Anderson v. Morris
| Decision Date | 18 November 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 43655,43655 |
| Citation | 87 Wn.2d 706,558 P.2d 155 |
| Parties | Karen E. ANDERSON and Emily Peterson, on their own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Appellants, v. Charles R. MORRIS, Individually and in his capacity as Secretary of the Washington State Department of Social and Health Services, Respondent, and Virginia Westerberg, Intervenor. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Northwest Washington Legal Services, Lonnie G. Davis, Janalee R. Strandberg, Everett, for appellants.
Slade Gorton, Atty. Gen., Walter E. White, Asst. Atty. Gen., Olympia, for respondents.
Legal Services Center, Jack Archer, Linda L. Dawson, Patrick H. McIntrye, Seattle, for intervenor.
This appeal concerns the way in which the State Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) treats 'lump sum' payments in the administration of the Aid For Dependent Children (AFDC). The appellants, Karen E. Anderson and Emily Peterson, both receive monthly assistance grants under AFDC. Appellant Anderson received an income tax refund check which was endorsed by her but cashed by her former husband. Even though she did not receive any of the funds, DSHS characterized the refund as 'income' within AFDC, reduced her monthly grant as a consequence, and ultimately assessed an overpayment subject to the administrative review process. Appellant Peterson, in addition to receiving an income tax refund ($78), also received a cash inheritance ($98). The DSHS classified both of these items as 'income' and as a consequence, terminated appellant Peterson's monthly grant, again subject to the administrative review process.
On July 18, 1974, the appellants sued the respondent, Charles R. Morris, individually and as Secretary of DSHS for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, seeking to invalidate respondent's definition of 'income,' to enjoin the use of the presumption that such 'income' was 'actually available,' and to require the release of wrongfully withheld funds. The case was certified as a class action on October 7, 1974, on the first two issues of the validity of respondent's definition of 'income' and the correctness of the presumption that such 'income' is 'actually available.' The class represented by appellants consists of public assistance recipients under AFDC who have been notified that their monthly grants would be reduced or terminated due to the receipt of similar 'lump sum' amounts. Following trial in this matter, the superior court entered a judgment of dismissal on February 3, 1975, and it is from this judgment that appellants appeal.
Intervenor, Virginia Westerberg, is a member of the class represented by the appellants. Her position is presented on an agreed statement of facts. Intervenor worked from January to June, 1973, and began receiving AFDC benefits in October, 1973. In March, 1974, she received an income tax refund ($466). As with appellants, DSHS classified this amount as 'income' within the AFDC program and as a result assessed an overpayment against intervenor. Intervenor argued that she was entitled to apply this amount against certain exemptions created by Washington in administering AFDC and thus DSHS could not consider the refund in determining intervenor's monthly assistance level. By order of this court dated October 17, 1975, intervenor was allowed to join appellants in this appeal in order to present this argument.
The first issue in this appeal is whether the state definition of 'income' contained in RCW 74.04.005(12) and WAC 388--22--030(34) is valid. The appellants argue that it is inconsistent with federal regulations and therefore cannot stand. We agree.
AFDC, which was created by 42 U.S.C. §§ 601--10, is a joint federal-state program involving federal funding and state administration. A state need not participate in the program but if it does, then the state system must be consistent with the federal legislation creating the program and the federal rules and regulations implementing it. See Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 286, 92 S.Ct. 502, 30 L.Ed.2d 448 (1971); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 420, 90 S.Ct. 1207, 25 L.Ed.2d 442 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316--17, 333 & n. 34, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968); Rodriquez v. Vowell, 472 F.2d 622, 624 (5th Cir.), Cert. denied, 412 U.S. 944, 93 S.Ct. 2777, 37 L.Ed.2d 404 (1973).
With regard to the present case, the pertinent federal statutory provision is 42 U.S.C. § 602(a).
(a) A State plan for aid and services to needy families with children must . . . (7) . . . provide that the State agency shall, in determining need, take into consideration any other income and resources of any child or relative claiming aid to families with dependent children . . .
The applicable implementing regulation, promulgated by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, is contained in 45 CFR 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(c) (1973): 1(I)n establishing financial eligibility and the amount of the assistance payment . . . (c) only such net income as is actually available for current use on a regular basis will be considered, and only currently available resources will be considered . . .
Under this regulation, in order to be considered in determining eligibility and need, income must meet all three requirements, I.e., it must be 'actually available for current use on a regular basis.' See Kaisa v. Chang, 396 F.Supp. 375, 377 (D.Haw.1975).
The definition of income adopted by the state legislature is found in RCW 74.04.005(12). 'Income' consists of
(a)ll appreciable gains in real or personal property (cash or kind) or other assets, which are received by or become available for use and enjoyment by an applicant or recipient after applying for or receiving public assistance . . .
See WAC 388--22--030(34). It is clear that this definition at most requires actual availability for current use. Under the state definition of income, nonregular gains or amounts that are currently available may be considered as 'income.' It is under this definition that the DSHS in the present case determined that the 'lump sum' amounts, consisting of income tax refunds and a cash inheritance, constituted 'income' and were to be considered as such in determining eligibility and need under AFDC.
Respondent suggests and it has been argued that an annual income tax refund is 'regular' and therefore within the federal definition of 'income.' See Walker v. Juras, 16 Or.App. 295, 297, 518 P.2d 63 (1974). We feel that this reasoning is unpersuasive, however, since the amount of a tax refund is not certain until it is actually received and it is received only once a year if at all. Consequently, a tax refund is not 'regular' in the ordinary sense of the word. See Kaisa v. Chang, supra at 377 n. 13. Respondent also argues that in effect appellants are really challenging the state's determinations as to standard of need and level of benefits, an area in which the state unquestionably has complete authority. See King v. Smith, supra, 392 U.S. at 318, 88 S.Ct. 2128. This argument is clearly without merit because while it is true that the state determines its own standards as to need and benefit levels in terms of a recipient's 'income' and 'resources,' it nevertheless must do so within the applicable federal regulations and definitions.
In order to treat a 'lump sum' receipt as 'income' within the federal regulation applicable to the present case, the receipt must be available 'on a regular basis.' To the extent that the State definition of 'income' contained in RCW 74.04.005(12) allows otherwise, it is invalid under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution and cannot stand. See Townsend v. Swank, supra; Rosado v. Wyman, supra; King v. Smith,supra, 392 U.S. at 316--17, 333 n. 34, 88 S.Ct. 2128. Since an income tax refund or cash inheritance is not available on a regular basis, it is not 'income' within 45 CFR 233.20(a)(3)(ii) (c) (1973), and cannot be considered as income for the purpose of determining eligibility and need under AFDC. See Kaisa v. Chang, supra at 377--78, citing Carr v. Saucier, Civil No. 16,704 (N.D.Ga., March 29, 1973), and County of Alameda v. Carleson, 5 Cal.3d 730, 749, 97 Cal.Rptr. 385, 488 P.2d 953, 966 (1971), Appeal dismissed,406 U.S. 913, 92 S.Ct. 1762, 32 L.Ed.2d 112 (1972).
This does not mean, of course, that such 'lump sum' payments are not to be considered at all in the determination of eligibility and need. 'Lump sum' payments would still constitute a 'resource' within 45 CFR 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(c) (1973) and could be taken into consideration to the extent they are 'currently available.' Cf. Kaisa v. Chang, supra at 377 n. 10; Langs v. Harder, 165 Conn. 490, 338 A.2d 458, 461 (1973), Cert. denied, 416 U.S. 994, 94 S.Ct. 2409, 40 L.Ed.2d 774 (1974).
The second issue raised by the appellants concerns the Department's treatment of 'lump sum' amounts in terms of 'actual availability.' Appellants contend that DSHS impermissibly presumes that once a public assistance recipient received such amounts, they are 'actually available' and therefore properly considered in determining eligibility and need under AFDC. Since we have decided that irregular 'lump sum' amounts are resources rather than income, we will consider this argument in terms of 'current availability,' the standard for resources under 45 CFR 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(c) (1973).
Contrary to appellants' assertion, there has been no showing that DSHS employs an Irrebuttable presumption when a 'lump sum' amount is received by a public assistance recipient. DSHS presumes merely that once such an amount is received by the recipient and is under her or his control, it is 'currently (actually) available' to meet the needs of the recipient and therefore properly considered in determining AFDC eligibility and need. Following the recipt of a 'lump sum' amount and a DSHS determination that it is currently available, it is up to the recipient to rebut the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Vaessen v. Woods
...be deemed available on a regular basis and hence were not income for AFDC purposes. (396 F.Supp. at pp. 377-378.) In Anderson v. Morris (1976) 87 Wash.2d 706, 558 P.2d 155, the Washington State Supreme Court also found that "a tax refund is not 'regular' in the ordinary sense of the word" a......
-
State v. Schelin
...24, of the Washington Constitution. It is our duty to avoid such a statutory construction if at all possible. Anderson v. Morris, 87 Wash.2d 706, 716, 558 P.2d 155 (1976). THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS IS ABSOLUTE WITHIN THE SCOPE OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 24 Appropriate constitutional analys......
-
Roy v. City of Everett
...harmonizing all provisions to ensure proper construction. (Citations omitted.) Similarly, a unanimous court in Anderson v. Morris, 87 Wash.2d 706, 716, 558 P.2d 155 (1976) [I]f alternative interpretations are possible, the one that best advances the overall legislative purpose should be ado......
-
State v. Yishmael
...uphold its constitutionality." State v. Reyes , 104 Wash.2d 35, 41, 700 P.2d 1155 (1985) (emphasis added) (citing Anderson v. Morris , 87 Wash.2d 706, 716, 558 P.2d 155 (1976) ). We should not interpret a statute in a manner that could transform it into an unconstitutional restriction on fr......
-
The Short Happy Life of Litigation Between Tortfeasors: Contribution, Indemnification and Subrogation After Washington's Tort Reform Acts
...v. MGM/UA Entertainment Co., 106 Wash. 2d 1, 6, 721 P.2d 1, 4 (1986) (citations omitted). 269. Anderson v. Morris, 87 Wash. 2d 706, 716, 558 P.2d 155, 161 270. In re R., 97 Wash. 2d 182, 187, 641 P.2d 704, 707 (1982). 271. 114 Wash. 2d 550, 789 P.2d 84 (1990). 272. See id. at 558, 789 P.2d ......