Langston v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co.

• Decision Date: 09 November 1909
• Docket Number: 1,737.
• Citation: 65 S.E. 1094,6 Ga.App. 833
• Parties: LANGSTON v. POSTAL TELEGRAPH CABLE CO.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

65 S.E. 1094

6 Ga.App. 833

LANGSTON v. POSTAL TELEGRAPH CABLE CO.

No. 1,737.

Court of Appeals of Georgia

November 9, 1909

Syllabus by the Court.

The evidence disclosing that the foreman, with whom was made the alleged contract by which it was sought to bind the defendant, was a special agent, and that the contract was beyond the scope of his authority, there was no error in awarding a nonsuit. Neither the nature of the duties performed by the foreman nor his title indicated a general agency to employ teams for a term of months. Under the undisputed evidence this foreman was a special agent with limited powers, and the plaintiff was bound, at his peril, to take notice of the extent of his authority.

The letter objected to, not tending to show a ratification of the alleged contract, was properly repelled as irrelevant.

The term "foreman" does not imply, ex vi termini, that it was the duty of the person so designated, or within his power simply as foreman of a gang of laborers, to employ laborers over whom he acted as foreman (citing Words and Phrases, vol. 3, p. 2892).

Error from City Court of Macon; Robt. Hodges, Judge.

Action by C.J. Langston against the Postal Telegraph Cable Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

Hardeman Jones & Johnston, for plaintiff in error.

Roland Ellis and Anderson, Felder, Rountree & Wilson, for defendant in error.

RUSSELL J.

Langston excepts to the grant of a nonsuit, and to various rulings admitting and rejecting evidence. His suit alleged a contract made by one Cofer, a foreman of a construction gang, for the hire of two teams for a definite term, and a breach of the contract by discharge of the teams before the expiration of the term. The nonsuit was granted, because the court was of the opinion that the foreman had no authority so to contract on behalf of the corporation for the hire of teams and men. It is true that it appeared that this foreman had authority to contract somewhat in behalf of the corporation for the hire of teams and men. It further appeared that the corporation recognized this authority, by paying for the hire of Langston's teams, and of others teams and men. It further appeared, however, that Cofer had explicit instructions not to hire teams, except by the day, and "subject to be discharged at the end of the day," and that the plaintiff knew that he had been hiring other teams by the day only. Cofer was only foreman "in charge of" the work of moving the posts and wire of the telegraph company between Macon and Ft. Valley. He selected the men and the teams he wished to employ, and "had authority to employ the teams locally for the work he was engaged in." "He had binding instructions to report to me [Superintendent of Construction B. S. Price] how many teams he had employed, and the terms on which he had employed them." He did not report in this case what teams he had employed and the terms of the contract he had made; but the corporation's money paid for the services actually rendered by the teams.

Was Langston a general agent, or only a special agent? The plaintiff in error insists that the case is controlled by the familiar rule that secret limitations upon the authority of a general agent are not binding upon a person dealing with him unless such limitations are known to such person. As this rule applies specifically to general agents, as will appear from a reading of section 3023 of the Civil Code of 1895, the real...