Langley v. Conlan

• Decision Date: 24 May 1912
• Citation: 212 Mass. 135,98 N.E. 1064
• Parties: LANGLEY v. CONLAN et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

212 Mass. 135

98 N.E. 1064

LANGLEY v. CONLAN et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

May 24, 1912

COUNSEL

Chas A. Whittemore and John S. Patton, both of Boston, for demandant.

OPINION

RUGG C.J.

This is a writ of entry to recover land claimed in fee by the demandant. John O. Langley died leaving a will, duly proved and allowed in 1872, by which he gave the demanded premises to a trustee to hold for the benefit of his daughter, Eliza J. Langley, for her life, authorizing the trustee in his discretion for the benefit of his daughter Elize to sell the real estate, and empowering her to dispose of it by will. No disposition was made of it in case she failed to dispose of it by will. The only heirs at law of the testator were two daughters, Eliza and Mary. The trustee named in the will declined to accept, and the daughter Eliza was appointed administratrix with the will annexed in 1872, rendering her final account as such in 1874. By mortgage deed containing full covenants dated December 7, 1900, and duly recorded Eliza conveyed the premises in mortgage to the demandant to secure her note for $1,100. In November, 1901, Eliza acquired whatever title had vested in her sister at the death of the testator, and was appointed and qualified as first trustee under his will. In 1902 she resigned, and one Barlow was appointed trustee in her stead, who as such trustee conveyed the demanded premises to the defendant Conlan in October 1902. In November, 1902, the demandant made entry on the demanded premises to foreclose his mortgage for breach of its condition and duly recorded certificate thereof. In 1903 Eliza J. Langley died, leaving a will dated September 25, 1902, which was duly allowed, and by which she devised the demanded premises to the tenants, Conlan and one McAleer whose administrator is joined in this writ.

The question is whether the demandant makes out a title on these facts. The first point to be considered is the execution of the power conferred upon Eliza J. Langley by the will of her father to dispose of the premises by will. It has been decided that a voluntary appointment made in execution of a general power is not good against creditors, and that by such appointment the property appointed becomes in equity a part of his assets. Clapp v. Ingraham, 126 Mass. 200; Tuell v. Hurley, 206 Mass. 65, 67, 91 N.E. 1013. The question has never arisen in this commonwealth whether the donee of a power can be estopped from a voluntary exercise of the power. But it seems to follow from the decisions just cited. It is only consonant with principles of fair dealing and common sense that any conduct by the donee of a power which in good faith precludes him from making an appointment should have the effect of an estoppel. Any dealing with the estate by the donee of the power inconsistent with its exercise by which the rights of others are affected puts an end to the power. It has been so held in other jurisdictions. In re Hancock, 1906 (C. A.) 1 Ch. 173; Foakes v. Kackson [1900] 1 Ch. 807; Leggett v. Doremus, 25 N. J. Eq. 122, 127; Brown v. Renshaw, 57 Md. 67, 79; Grosvenor v. Bowen, 15 R.I. 549, 10 A. 589. This principle prevails notwithstanding the general rule that appointees by exercise of a power take, not through the person making the appointment, but through the donor of the power. Where the execution of the power is voluntary on the part of the donee, his conduct may be such as to prevent the exercise of the power. This is such a case. Eliza J. Langley made conveyance in mortgage with full covenants of warranty to the demandant. She received for her own use the consideration of the mortgage. It is hard to conceive of conduct more decisively indicating in good faith a promise not to exercise the appointment to the prejudice of the mortgagee. It follows that the appointees under the will of Eliza J. Langley have no title in the demanded premises.

The will of John O. Langley created a life estate for the benefit of his daughter Eliza. As he made no disposition of the property in the event of her failure to exercise the power of appointment, he was intestate to that extent. Hence the remainder vested in his heirs at law subject to the daughter Eliza's life estate and subject to be divested by the exercise of the power of appointment by her. At the time of the conveyance by Eliza to the defendant, she was therefore life tenant and owner in fee of one-half the remainder subject to her own power of appointment, and shortly after this mortgage she acquired the entire interest in remainder, and was appointed trustee under the will of her father, being the first to qualify as such trustee. The inquiry is whether under these circumstances the conveyance to the plaintiff passed title so as to render ineffective the deed of Barlow subsequently appointed trustee. Under these circumstances there was a merger of the life interest and the ownership of the remainder so as to vest an absolute title in Eliza.

It is a general principle that where property is given for the benefit of certain persons in such a way that no one else has or can have a possible interest in it, they are in effect absolute owners and should have the control and disposition. In such case equity will decree a dissolution of the trust. Sears v. Choate, 146 Mass. 395, 15 N.E. 786, 4 Am St. Rep. 320. It is also held generally that where the legal and equitable title of real estate both vest in the same person, the equitable title will merge in the legal estate, and absolute ownership will ensue divested of the trust. 1 Perry on Trusts (6th Ed.)...