Langenfelder v. Thompson

• Decision Date: 10 June 1941
• Docket Number: 27.
• Citation: 20 A.2d 491,179 Md. 502
• Parties: LANGENFELDER et al. v. THOMPSON.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

20 A.2d 491

179 Md. 502

LANGENFELDER et al. v. THOMPSON.

No. 27.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

June 10, 1941

Appeal from Superior Court of Baltimore City; Samuel K. Dennis Judge.

Action by Marguerite Thompson against Conrad J. Langenfelder and George H. Langenfelder, individually and trading as C.J Langenfelder & Son, for personal injuries resulting from collision allegedly due to negligence of defendants' employee. From a judgment for plaintiff, the defendants appeal.

Judgment affirmed.

BOND C.J., and JOHNSON, J., dissenting.

Walter L. Clark, of Baltimore (J. Gilbert Prendergast, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellants.

Foster H. Fanseen, of Baltimore, for appellee.

Argued before BOND, C.J., and SLOAN, JOHNSON, DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, and FORSYTHE, JJ.

DELAPLAINE Judge.

This appeal of Conrad J. Langenfelder and George H. Langenfelder is from a judgment entered upon the verdict of a jury in favor of Marguerite Thompson for personal injuries, which she alleged were the result of a collision caused by the negligence of an employee of the appellants.

Mrs. Thompson, a resident of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 28 years of age, was injured while returning from a trip to Annapolis on August 4, 1939, when a motor truck owned by the appellants crashed into the automobile, in which she was touring, just after her husband had stopped it at a red traffic light on the Governor Ritchie Highway. Knocked unconscious by the impact, she was taken in an ambulance to Baltimore, where she stayed two days in a hospital and two more days in a rooming house until she was able to return home. On August 9, while still suffering intense pain as a result of the collision, she consulted her family physician, Dr. H. Stanley Wallace, of Pittsburgh, a specialist in gynecology and surgery. An examination made by him on August 18 revealed that her uterus was retroverted and retroflexed. He testified that retroversion and retroflexion can result from different causes, but he had formed an opinion of the cause of Mrs. Thompson's condition from a definite indication by vaginal examination. When asked to give his opinion of the cause of the displacement in this case, he answered: 'The accident in all probability.'

The appellants, objecting to the doctor's opinion, argued that it invaded the province of the jury. In a decision rendered in 1909, Judge Van Denvanter explained the province of the jury as follows: 'It is true that in trials by jury it is their province to determine the ultimate facts * * *. And it is also true that this has at times led to the statement that witnesses may not give their opinions upon the ultimate facts which the jury are to decide, because that would supplant their judgment and usurp their province. But such a statement is not to be taken literally. It but reflects the general rule, which is subject to important qualifications, and never was intended to close any reasonable avenue to the truth in the investigation of questions of fact. Besides, the tendency of modern decisions is not only to give as wide a scope as is reasonably possible to the investigation of such questions, but also to accord to the trial judge a certain discretion in determining what testimony has a tendency to establish the ultimate facts, and to disturb his decision admitting testimony of that character only when it plainly appears that the testimony had no legitimate bearing upon the questions at issue and was calculated to prejudice the minds of the jurors. * * * The most important qualification of the general rule before stated is that which permits a witness possessed of special training, experience, or observation, in respect of the matter under investigation, to testify to his opinion when it will tend to aid the jury in reaching a correct conclusion; the true test being, not the total dependence of the jury upon such testimony, but their inability to judge for themselves as well as is the witness.' United States Smelting Co. v. Parry, 8 Cir., 166 F. 407, 410, 411. In accordance with the weight of authority, it has been held by this Court that while expert testimony is not admissible on a question which the jurors themselves can decide from the facts, it is admissible when the formation of a rational judgment from the facts requires special training or skill. Consolidated Gas, Electric Light & Power Co. v. State, to Use of Smith, 109 Md. 186, 203, 72 A. 651, 658.

It is obvious that in many cases it would be impossible to ascertain the cause of a bodily or mental ailment except with the aid of medical science. Matteson v. New York Central R. R. Co., 35 N.Y. 487, 91 Am.Dec. 67, 70; Chicago Union Traction Co. v. Roberts, 229 Ill. 481, 82 N.E. 401; State v. Hessenius, 165 Iowa 415, 146 N.W. 58, L.R.A.1915A, 1078. The law is settled in Marylnd that where an injury or disease is of such a character as to require a person skilled in the science or practice of medicine to determine its cause, a medical expert may testify to his opinion thereof based upon his scientific knowledge and skill and upon personal observation or scientific deductions from given facts. Armour & Co. v. Leasure, 177 Md. 393, 407, 9 A.2d 572, 579; 2 Jones on Evidence, sec. 378; 20 Am.Jur., Evidence, secs. 862, 867. For instance, in a case where the question was whether a premature separation of a woman's placenta, which necessitated a Caesarian operation, had resulted from an automobile accident, Judge Parke, speaking for this court, said: 'Her ailment was not of external appearance nor susceptible of apprehension by any of her senses; and the asscertainment of its cause, therefore, depended upon inferences and interpretations to be drawn and made upon the data observed by a skilled and qualified expert or furnished to him by herself and others. It was peculiarly within the province of medical science to ascertain the cause from which the illness requiring the operation arose, and whether it was produced by violence or disease.' Symington v. Graham, 165 Md. 441, 447, 169 A. 316, 319. Since Mrs. Tompson's ailment was of such a nature that the jurors could obviously not be expected to determine the cause without the aid of expert advice, the doctor's opinion did not usurp their function. Abend v. Sieber, 161 Md. 645, 648, 158 A. 63.

It was urged by the appellants that, according to some medical authorities, retroversion and retroflexion of the uterus cannot be caused traumatically. However, Dr. Wallace asserted that, from his own experience in the practice of medicine, he had no doubt that a displacement of the uterus can be caused by a violent injury. Dr. Thomas K. Galvin, of Baltimore, a specialist in gynecology and surgery, who was called as a witness by the defendants, likewise testified that he certainly did not deny that 'a rare accident' could produce a displacement of the uterus. It is generally accepted that an expert witness should not be barred from expressing his opinion merely because he is not willing to state his conclusion with absolute certainty. We adopt the prevailing view that the opinions of medical experts are admissible as to the cause which produced, or probably produced, or might have produced, a certain physical condition. Barker v. Ohio River R. R. Co., 51 W.Va 423, 41 S.E. 148, 152, 90 Am.St.Rep. 808; Shaughnessy v. Holt, 236 Ill. 485, 86 N.E. 256, 21 L.R.A.,N.S., 826; Denver & Rio Grande R. R. Co. v. Roller, 9 Cir., 100 F. 738, 752, 49 L.R.A. 77; 2 Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 656; 20 Am.Jur., Evidence, secs. 862, 867. The opinion of an expert as to the probability, or even the possibility, of the cause of a certain condition may frequently be of aid to the jury; for when the facts tend to show that an accident was the cause...