Langs v. Harder

• Decision Date: 04 December 1973
• Citation: 165 Conn. 490,338 A.2d 458
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: , 80 A.L.R.3d 759 Jannie LANGS, Guardian of the Estate of Everett C. Langs, et al. v. John F. HARDER, Commissioner of Welfare.

Page 458

338 A.2d 458

165 Conn. 490, 80 A.L.R.3d 759

Jannie LANGS, Guardian of the Estate of Everett C. Langs, et al. v. John F. HARDER, Commissioner of Welfare.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Dec. 4, 1973.

Certiorari Denied May 13, 1974. See 94 S.Ct. 2409.

Edward F. Pasiecznik, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, was Robert K. Killian, Atty. Gen., for appellant (defendant).

James I. Lotstein, Hartford, with whom, on the brief, was Paul W. Orth, Hartford, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before HOUSE, C.J., and SHAPIRO, LOISELLE, MacDONALD and BOGDANSKI, JJ.

MacDONALD, Associate Justice.

The basic question presented by this appeal is whether the defendant welfare commissioner abused his discretion and acted arbitrarily and unreasonably in discontinuing welfare assistance granted for the support of the plaintiff Jannie Langs' minor child Everett Langs who was the beneficiary of an estate of over $14,000 resulting from the settlement of a personal injury claim, that estate being held by the plaintiff, under the control of a Probate Court, for the use of the minor.

The facts, as summarized in the pleadings and in the memoranda of decision filed by the courts below are not in dispute. Everett Langs, at the age of two years, was badly bitten on the face by a dog and a tort claim in his behalf against the owner of the dog was settled for an amount approved by the Probate Court for the district of Hartford and which, after payment of medical expenses, attorney's fees and costs, resulted in the payment to the plaintiff, as guardian, of the net sum of $14,144.65. This sum of money, at all times relevant hereto, has been held by the plaintiff as guardian of her minor son's estate in a savings account under the supervision of the Probate Court.

At the time of obtaining the settlement funds, and for some time prior thereto, the plaintiff and her six minor children, including Everett, were recipients of welfare assistance awards from the Connecticut state welfare department under the state's aid to dependent children program, hereafter called A.D.C., which is, in part, federally funded. Upon learning of Everett's tort claim settlement and the guardianship of his estate, the defendant commissioner of welfare found him ineligible to receive assistance as a dependent child and removed him from public assistance effective March 31, 1969. The plaintiff requested a fair hearing under § 17-2a of the General Statutes claiming that such discontinuance of assistance was wrongful, and after such hearing the designated hearing officer upheld the decision of the defendant commissioner. This decision was appealed by the plaintiff under the provisions of § 17-2b to the Circuit Court which found that the commissioner did not as a matter of law abuse his discretion and that he was not arbitrary or unreasonable in discontinuing assistance to Everett. On appeal from that decision, the Appellate Division of the Court of Common Pleas found error and directed judgment sustaining the plaintiff's appeal and from that judgment, upon the granting of certification, the defendant has appealed to this court.

It is the position of the defendant commissioner that the right to receive welfare is purely statutory and that he was not authorized by statute to distribute welfare to Everett Langs under the conditions existing on March 31, 1969, when such assistance was terminated. In determining whether he abused his discretion and acted arbitrarily and unreasonably, therefore, we first must examine the applicable statutes in effect on that date.

Section 17-90 of the General Statutes provides, in relevant part, that '(t)he commissioner shall grant aid only if he finds the applicant eligible therefor . . ..' and § 17-94 provides that he 'may, at any time, modify, suspend or discontinue any aid previously granted, when such action is necessary in order to carry out the provisions of this part.' Section 17-82 defines a 'dependent child' as meaning 'a needy child under the age of eighteen . . . who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent, and who is living with his father, mother . . . or any other relative . . .' and § 17-87 provides that '(a)id shall be granted on behalf of such dependent child or children and for the needs of such supervising relative to any such relative eligible therefor under this part to an extent adequate to enable the relative caring for such child or children, together with all other available income and support, to maintain a standard of living in the home reasonably compatible with health and decency for such child or children.'

Section 17-83 directs that the 'commissioner shall make regulations necessary to enable him to carry out the provisions of this chapter,' and one of the regulations issued pursuant to that directive states 'Need exists when it is found that income and resources available to the individual or family group are insufficient to provide the standard of living which the Department considers compatible with 'health and decency." State Welfare Department Policies, 1 Public Assistance Manual, c. III, index 300. 'Income and resources are interpreted as including (1) Capital assets in the form of real or personal property . . . (2) Available income, in cash or kind whether received regularly or occasionally.' Id., index 302. ¹ Included among the types of personal property requiring consideration in relation to eligibility are 'Cash (on hand, in safe deposit box or elsewhere)' and 'Bank accounts (savings or checking accounts).' Id., index 321.

The plaintiff's first contention is that the settlement funds were not a 'resource' within the purview of the above statutes and regulations. She argues, in support of this proposition, that (1) the purpose of tort recovery is to restore the injured party to his original position, i.e., to 'make him whole,' and (2) that § 104 of the Internal Revenue Code; 26 U.S.C. § 104; recognizes that personal injury recoveries are, in effect, reimbursements for damages since they are not to be recognized or taxed as income.

We find the plaintiff's reliance upon the Internal Revenue Code to be unpersuasive. The central issue presented on this appeal is the scope of the commissioner's discretion in discontinuing welfare assistance which, in turn, ultimately depends upon an interpretation of the term 'available resource.' The fact that the fund in question herein is not to be taxed as income by the federal government is hardly determinative of whether it is a 'resource' 'available' for the support of the minor within the purview of the applicable state welfare statutes and regulations. If any federal statute were to be considered as having a bearing on the issues presented here it would be federal welfare, not tax, legislation. In this regard Congress has provided, in 42 U.S.C. § 601 et seq., for making payments to states which have adopted approved plans for aid to needy families with dependent children. The federal law, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a), provides that the state plan must '(7) except as may be otherwise provided in clause (8), provide that the State agency shall, in determining need, take into consideration any other income and resources of any child or relative claiming aid . . ..' (Emphasis added.) Clause (8) of § 602(a) provides that the state shall exclude from such consideration earned income of dependent children in certain situations not relevant here. It is worthy of note that Congress in mandating the consideration of 'any other income and resources' of the child in determining need has seen fit specifically to exclude from such consideration only certain earned income and has made no reference to excluding other income or resources of the child from such consideration.

Insofar as the Internal Revenue Code is concerned, it is clear that, if it is relevant at all, it can serve only as a buttress to the plaintiff's main argument that the purpose of tort recovery is to restore the injured party to his original position, in that it is at least one legislative recognition of that theory. See, e.g., Starrels v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 304 F.2d 574 (9th Cir.).

The plaintiff's 'make whole' argument is, at least at first blush, a compelling one. It has been stated that the purpose of tort recovery is to restore the injured party to his original position. See, e.g., Wright, Connecticut Law of Torts (2d Ed.), p. 351. At the same time, however, it frequently has been pointed out by this court that damages in personal injury cases are necessarily somewhat nebulous and cannot be ascertained with certainty. 'Proper compensation for personal injuries cannot be computed by mathematical formula, and the law furnishes no precise rule for their assessment.' Lopez v. Price, 145 Conn. 560, 569, 145 A.2d 127, 132; Russakoff v. Stamford, 134 Conn. 450, 455, 58 A.2d 517; Knight v. Continental Automobile Mfg. Co., 82 Conn. 291, 293, 73 A. 751. It can be argued that the theory of 'making whole' was established essentially for the guidance of a jury or court in determining damages. Here that evaluation already has been reduced to cash in the bank by the settlement of the tort claim.

Furthermore, there is no evidence whatsoever that any of the funds in question are needed to make the plaintiff's minor son whole in any realistic sense, i.e., for special surgery, skin grafts, artificial limbs or similar remedial expenses. At the fair hearing the plaintiff's attorney maintained that the plaintiff desired to place allotted funds in an educational trust to be used for higher education or special education and training. The plaintiff in her brief maintains that one of the reasons the funds are needed is to allow Everett to 'escape the cycle of poverty,' apparently through education. These assertions are, at least to some extent, inconsistent with the 'make whole' argument....