Langley v. Chapin

• Decision Date: 22 January 1883
• Citation: 134 Mass. 82
• Parties: Henry J. Langley v. Daniel A. Chapin
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

134 Mass. 82

Henry J. Langley v. Daniel A. Chapin

Supreme Court of Massachusetts

January 22, 1883

[Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material]

Bristol. Writ of entry, dated May 18, 1881, to recover a parcel of land in Fall River. Plea nul disseisin. The tenant also filed a claim for improvements. Trial in the Superior Court without a jury, before Blodgett, J., who allowed a bill of exceptions in substance as follows:

The demandant put in a deed of the land in question from John Jenks and others to himself and Daniel McCowan, dated February 15, 1872, and a deed, dated September 17, 1873, from himself and McCowan to a corporation called the Corbitant Mills, by the terms of which the grantors, in consideration of one dollar, conveyed to said corporation the land in question, and which contained, after the description of the land, and before the habendum, the following clause: "This conveyance is made by us upon condition that the said Corbitant Mills, or its successors, will erect or cause to be erected upon said premises a cotton-factory of not less than twenty thousand spindles within two years from the date hereof."

The demandant's evidence further tended to show that the Corbitant Mills, in the fall of 1873, after the delivery of the deed, and in the spring of 1874, put in the foundation of a cottonmill, but did nothing after the last-named time towards its erection; and that, in 1877, he entered and took possession for breach of the condition contained in the deed to the corporation, and made a certificate of that fact, which was recorded in the registry of deeds at Taunton. No notice of such entry was ever given to the tenant, or those under whom he claims. The demandant testified that, after taking possession in 1877, he went on the premises very frequently, and never saw the tenant there. The demandant also put in evidence a conveyance from McCowan to himself, dated February 16, 1880.

The tenant put in evidence to show that the city of Fall River, in 1876 and 1877, sold the land in question by public auction, for non-payment of taxes, under proceedings that were regular, and bid it off, and held it until March 1, 1880, when the city gave a quitclaim deed of the land to the Corbitant Mills, the tenant paying the taxes, and that afterwards, on the same day, the Corbitant Mills gave a quitclaim deed of the land to the tenant. The deed from the city of Fall River recited that, on October 12, 1877, the city received from its treasurer and collector of taxes a conveyance of a certain parcel of real estate, upon which there was then due the city, for taxes for the year 1875, the sum of $ 96.03; that the Corbitant Mills, "who claim to be entitled to redeem said real estate, had paid to the city the sum of $ 354.81 in redemption thereof, the same being the sum due for taxes at the time of sale, together with ten per cent interest per annum thereupon, and all intervening taxes and necessary charges;" and released to the Corbitant Mills, in consideration of $ 354, "all the right, title, interest and estate which the said city of Fall River acquired under and by virtue of the said deed and all subsequent deeds of its treasurer and collector of taxes, in and to" the land in question, describing it by metes and bounds.

The tenant testified that the Corbitant Mills had expended the sum of $ 7500 in putting in a foundation and getting out stone on the land; that it built a blacksmith's shop and one or two other sheds on the land; that it did nothing in the way of building the mill after the spring of 1875; that, after the last named date, the witness went there occasionally, and had the tools and fixtures in the sheds and shops cared for until sold; and that, in 1877, he sold for the corporation one of the buildings on the land.

No tender was ever made by the demandant, or by any one in his behalf, of the taxes and charges for which the land was sold; and, after the entry in 1877, the demandant did nothing to utilize or improve the premises.

The tenant asked the judge to rule that the clause in the deed that the grantee should erect a cotton-mill in two years from the date of the deed was a covenant, if anything; that it could not work a forfeiture of the whole estate; that the demandant could not maintain his action; and that the tenant also had good title by the tax sale and mesne conveyances to him; or, if not, that the title to the land was in the city of Fall River when the demandant sued out his writ, and he could not maintain his action. The tenant also contended that, if judgment was for the demandant, he was entitled to the improvements made by his grantor. The judge ruled that the clause in the deed was a condition, and, not being complied with, worked a forfeiture of the estate; that the Corbitant Mills by its deed from the city of Fall River acquired no title against the demandant, and that the deed on the part of the city of Fall River conveyed no title; that the demandant could maintain his action, and had title; and found as a fact, upon all the evidence, that neither the tenant nor his grantor had had such possession for six years as to entitle him or his grantor to improvements; and found for the demandant. The tenant alleged exceptions.

Exceptions overruled.

H. K. Braley & M. G. B. Swift, for the tenant. 1. Grants are to be construed beneficially for the grantor, and forfeitures are not favored in law or equity. If it be doubtful whether a clause in a deed is a covenant or a condition, courts will not incline to the latter construction. The deed from McCowan and Langley to the Corbitant Mills is not, by the accepted rule of the present day, a grant upon condition subsequent, but is a conveyance of an absolute title. The words upon which the demandant relies, not being coupled with any clause of forfeiture or reentry, do not, by the strict rule of common law, work a forfeiture; and a result so disastrous to the tenant is not to be established by mere inference or argument. Rawson v. Uxbridge School District, 7 Allen 125. Chapin v. Harris, 8 Allen 594. Ayer v. Emery, 14 Allen 67. Sohier v. Trinity Church, 109 Mass. 1. The doctrine in Gray v. Blanchard, 8 Pick. 283, if ever regarded as a precedent, is overruled by the cases above cited. Stone v. Ellis, 9 Cush. 95, is not analogous, because in the case at bar the full consideration of the deed was paid.

2. If this is a condition subsequent, it was broken before February 16, 1880. McCowan never availed himself of his rights under it, and his deed to the demandant conveyed no right of reentry upon the premises. A condition in a grant of land can be reserved only to the grantor and his heirs. The privity existing between grantor and heir does not exist between grantor and grantee. Rice v. Boston & Worcester Railroad, 12 Allen 141. Stearns v. Harris, 8 Allen 597. Guild v. Richards, 16 Gray 309. Stockbridge Iron Co. v. Cone Iron Works, 102 Mass. 80, 85. Brattle Square Church v. Grant, 3 Gray 142. Dana v. Wentworth, 111 Mass. 291. Skinner v. Shepard, 130 Mass. 180. Tobey v. Moore, 130 Mass. 448. McCowan has waived the breach of the condition by not availing himself of any forfeiture. Hubbard v. Hubbard, 97 Mass. 188.

3. The entry of the demandant, without notice to the tenant or his grantors, was not sufficient. He should have given notice of his entry, and the purpose of it. Erskine v. Townsend, 2 Mass. 493. Guild v. Richards, Stone v. Ellis, and Stockbridge Iron Co. v. Cone Iron Works, ubi supra.

4. The sale and deed to the city of Fall River, for nonpayment of taxes, conveyed to the city a good title, subject to the right of redemption. Pub. Sts. c. 12, §§ 40, 42. And the demandant, not having availed himself of the provisions of the statute, has no title to, or immediate right of entry upon, the premises. Pub. Sts. c. 12, §§ 49, 58, 66.

5. The tenant is entitled to compensation for improvements. Pub. Sts. c. 173, § 17. The entry of the demandant in 1877 being insufficient to terminate the estate of the Corbitant Mills and vest it in himself, it is clear that the adverse possession of the tenant and his grantors was more than six years; and he is entitled to compensation for improvements, under the Pub. Sts. c. 173, § 18. McSorley v. Larissa, 100 Mass. 270.

J. M. Morton & A. J. Jennings, for the demandant.

OPINION

Holmes, J.

The first question raised by the bill of exceptions touches the construction of the clause of the deed of September 17, 1873 to the Corbitant Mills. There is no doubt that it...