Langer v. HV Glob. Grp.
| Decision Date | 12 October 2021 |
| Docket Number | 2:21-cv-00328-JAM-KJN |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | CHRIS LANGER, Plaintiff, v. HV GLOBAL GROUP, INC., a Delaware Corporation, Defendant. |
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S AMENDED MOTION TO DISMISS
Chris Langer (“Plaintiff” or “Langer”) sued HV Global Group, Inc. (“Defendant”), alleging violations of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. and the California Unruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh Act”), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51-53. See Compl., ECF No. 1.
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's claims for lack of standing and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Amended Mot. to Dismiss (“Amended Mot.”), ECF No. 11. Plaintiff opposes the motion. See Opp'n, ECF No. 13. Defendants replied. See Reply, ECF No 15. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion to dismiss.[1]
I. BACKGROUND
Langer suffers from permanent partial hearing loss, for which he uses several assistive listening devices, such as hearing aids or headphones. Compl. ¶ 1. Because of his disability, Langer relies on “subtitles and closed captioning to hear audio in recorded content.” Id. ¶ 11. In February 2021, Langer visited Defendant's website with the root domain “hyattresidenceclub.com/home.html” (“Website”) to access information about the Hyatt Residence Club. Id. ¶¶ 4, 15. In viewing the website, Langer wished “to confirm the business was open, review any policies regarding customer safety, and look for information about the company and its vacation programs.” Id. ¶ 15. While perusing the Website, Langer encountered video content without closed captioning, which he alleges “made him unable to fully understand and consume the contents of the videos.” Id. ¶ 16. As a result, he alleges he was “deterred from further use of the Website” in violation of his rights under the ADA and Unruh Act. Id. ¶ 17. Langer filed suit in February 2021. See Compl.
II. OPINION
Federal Rule of Evidence 201 allows the Court to notice a fact if it is “not subject to reasonable dispute, ” such that it is “generally known” or “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed.R.Evid. 201(b). The Court must take judicial notice “if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary information.” Fed.R.Evid. 201(d). The Court need not, however, take notice of facts that do not provide any additional relevant information. See Adriana Int'l Corp. v. Thoeren, 913 F.2d 1406, 1410 n.2 (9th Cir. 1990) (); Neylon v. Cty. of Inyo, No. 1:16-CV-0712-AWI-JLT, 2016 WL 6834097, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2016) ()
Defendant asks the Court to take judicial notice of Plaintiff's past litigation history. Amended Mot. at 1. Defendant did not, however, supply any information in support of its request, such as a list of the relevant suits. Instead, Defendant asks the Court to take notice based on Defendant's assertion that Plaintiff has “filed at least 32 lawsuits in both federal and state courts all over California.” Id. This does not satisfy the “necessary information” requirement under Rule 201(d). Further, an ADA tester's litigation history is not relevant to the merits of his case. D'Lil v. Best W. Encina Lodge & Suites, 538 F.3d 1031, 1040 (9th Cir. 2008) (). For these reasons, the Court declines to take judicial notice of Plaintiff's litigation history.
Plaintiff has requested the Court take judicial notice of relevant pages of Defendant's Website, submitted as Exhibits 1-3. See Pl.'s Req. for Judicial Notice (“RJN”), ECF No. 14. Websites and their contents are proper subjects for judicial notice. Threshold Enterprises Ltd. v. Pressed Juicery, Inc., 445 F.Supp.3d 139, 146 (N.D. Cal. 2020). The Court may also consider documents attached to the complaint or documents that the complaint necessarily relies upon. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). Thus, the Court grants Plaintiff's request for judicial notice of Exhibits 1-3.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) governs a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, as standing pertains to a federal court's subject matter jurisdiction under Article III. White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). Under Rule 12(b)(1), when the Court finds a lack of Article III standing, the Court must dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2011). Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to assert allegations sufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction. Amended Mot. at 7. This constitutes a facial attack under Rule 12(b)(1). White, 227 F.3d at 1242. To rule on a facial attack, the Court “must assume the allegations in the complaint are true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Ryan v. Salisbury, 382 F.Supp.3d 1062, 1073 (D. Haw. 2019) (citing Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004)). Because Plaintiff is the party asserting federal subject-matter jurisdiction, he has the burden of establishing its existence. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, (1994).
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for lack of standing under the ADA. Because standing is a “threshold question” in “determining the power of the court to entertain the suit, ” the Court addresses this issue first. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). To establish standing, a plaintiff must show he “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision." Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1547, (2016).
In ADA claims, the only remedy available to the plaintiff is injunctive relief, and Article III standing for injunctive relief requires the plaintiff to establish a “real and immediate threat of repeated injury.” Fortyune v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 364 F.3d 1075, 1081 (9th Cir. 2004). In the Ninth Circuit, an ADA plaintiff may establish standing "either by demonstrating deterrence, or by demonstrating injury-in-fact coupled with an intent to return to a noncompliant facility." Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 944 (9th Cir. 2011). When a plaintiff alleges “an ADA violation based on unequal access to a ‘service' of a place of public accommodation, courts have held that a plaintiff must allege that there is a ‘nexus' between the challenged service and the place of public accommodation.” Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F.Supp.2d 946, 952 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
A website is a type of service that may be offered by a public accommodation, and, as a service, a website is not a place of public accommodation without some nexus to a physical location where goods and services are offered to the public. Id. Thus, for accessibility barriers on a website to form the basis of ADA standing, that website must have “connect[ed] customers to the goods and services of [the defendant's] physical [locations].” Robles v. Domino's Pizza, LLC, 913 F.3d 898, 905-06 (9th Cir. 2019) (); See also Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 452 F.Supp.2d at 955 () A plaintiff who does not allege a connection between an inaccessible website and a physical location does not have standing under the ADA. See Brooks v. See's Candy, No. 2:20-cv-01236-MCE-DB, 2021 WL 3602153, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2021) ().
Defendant argues Plaintiff has failed to do exactly that. Defendant points out that “Plaintiff makes no attempt to allege that he was trying to access a service of a physical location.” Amended Mot. at 7-8. Plaintiff objects to this characterization, pointing to Paragraph 14 of his complaint, which states, “[he] was a prospective customer who wished to access Defendant's goods and services.” Opp'n. at 6; Compl. ¶ 14. Plaintiff's allegation, however, does not specify that he wished to access the goods and services of a physical location. Rather, his contentions about accessibility are limited to Defendant's Website. In Plaintiff's own words, he contends that “[i]f the Website had been constructed equally accessible to all individuals, Plaintiff would have been able to navigate the website [sic] and avail himself of its goods and/or services.” Compl. ¶ 24 (emphasis added). Thus, to the extent Plaintiff alleged he wished to access goods and services, they were the goods and services of Defendant's Website. Without more, Plaintiff's allegations that he could not access certain parts of Defendant's Website because of the lack of closed captioning is not sufficient to allege standing under the ADA.
As a result, Plaintiff lacks standing because he has not sufficiently alleged that he was deterred from a place of public service or demonstrated an injury-in-fact coupled with an intent to return to the noncompliant facility. Accordingly, Plaintiff's ADA claim is dismissed without prejudice. See Eminence Capital,...
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