Langford v. Day, 95-99001
| Decision Date | 14 April 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-99001,95-99001 |
| Citation | 110 F.3d 1380 |
| Parties | Terry Allen LANGFORD, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Rick DAY, Acting Administrator of Corrections Division; Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General of the State of Montana, Respondents-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Michael Donahoe, Helena, MT, for petitioner-appellant.
John Paulson, Deputy Attorney General, Helena, MT, for respondents-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana, Charles C. Lovell, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No.CV-91-00051-CCL.
April 14, 1997
The final paragraph of section II of the opinion filed in this case on December 24, 1996 (slip op. 15999), reported at 102 F.3d 1551, is modified as follows:
The panel has voted unanimously to deny the petition for rehearing. Judges Trott and Hawkins voted to reject the suggestion for rehearing en banc and Judge Canby has so recommended.
The full court has been advised of the suggestion for rehearing en banc and of this amendment and no active judge has requested a vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc. Fed.R.App.P. 35.
The petition for rehearing is denied and the suggestion for rehearing en banc is rejected.
Before: CANBY, TROTT and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges.
Terry Allen Langford, a Montana death-row inmate, appeals the denial of his habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and the grant of summary judgment for respondents. Langford confessed to two murders, pleaded guilty, did not present mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing, and asked for the death penalty. Soon after being sentenced to death, however, Langford obtained new counsel and moved to withdraw his guilty pleas. The Montana state courts denied his motion to withdraw his pleas and upheld his convictions and sentences.
On appeal, Langford argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel from his first attorney, who counseled him through the guilty plea and sentencing phases of this case. He also argues that the Montana Supreme Court failed to consider and give effect to mitigating evidence at sentencing, that the Montana death penalty statutes are unconstitutional because of the manner in which they were enacted, and that death by hanging is a cruel and unusual method of execution.
We have jurisdiction over Langford's claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. We affirm.
In July 1988, Montana authorities found the bodies of Edward and Celene Blackwood in their residence. The Blackwoods had been bound and shot, and Mrs. Blackwood's throat had been slashed. Certain items were missing from their house, including several guns with known serial numbers, and the Blackwood's pickup truck was also gone. The police entered the serial numbers of the guns into the National Crime Information Computer ("NCIC"). The truck was found a few days later about sixty miles away, and the police lifted latent fingerprints from inside its cab.
Later that month, Indiana authorities notified the Montana authorities that they had found a bag, containing the Blackwoods' guns, that was believed to have been abandoned by a fleeing suspect after an attempted robbery of a motel. The robbery suspect had registered at the motel as Terry Allen Langford and listed his residence as Raleigh, North Carolina. One of the guns in this bag later was determined to be the murder weapon. Langford was listed in the NCIC as a probationer in North Carolina. Montana and Indiana authorities secured Langford's fingerprints and photograph from the North Carolina authorities. The fingerprints matched those in the Blackwoods' truck. The photograph was identified as being that of the would-be robber in Indiana.
Warrants for Langford's arrest were issued in connection with the Indiana attempted robbery, and he was arrested in Raleigh, North Carolina. Upon this arrest, North Carolina police advised Langford of his Miranda rights, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1629-31, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), but Langford refused to sign a Miranda waiver form, stating that he did not want to waive any rights. 1 Consequently, the North Carolina authorities did not question Langford about the Indiana robbery or any other crime.
Three days later, the Montana police arrived to question Langford in the North Carolina jail. The Montana officers advised Langford of his Miranda rights, and Langford signed a written Miranda waiver. Langford then confessed to the murders of the Blackwoods. The Montana police transported Langford to Montana, and about three days later Langford appeared before a Montana Justice of the Peace on the charges that are the subject of this appeal.
An information then was filed in the Third Judicial District Court of Powell County, Montana (hereinafter "the state trial court"). That court appointed attorney Conde F. MacKay to represent Langford. During one of his meetings with MacKay, Langford said, "something might be wrong with me." MacKay then moved for psychiatric evaluation of Langford at the state hospital. Langford spent 54 days in the hospital. Although MacKay did not advise him that he had the right to remain silent during any psychiatric interviews, the hospital as a matter of course advised Langford that he had the right to remain silent and the right to meet with counsel, and Langford signed a form acknowledging that he had been so advised. The psychiatric report found that Langford was not suffering from a mental disease, disorder, or defect. Langford told a doctor at the hospital that he wished to plead guilty and seek the death penalty.
MacKay requested and received the Powell County investigative file on Langford's case, but the file did not contain much information about the North Carolina arrest on the Indiana charges. MacKay discussed the circumstances of the arrest with Langford, but Langford did not mention that he had refused to sign the first Miranda waiver form. MacKay discussed with Langford the possibilities of filing a motion to suppress his confession and of challenging the constitutionality of Montana's death penalty statutes. Langford told MacKay that unless MacKay could guarantee that Langford would not spend a great deal of time in prison, he wanted to plead guilty and seek the death penalty. MacKay told Langford that no attorney could give such a guarantee.
MacKay met with Langford often during the two to three months after he was released from the hospital and before he pleaded guilty. MacKay discussed defense options with Langford and urged him to think again about his decision to plead guilty, but Langford continued to insist on pleading guilty and seeking the death penalty. On January 5, 1989, Langford pleaded guilty, without a plea agreement, to the following charges: two counts of deliberate homicide, two counts of aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated burglary, one count of robbery, and one count of theft. After Langford pleaded guilty, MacKay advised the state trial court that Langford wanted all matters expedited and wanted the death penalty. The trial court ordered, over MacKay's objection, that a presentencing report be prepared.
Langford refused to be interviewed by the probation officer for the presentencing report. On the basis of the hospital evaluation of Langford's mental condition and an interview of Langford's father, the officer concluded that Langford was trying to portray himself in the worst possible light, and that it seemed that Langford was requesting the death penalty as retribution against his parents, with whom Langford had a poor relationship. The officer refused to make a sentencing recommendation because of his limited information.
At the sentencing hearing, Langford presented no mitigating evidence. MacKay advised the trial court that Langford wanted the death penalty. Langford testified at the sentencing hearing. He said he was motivated to ask for the death penalty because his lawyer told him his choices were either the death penalty or life in prison. He denied that he was seeking the death penalty as retribution against his parents. Langford said he would kill again if provoked. The sentencing judge asked him several questions, including some concerning his prior criminal history, which was not extensive. Langford testified that he regularly had used drugs, but that he was not using drugs at the time he committed the murders. Langford was twenty-two at the time he committed the crimes and at sentencing.
The state trial court sentenced Langford to death for the murders and the aggravated kidnapping counts. The aggravating factors were that Langford used a firearm in the commission of the offense, that the murders were part of a scheme that resulted in the death of two persons, and that Langford committed aggravated kidnapping that resulted in the death of two persons. The trial court said that it "searched the entire record for mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency for this Defendant and there are no such mitigating circumstances." Specifically, the trial court found that Langford did not have an extensive prior criminal record. At the time of the murders, Langford was on probation for forgery and tampering with a vehicle. The trial court found that Langford's chances of rehabilitation and treatment were "virtually nonexistent." The state trial court also sentenced Langford to consecutive terms of imprisonment totalling 100 years on the other counts.
Initially, Langford did not appeal the sentence, but automatic review proceedings nevertheless commenced in the Montana Supreme Court pursuant to statute. Before any decision was rendered, Langford filed a notice of appeal, and that appeal was consolidated with the automatic review proceedings. Langford then moved to substitute his counsel, and...
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