Langston v. Lundsford
| Decision Date | 19 February 1936 |
| Citation | 122 Fla. 813,165 So. 898 |
| Parties | LANGSTON v. LUNDSFORD. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Petition for habeas corpus by A. I. Langston against N. B. Lundsford as police officer of the City of Panama City.
Petitioner discharged from custody.
COUNSEL H. H. Wells, B. K. Roberts, William K Whitfield, and C. N. Ashmore, all of Tallahassee, for petitioner.
J. M. & H. P. Sapp, of Panama City, for respondent.
The petitioner for the writ of habeas corpus, A. I. Langston, of Leon county, Fla., alleges that he is unlawfully detained by the respondent, a police officer of Panama City, Fla., by virtue of a judgment of the municipal court of Panama City, Fla., predicated upon an affidavit and testimony, copy of which is attached.
On habeas corpus proceedings, the court will inquire whether the complaint upon which a defendant is held, or has been convicted, charges a public offense, and when it finds that, to the charge preferred, no criminality is attached by law, the party imprisoned is entitled to his discharge. Ex parte Bailey, 39 Fla. 734, 23 So. 552; Bell v. Gregory, 89 Fla. 293, 103 So. 832; Crosby v. Chapman, 114 Fla. 19, 153 So. 149; State ex rel. Cacciatore v. Drumbright, 116 Fla. 496, 156 So. 721, 97 A.L.R. 154.
The affidavit upon which petitioner was convicted charged that on October 29, 1935, in Panama City, Fla., 'he did engage in the business of soliciting and taking orders or requests for vinous, malt and alcoholic liquors for Tampa Florida Breweries, an organization engaged in the business of distributors of such liquors and which had not paid a license in the City of Panama City for such business, he, the said Langston, not having obtained the license required, contrary to the ordinance in such cases made and provided,' etc.
The ordinance, No. 220, relied on by respondent, provides that 'each and every person who shall engage in the business of soliciting and taking orders or requests within the City of Panama City for vinous, malt or alcoholic liquors, for persons, business houses or organizations engaged in the business of distributors of such liquors who shall not have paid a license to the City of Panama City for such business and for delivery within the City of Panama City and when the same shall not constitute interstate commerce, shall prior to so engaging in such business of soliciting or agency, obtain from the city a license for such privilege,' etc., fixing the amount of the license, and the fine or imprisonment for its violation. This ordinance was adopted September 28, 1935.
Panama City has under its charter a general power to impose a tax 'upon any and all business, professions or occupations engaged in or carried on, either wholly or in part,' within the city, 'whether the same be taxed by the State or not.' It is argued that this authorized the adoption of the ordinance in question.
But if this particular attempt to exercise the general charter power referred to, as represented by this ordinance, was in violation of, or repugnant to, a state law, which had the effect of taking away from the city the power to adopt such an ordinance, then the charge upon which petitioner was tried and convicted in the municipal court stated no offense to which any criminality could be attached.
In May of 1935, the Legislature adopted chapter 16774, which is a general statute designed to cover the field of both regulation and taxation of the manufacture, distribution, and sale of all beverages containing more than 1 per cent. of alcohol. This act provides what licenses manufacturers and distributors and vendors shall pay, and a licensed distributor is authorized to sell to other licensed distributors and licensed vendors, not only within the county where his or its principal place of business is located, but elsewhere in the state, and authorizes them to transport, or cause to be transported such beverages covered by their licenses from one place in this state to another in this state, or beyond its boundaries, for sale at wholesale, except in counties in this state where their sale is prohibited. And they are authorized to maintain branch offices within, or without the state, but for each and every branch establishment conducted, an annual license is required. In section 5 of the act, it is provided that: 'It shall not be necessary for the employees, agents or servants of any licensee to obtain a license to engage in the business herein referred to as such agents, servants or employees of such licensee.'
Section 7 of the act reads as follows:
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American Bakeries Co. v. Haines City
...should be applied to the case at bar. It cannot strike down a statute by implication as is attempted here. Fourth. In Langston v. Lundsford, 122 Fla. 813, 165 So. 898, based on chapter 16774, Acts of 1935, there is contained general repealing clause, whereas chapter 18011, Acts of 1937, whi......
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State ex rel. Limpus v. Newell
...City, 131 Fla. 790, 180 So. 524; State ex rel. First Savings & Trust Co. of Tampa v. Sholtz, 125 Fla. 361, 169 So. 849; Langston v. Lundsford, 122 Fla. 813, 165 So. 898; Sanders v. Howell, 73 Fla. 563, 74 So. It is our conclusions that the quoted portion of Subsection (3) of Section 4 of Ch......
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...a tax, it is violative of Ch. 323, supra, and rightly so. See Anderson v. Wentworth, 1918, 75 Fla. 300, 78 So. 265; Langston v. Lundsford, 1936, 122 Fla. 813, 165 So. 898. Before discussing this question it should be noted that the petitioners are not objecting to the city's regulation of t......