National Federation of the Blind v. Target Corp.

• Decision Date: 06 September 2006
• Docket Number: No. C 06-01802 MHP.,C 06-01802 MHP.
• Citation: 452 F.Supp.2d 946
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
• Parties: NATIONAL FEDERATION OF THE BLIND, the National Federation of the Blind of California, on behalf of their members, and Bruce F. Sexton, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. TARGET CORPORATION, Defendant.

452 F.Supp.2d 946

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF THE BLIND, the National Federation of the Blind of California, on behalf of their members, and Bruce F. Sexton, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. TARGET CORPORATION, Defendant.

No. C 06-01802 MHP.

United States District Court, N.D. California.

September 6, 2006.

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Mazen Mohammed Basrawi, Laurence W. Paradis, Disability Rights Advocates, Berkeley, CA, Daniel F. Goldstein, Brown Goldstein & Levy, LLP, Baltimore, MD, Joshua Konecky, Todd M. Schneider, Schneider & Wallace, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiffs.

Robert A. Naeve, Morrison & Foerster LLP, Irvine, CA, David Frank McDowell, Michael James Bostrom, Morrison & Foerster LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Re: Defendant's Motion to Dismiss; Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction

PATEL, District Judge.

Plaintiffs National Federation of the Blind, National Federation of the Blind of California, Bruce Sexton, and all those similarly situated, filed this action against Target Corporation ("Target"), seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. Plaintiffs claim that Target.com is inaccessible to the blind, and thereby violates federal and state laws prohibiting discrimination against the disabled. Now before the court is defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Having considered the parties' arguments and submissions, and for the reasons set forth below, the court enters the following memorandum and order.

BACKGROUND¹

Target operates approximately 1,400 retail stores nationwide, including 205 stores in California. Target.com is a website owned and operated by Target. By visiting Target.com, customers can purchase many of the items available in Target stores. Target.com also allows a customer to perform functions related to Target stores. For example, through Target.com, a customer can access information on store locations and hours, refill a prescription or order photo prints for pick-up at a store, and print coupons to redeem at a store.

Plaintiffs allege that Target.com is not accessible to blind individuals. According to plaintiffs, designing a website to be accessible to the blind is technologically simple and not economically prohibitive. Protocols for designing an accessible internet site rely heavily on "alternative text": invisible code embedded beneath graphics. A blind individual can use screen reader software, which vocalizes the alternative text and describes the content of the web-page. Similarly, if the screen reader can read the navigation links, then a blind individual can navigate the site with a keyboard instead of a mouse. Plaintiffs allege that Target.com lacks these features that would enable the blind to use Target.com. Since the blind cannot use Target.com, they are denied full and equal access to Target stores, according to plaintiffs.

On February 7, 2006 plaintiffs filed this action in Superior Court of California for the County of Alameda. On March 9, 2006 defendant removed the case to federal court. Defendant now moves to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. Defendant claims that each of the antidiscrimination laws protecting the disabled— the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. section 12182, ("ADA"), Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ.Code section 51 ("Unruh Act"), and the Disabled Persons Act, Cal. Civ.Code section 54.1 ("DPA")—covers access to only, physical spaces. Since Target.com is not a physical space, defendant asserts that the complaint does not state a claim under these laws. Additionally, defendant contends that even if the Unruh Act' and the DPA do govern access to websites, applying these state laws to the internet would violate the dormant commerce clause.

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Motion to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) "tests the legal sufficiency of a claim." Navarro v. Block 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir.2001). Because Rule 12(b)(6) focuses on the "sufficiency" of a claim—and not the claim's substantive merits—"a court may [typically] look only at the face of the complaint to decide a motion to dismiss." Van Buskirk v. Cable News Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir.2002).

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) should be granted if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.1988). Allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir.1996). The court need not, however, accept as true allegations that are conclusory, legal conclusions, unwarranted deductions of fact or unreasonable inferences. See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir.2001); Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir.1994).

II. Motion for Preliminary Injunction

"A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy, the purpose of which is to preserve the status quo and to prevent irreparable loss of rights prior to final disposition of the litigation." Napa. Valley Publ'g Co. v. City of Calistoga, 225 F.Supp.2d 1176, 1180 (N.D.Cal.2002) (Chen, Mag. J.) (citing Sierra On Line, Inc. v. Phoenix Software, Inc., 739 F.2d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir.1984)). In light of these considerations, a plaintiff seeking preliminary injunctive relief must demonstrate either: "(1) a likelihood of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury; or (2) that serious questions going to the merits [have been] raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in [the plaintiffs] favor." Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 914, 917 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc) (per curiam) (citing Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 340 F.3d 810, 813 (9th Cir.2003)); see also Sun Micro-systems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 188 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir.1999). The components of these two tests, together with the added consideration of the public interest, operate on a sliding scale or "continuum." Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project, 344 F.3d at 918. Consequently, "the less certain the district court is of the likelihood of success on the merits, the more plaintiffs must convince the district court that the public interest and balance of hardships tip in their favor." Id. (citation omitted); see also Miller v. California Pac. Med. Ctr., 19 F.3d 449, 456 (9th Cir. 1994) (en bane).

In cases where a party seeks mandatory preliminary relief the Ninth Circuit has held that there must be a showing that "the law and the facts clearly favor granting such relief." Stanley v. University of Southern, California, 13 F.3d 1313, 1320 (9th Cir.1994); Martin v. Int'l Olympic Committee, 740 F.2d 670 (9th Cfr.1984). The "higher degree of scrutiny" is required because "prohibitory injunction[s] preserve[ ] the status quo ... [while a] mandatory injunction goes well beyond simply maintaining the status quo pendente lite and is particularly disfavored." Stanley, 13 F.3d at 1320 (internal citations omitted); see also Brewer v. West Rondequoit Cent. School Dist., 212 F.3d 738, 744 (2d Cir.2000) superseded on alternate grounds by statute, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 52, as recognized in Zervos v. Verizon New York, Inc., 252 F.3d 163, 171 n. 7 (2d Cir.2001) (noting that an injunction is mandatory if it will alter rather than maintain the status quo or if it will provide movant with substantially all relief sought).

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Dismiss

A. ADA

Title III of the ADA prevents discrimination against the disabled in places of public accommodation: "No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to) or operates a place of public accommodation." 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).

"Discrimination" under the. ADA encompasses the denial of the opportunity, by the disabled, to participate in programs or services, and providing the disabled with separate, but unequal, goods or services. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i-iii). To ensure that the disabled have full and equal enjoyment of the goods and services of places of public accommodation, the ADA requires "reasonable modification" of "policies, practices, and procedures," the provision of auxiliary aids to ensure effective communication with the disabled, and the removal of architectural and communications barriers. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii-iv). The ADA thus, departs from certain anti-discrimination statutes in requiring that places of public accommodation take affirmative steps to accommodate the disabled. H.R.Rep. No. 101-485, pt.2, at 104 (1990); 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii-iv).

Defendant contends that Tar get corn is not a place of public accommodation within the meaning of the ADA, and therefore plaintiffs cannot state a claim under the ADA. Specifically, defendant claims that the complaint is deficient because it does not allege that "individuals with vision impairments are denied access to one of Target's brick and mortar stores or the goods they contain." Def.?s Motion at 10. However, the complaint states that "due to Target's failure and refusal to remove access barriers to Target.com, blind individuals have been and are being denied equal access to Target stores, as well as to the numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through Target.com." Complaint ¶ 24. Plaintiffs'...