Langevin v. Bloom

• Decision Date: 16 June 1897
• Docket Number: Nos. 10,636 - (179).,s. 10,636 - (179).
• Citation: 69 Minn. 22
• Parties: HECTOR LANGEVIN v. WILLIAM BLOOM.<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL>
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

69 Minn. 22

HECTOR LANGEVIN v. WILLIAM BLOOM.¹

Nos. 10,636 - (179).

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

June 16, 1897.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment for plaintiff in the district court for Polk county, entered pursuant to the order of Ives, J. Reversed.

W. Watts and E. P. Pierce, for appellant.

Martin O'Brien, for respondent.

MITCHELL, J.

The defendant, as constable, had levied on a buggy, the property of the plaintiff, on an execution on a judgment rendered against him in favor of one Ellington. This judgment was rendered upon a promissory note given by plaintiff to Sylvester and Finseth, and by them transferred to Ellington. The note was given for the purchase money of the buggy levied on. The buggy was exempt, unless subject to levy, under G. S. 1894, § 5460, which provides that

"the property hereinbefore mentioned is not exempt from any attachment issued in an action for the purchase money of the same property, or from an execution issued upon any judgment rendered therein."

The only question is whether the assignee of the note succeeded to the privilege or right of the vendor as against the exemption right of the vendee.

The authorities on this question are conflicting. See Thompson, Homest. & Ex. § 336. Most of the cases consider it the same as or analogous to the question whether the equitable lien of a grantor of land for purchase money is assignable. Some courts hold that it is the mere personal privilege of the vendor, which is not assignable, and consequently will not pass by the assignment of the debt; while others view it as a privilege or right inherent in the contract, which goes with the debt like any other privilege, lien, or security. We think the latter view is correct on principle, as well as equitable. Unless the vendor can sell the debt accompanied by the privilege or right to levy on the property sold in the hands of the vendee, he does not get the full benefit of the right which the statute gives him. This right is one of the things which gives value to the debt. There is no reason in equity why the vendee should hold the property as exempt against process to collect the purchase money in favor of the assignee of the vendor, any more than if the process was in favor of the vendor himself. The theory upon which the statute cited was enacted, and upon which it is held constitutional, is that the buyer ought not, as against the seller, to hold the property as exempt, until he has paid for it, and that the property passes...