Langham v. State

Decision Date12 June 1990
Docket NumberNos. A90A0683,A90A0769 and A90A0803,s. A90A0683
Citation196 Ga.App. 71,395 S.E.2d 345
PartiesLANGHAM v. The STATE. BETTERSON v. The STATE. BETHEA v. The STATE.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Thomas M. West, Atlanta, for appellants, Langham and Bethea.

Richard L. Hodge, Albany, for appellant, Betterson.

Britt R. Priddy, Dist. Atty., John L. Tracy, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.

CARLEY, Chief Judge.

Appellants were indicted for possession of more than 28 grams of cocaine. In addition, appellant Betterson was indicted for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Appellants were jointly tried before a jury and verdicts of guilty were returned. The trial court entered judgments of conviction and sentences on the jury's verdicts and appellants filed separate notices of appeal. Since the three appeals raise related enumerations of error, they are hereby consolidated for appellate disposition in this single opinion.

1. Over appellant Betterson's chain of custody objection, the trial court admitted into evidence the 928 grams of pure cocaine seized from the motel room she had rented. She enumerates this evidentiary ruling as error.

The chain of custody objection was premised upon the fact that the investigating officers had seized and inventoried seven bricks or slabs of rock cocaine, but that the cocaine that was proffered for admission into evidence at trial was in the form of smaller crumbled pieces. However, there was no material discrepancy in the weight or color and there was no physical indication that the evidence bags had been improperly opened and resealed. See Richards v. State, 189 Ga.App. 146, 147(1), 375 S.E.2d 278 (1988). A witness from the State Crime Lab gave an explanation for the crumbled appearance of the rock cocaine in the bags. There being, at most, bare speculation of tampering or substitution, the trial court correctly admitted the cocaine into evidence. Johnson v. State, 143 Ga.App. 169, 170(1), 237 S.E.2d 681 (1977).

2. Appellants enumerate the general grounds. The evidence would authorize the following findings: Appellant Betterson drove from Florida to a motel in Dougherty County, Georgia, in a car that was owned by appellant Langham. Appellants Langham and Bethea followed in a rental car leased by appellant Betterson. Appellant Betterson checked into Room 235 under her own name, while appellant Langham checked into Room 240 under a false name. Acting on a tip from a confidential informant, the Dougherty County Sheriff's Department placed the two rooms under surveillance and obtained a search warrant. When the warrant was executed, all three appellants were in the room rented by appellant Langham under a false name. In appellant Betterson's purse was found the key to Room 235, as well as an automatic pistol. In Room 235, the cocaine was found in plain sight on the bed. The surveillance team members testified that both appellants Langham and Bethea moved freely between the two rooms at periodic intervals, and walked the motel corridors as if on the lookout.

The undisputed evidence that appellant Betterson had in her purse the key to the locked motel room containing the cocaine is sufficient circumstantial evidence to authorize a rational trior of fact to find that she had actual possession of the contraband, in that she exercised "direct physical control" over it. Evans v. State, 167 Ga.App. 396, 397(1), 306 S.E.2d 691 (1983). As to appellants Langham and Bethea, the evidence authorized a finding of their participation in the crime of trafficking with knowledge and intent. " '[T]he case is controlled by the well established principle that knowledge or scienter may be proved, like any other fact, by circumstantial evidence. (Cits.) Even though knowledge [was denied by appellants Langham and Bethea], the jury would be...

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18 cases
  • Milton v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • May 27, 1998
    ...or scienter may be proved, like any other fact, by circumstantial evidence." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Langham v. State, 196 Ga.App. 71, 72(2), 395 S.E.2d 345 (1990). In light of the evidence presented by the State that Milton initially fled from the police by car, was seen throw......
  • Whitfield v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • May 8, 1995
    ...explained that he weighed the cocaine "exclusive of any packaging[,]" thereby explaining the apparent discrepancy. Langham v. State, 196 Ga.App. 71(1), 72, 395 S.E.2d 345. This enumeration is without 3. In defendant's third enumeration, he contends the trial court erred in denying his motio......
  • Davidson v. State, A02A1081.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • September 4, 2002
    ...other than a weighing or recording error." Neither do we find the discrepancy in weights here to be material. Langham v. State, 196 Ga.App. 71(1), 395 S.E.2d 345 (1990). Davidson also relies on Meeks v. State, 150 Ga.App. 170, 257 S.E.2d 27 (1979). There "[t]he container of marijuana was ne......
  • Lawson v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • January 27, 2012
    ...scienter may be proved, like any other fact, by circumstantial evidence[,]” (citations and punctuation omitted) Langham v. State, 196 Ga.App. 71, 72(2), 395 S.E.2d 345 (1990), to warrant a conviction on such circumstantial evidence, “the proved facts shall not only be consistent with the hy......
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