Langston v. State

• Decision Date: 28 October 1899
• Citation: 35 S.E. 166,109 Ga. 153
• Parties: LANGSTON v. STATE. [1]
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

35 S.E. 166

109 Ga. 153

LANGSTON v. STATE. ^[1]

Supreme Court of Georgia

October 28, 1899

Syllabus by the Court.

An indictment which charges the accused with seducing a virtuous unmarried female "by persuasion and promises of marriage, and by other false and fraudulent means," is demurrable for failure to set forth by what means, other than persuasion, accompanied by promises of marriage, the alleged seduction was accomplished.

Error from superior court, Floyd county; W. M. Henry, Judge.

Will Langston was convicted of crime, and brings error. Reversed.

Little J., dissenting.

M. B Eubanks, for plaintiff in error.

Moses Wright, Sol. Gen., for the State.

LUMPKIN P.J.

The only question for decision in this case is whether or not the court erred in overruling a special demurrer to the indictment. It charged the accused with the offense of seducing one Emma Oliver "by persuasion and promises of marriage, and by other false and fraudulent means." The main point presented by the demurrer was that the indictment failed to set forth what were the "other false and fraudulent means" employed by the accused in accomplishing the alleged seduction. In our judgment, this point was well taken. Section 387 of the Penal Code specifically declares that the offense of seduction may be committed either by "persuasion and promises of marriage," or by "other false and fraudulent means"; that is, means not consisting of mere persuasion accompanied by promises of marriage. This court, in the noted case of Wood v. State, 48 Ga. 192, distinctly and in terms recognized the distinction between seduction accomplished by persuasion and promises of marriage and seduction brought about by false and fraudulent means of a different character. While section 929 of the Penal Code provides that "every indictment or accusation of the grand jury shall be deemed sufficiently technical and correct which states the offense in the terms and language of this Code, or so plainly that the nature of the offense charged may be easily understood by the jury," yet, as has been held by this court, the purpose of this section was not to dispense with good pleading, or to deny to one accused of an offense which may be committed in more than one way a statement of the facts relied on to establish his guilt sufficiently full and complete to put him upon reasonable notice of what he is called upon to meet. Johnson v State, 90 Ga. 441, 444, ...