• Decision Date: 25 July 1940
• Docket Number: No. 11041.,11041.
• Citation: 142 S.W.2d 833
• Parties: LANGE CABLE TOOL DRILLING CO. v. BARNETT PETROLEUM CORPORATION.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

142 S.W.2d 833

LANGE CABLE TOOL DRILLING CO. v. BARNETT PETROLEUM CORPORATION.

No. 11041.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Galveston.

July 25, 1940.

Appeal from District Court, Upshur County; Bascom Gist, Judge.

Action by the Lange Cable Tool Drilling Company against the Barnett Petroleum Corporation to recover for labor performed and services rendered in drilling out a plug in an oil well owned by the defendant, and to establish and foreclose an alleged lien against property on which the well was located. From an adverse judgment the plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Kirmit Smith and Aubrey A. Wilson, both of Gladewater, for appellant.

Florence & Florence, of Gilmer, and E. M. Dodson, of Marlin, for appellee.

MONTEITH, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal in an action brought by appellant, Lange Cable Tool Drilling Company, against appellee, Barnett Petroleum Corporation, to recover for labor performed and services rendered in drilling out a plug in an oil well owned by appellee in Upshur County, Texas, and to establish and foreclose an alleged lien against the property on which the well was located.

The action was originally brought against appellee and Phillips-Packer Company but was dismissed by appellant as to Phillips-Packer Company when the case was called for trial.

Appellant alleged that it had entered into an oral contract with Phillips-Packer Company to perform said labor and services that said contract had been ratified by appellee through its authorized agent, H. C. Duncan; that the said labor had been performed, its lien had been filed, and that all other acts necessary to protect its lien on the property on which said well was located had been done.

Appellee answered by general demurrer and general denial. It specifically denied that it had made any contract with appellant to do said work or that it had ratified any contract between appellant and Phillips-Packer Company to do said work. It pled that it had made a contract with the Phillips-Packer Company to plug said oil well at a specified price for the work prior to the time the work involved in this suit had been performed; that under said agreement it had no right to control the manner and method by which said work was done; that appellee did not employ appellant, and that, if appellant had performed the work alleged, said work was done for Phillips-Packer Company and not for appellee.

In answer to special issues submitted, the jury found, in effect, that appellant did not have an oral agreement with appellee for the performance of the services in question; that appellant had an oral agreement with Phillips-Packer Company for the performance of such services; and that H. C. Duncan, an agent for appellee, did not ratify said agreement or contract on its behalf to pay for said services. Based on said verdict of the jury judgment was rendered in favor of appellee.

The record shows that in November, 1938, appellee entered into a contract with Phillips-Packer Company to place a cement plug in its oil well known as Bradshaw #1 for the purpose of shutting off the salt water in the well, with the understanding that no charges would be made therefor in the event the plug did not produce the claimed results. The plug did not prove to be satisfactory, in that it shut off both the salt water and the oil in the well, and thereafter Phillips-Packer Company agreed with appellee that it would, at its own expense, drill the plug out of the well. The labor in question was performed by appellant under an oral agreement with Phillips-Packer Company.

The jury having found the ultimate issues made by appellants' pleadings in favor of appellee, to the effect that appellee had neither contracted with appellant nor ratified said contract or agreed to pay for the services rendered by appellant, the only...