Langon v. State, 98-0215.
Decision Date | 28 July 1999 |
Docket Number | No. 98-0215.,98-0215. |
Citation | 791 So.2d 1105 |
Parties | Steven LANGON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
James L. Eisenberg, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and James J. Carney, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
Appellant's motion for rehearing is denied. However, we republish our opinion, with two corrections, as follows:
We affirm Appellant's conviction and sentence for first-degree murder with a firearm, attempted robbery with a firearm, aggravated assault with a firearm, and carrying a concealed weapon.
Langon contends that his Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel was violated because of the court's failure to conduct a complete inquiry to determine a knowing and intelligent waiver of such right. He also asserts that his rights to assistance of counsel and to a fair trial were compromised by the court's denial of a continuance prior to trial.
In 1990, Langon was convicted of these same charges, but this court overturned that conviction and remanded for a new trial. Langon v. State, 636 So.2d 578 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). In June 1994, the trial court determined that lead counsel from the first trial, Anthony Natale, would be retained for the second. However, in July 1994, the trial court heard Natale's motion to withdraw in the first of a string of similar motions stretching over many years. Natale had irreconcilable differences with Langon and submitted a sealed affidavit as to the specifics. Langon confirmed that he wanted Natale to withdraw. The trial court rejected Natale's suggestion that Nelson Bailey, the second chair counsel in the first trial, be appointed to the case, and instead appointed Joe Atterbury. The trial court subsequently granted two motions by Atterbury for continuances. In January 1995, the trial court appointed Jorge Labarga as second chair.
In March 1995, with the trial set for April 3, Langon filed a pro se motion to discharge counsel, claiming that Atterbury's representation fell below the standards of professional conduct due to the manner in which he pursued a motion to suppress, his failure to file a motion to dismiss certain underlying charges, his failure to file a motion in limine, and his failure to investigate circumstances to effectively pursue an intoxication defense at trial. At a hearing on the motion, Atterbury asked to be discharged from the case based on the fact that Langon was refusing to discuss the case or work with him. The trial court informed Langon that he did not "get to just get two weeks from trial and say, I don't like my lawyer, and we start all over again." The trial court gave Langon a choice from the four lawyers who had worked with him previously, Atterbury, Labarga, Bailey, or Natale. Langon chose Bailey.
Bailey requested that Labarga remain on the case as second chair and asked for a few additional months to prepare. The trial court replied:
A few weeks before an October trial date, the trial court allowed Bailey to withdraw from the case due to his appointment to the county court. Labarga was then appointed as lead counsel. The trial court later allowed Labarga to withdraw because he was appointed to the circuit court. About that time, the trial court also permitted counsel, Jack Goldberger, to withdraw based on Goldberger's claim that it would be inappropriate for him to represent Langon when Atterbury, his partner, had previously withdrawn due to a conflict. The trial court then appointed Thomas Montgomery and continued the trial until August 12, 1996.
In May 1996, Langon filed a pro se motion requesting that the court remove Montgomery from the case due to an "ongoing conflict." Montgomery moved to withdraw, stating that Langon refused to see him at the jail, refused to discuss his case, refused to reply to written communications, and created a conflict by filing a writ in this court to have Montgomery removed. The trial court granted Montgomery's motion and appointed Michael Salnick as counsel. The trial court again continued the trial until February 7, 1997.
In December 1996, the trial court held a hearing on Salnick's motion to withdraw from the case. Salnick moved to withdraw at Langon's request. Langon claimed that he did not trust Salnick or feel that Salnick was keeping commitments he made to him. Salnick did not agree with Langon's representations. The state reminded the court that several of the previous attorneys on the case had run into problems similar to those encountered by Salnick and asserted that Langon was manipulating the system. The trial court denied Salnick's motion, stating, "The manipulation must end." (emphasis supplied)
Salnick later filed a motion for continuance based on the fact that Langon refused to see and cooperate with him until the jail made a change in Langon's housing. The court granted the motion but found that Langon had been "manipulative of the system in the extreme." The trial court made "a sort of plea" to Langon to cooperate with Salnick.
In January 1997, Langon filed a pro se motion to discharge Salnick. Salnick informed the court that he had no attorney-client relationship with Langon because Langon refused to see him or anyone from his office. Salnick stated that James Eisenberg would be willing to take the case. Langon stated that he would cooperate with Eisenberg as best as he could. The court warned:
Langon stated that he understood. The court clarified:
Langon agreed. The case was reset for trial twice thereafter.
On May 27, 1997, Eisenberg filed a motion to withdraw. According to Eisenberg, inmates with counsel were entitled to only one hour per week in the jail law library while other inmates were allowed twice that much. Langon wished to spend more time in the law library, and if this extra time were denied him, he wished to proceed pro se. Langon then filed a pro se "amended motion to allow counsel to withdraw and to allow defendant to represent himself." At the hearing on these motions, the following exchange took place:
Thereafter, Langon asked for a three month continuance. The court told Eisenberg:
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