Langton v. Cbeyond Communication, L.L.C.
| Decision Date | 18 September 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:03-CV-121.,2:03-CV-121. |
| Citation | 282 F.Supp.2d 504 |
| Parties | Marlin Todd LANGTON, Plaintiff, v. CBEYOND COMMUNICATION, L.L.C., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
Rowe Jack Ayres, Jr., Addison, TX, for plaintiff.
Lisa A. Dreishmire, Bracewell & Patterson, LLP, Dallas, TX, for defendant.
Defendant Cbeyond Communications, L.L.C. ("Cbeyond") has filed a motion to either dismiss Plaintiff Marlin Todd Langton's ("Langton") claims, or transfer venue (Docket # 3). Cbeyond asks the Court to dismiss, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Langton's claims for fraudulent inducement to contract, negligence, tortious interference, business disparagement, and libel and slander. Furthermore, Cbeyond seeks to dismiss or transfer any remaining claims to the Northern District of Texas on grounds that the Eastern District is an improper venue or, alternatively, for convenience of the parties and witnesses. The Court GRANTS Cbeyond's motion to dismiss Langton's claim for fraudulent inducement and DENIES Cbeyond's remaining motions.
This action stems from Langton's time as a Cbeyond salesman. Cbeyond is a competitive local exchange carrier of telecommunications services that targets small businesses. Langton was one of many salespersons in Cbeyond's employ. Cbeyond has only two offices in Texas, one in Dallas and another in Ft. Worth. Although Langton worked out of the Dallas office, approximately one third of his time was spent with customers in the Eastern District of Texas. Cbeyond allegedly targeted businesses in the Eastern District of Texas and encouraged its salespeople to visit up to 50 businesses a day whenever they worked in the Eastern District. In fact, up to 7% of Cbeyond's Texas business comes from customers in the Eastern District.
Langton worked as a salesman for Cbeyond for only two months. During that time, Langton and Cbeyond had a falling out, and Langton sought other employment. Ionex, a company in a similar line of business as Cbeyond, offered Langton a job. Langton accepted the position and resigned from Cbeyond. Langton alleges that after he resigned, Cbeyond disparaged his reputation and character to his new employer and customers. This lawsuit arises out of Cbeyond's alleged conduct after Langton resigned.
Cbeyond contends that Langton has not sufficiently pled his claim for fraudulent inducement to contract under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). Rule 9(b) applies to all fraud claims, including fraudulent inducement to contract. FED.R.CIV.P. 9(b); Window Headquarters, Inc. v. MAI Basic Four, Inc., 1994 WL 673519, *5 (S.D.N.Y.1994); Croce v. Hirsch, 1990 WL 29362, *1 (S.D.N.Y.1990). Rule 9(b) requires parties to state the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake "with particularity," but allows them to plead the mens rea generally. FED. R.CIV.P. 9(b). Simply put, a party must plead "the who, what, when, and where" to state a claim for fraud. Williams v. WMX Technologies, Inc., 112 F.3d 175, 178 (5th Cir.1997). However, courts are to read 9(b)'s heightened pleading requirement in conjunction with Rule 8(a)'s insistence upon simple, concise, and direct allegations. Id. Thus, "while 9(b) stands as an exception to an overarching policy of immediate access to discovery, it [does] not reflect a subscription to fact pleading." Id.
Langton's pleadings fall short of 9(b)'s heightened pleading requirement. Langton's Complaint states "Plaintiff would show that Defendant knowingly or recklessly made statements and representations to the Plaintiff that were both material and false, with the intent that the Plaintiff act upon these representations." (P's Comp. ¶ 23.) Langton's Complaint does not specify what statements were made, when the statements were made, or where the statements were made. Similarly, the plaintiffs in Williams sold their company based on the defendant's misrepresentations. Id. Although the plaintiffs had specifically identified the people who made and received the misrepresentations, the Williams court found the pleadings deficient because the plaintiffs did not state a time or place that the representations were made. Id. Here, Langton has not specified the what, when, nor where of the fraudulent inducement, and thus has failed to meet his pleading obligation. Accordingly, the court GRANTS Cbeyond's motion and dismisses Langton's fraudulent inducement claim without prejudice.
Although Langton's pleadings leave much to be desired, the Court will not dismiss under 12(b)(6). Dismissal under 12(b)(6) is only appropriate if "it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984). In this case, Langton's Complaint sets forth the basic facts leading up to the dispute, but gives no indication of how Cbeyond has been negligent. Although the pleadings are vague, the court cannot say with certainty that Langton can prove no set of facts that would permit recovery. Had Langton previously failed to comply with an Order for a More Definite Statement, the Court might be willing to grant Cbeyond relief under 12(b)(6). However, that is not this case's procedural posture, and the Court denies Cbeyond's motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6), at this time.
Langton's pleadings regarding his tortious interference claim, like his negligence claim, leave much to be desired. However, as with the negligence claim, the Court is not convinced that Langton can plead no set of facts that would permit recovery. Had Langton previously failed to comply with an Order for a More Definite Statement, the Court might be willing to grant Cbeyond relief under 12(b)(6). However, that is not this case's procedural posture, and the Court denies Cbeyond's motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6), at this time.
The Court will not dismiss this claim under 12(b)(6) for the same reasons as Langton's Negligence and Tortious Interference claims.
The Court will not dismiss this claim under 12(b)(6) for the same reasons as Langton's Negligence and Tortious Interference claims.
Cbeyond argues that the Court should dismiss Langton's Complaint under FED. R.CIV.P. 12(b)(3) because venue is not proper in the Eastern District. Alternatively, Cbeyond argues that the Court should transfer venue to the Northern District of Texas for the parties' and witnesses' convenience. The Court addresses each argument in turn.
Federal Rule 12(b)(3) allows defendants to move for dismissal based on improper venue. FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(3); Bigham v. Envirocare of Utah, Inc., 123 F.Supp.2d 1046, 1047-48 (S.D.Tex.2000). Once a defendant raises a 12(b)(3) motion to dismiss for improper venue, the burden of sustaining venue lies with the plaintiff. Laserdynamics Inc. v. Acer America Corp., 209 F.R.D. 388, 390 (S.D.Tex.2002); Bigham, 123 F.Supp.2d at 1048. If there is no evidentiary hearing, a plaintiff may carry its burden by presenting facts, taken as true, that establish venue. Laserdynamics, Inc., 209 F.R.D. at 390. Courts will accept uncontroverted facts in a plaintiff's pleadings as true, and will resolve any conflicts in the plaintiff's favor. Id.
Langton's assertion of venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1) requires the Court to determine whether Cbeyond would be subject to personal jurisdiction in the Eastern District of Texas, were the Eastern District a separate state. Section 1391 provides in relevant part "a civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship may . . . be brought only in (1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1). Section 1391 further declares "in a State which has more than one judicial district and in which a defendant that is a corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time an action is commenced, such corporation shall be deemed to reside in any district in that State within which its contacts would be sufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate State." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). The parties do not dispute that jurisdiction is properly based on diversity of citizenship nor that Cbeyond was subject to personal jurisdiction in Texas when this action was commenced. Thus, the only question before the Court is whether Cbeyond "resides" in the Eastern District of Texas under § 1391(c).
In Texas, a nonresident defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction if it has "minimum contacts" with the forum and if exercise of jurisdiction over the nonresident does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." See Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir.1994). The Court is not constrained by state law jurisdictional issues because the Texas long-arm statute is coextensive with the United States Constitution. Alpine View Co. Ltd. v. Atlas Copco AB, 205 F.3d 208, 214 (5th Cir.2000). Contacts sufficient to assert specific jurisdiction or general jurisdiction constitute sufficient "minimum contacts." Central Freight Lines, Inc. v. APA Transport Corp., 322 F.3d 376, 381 (5th Cir.2003). "When a nonresident defendant has purposefully directed its activities at the forum state and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities," the defendant's contacts are sufficient to support the exercise of specific jurisdiction over that defendant. Id. (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985)). "General jurisdiction may...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Empty Barge Lines II v. Dredge Leonard Fisher
...litigants' convenience and (2) the public interest in the fair and efficient administration of justice." Langton v. Cbeyond Commc'n, L.L.C., 282 F.Supp.2d 504, 509 (E.D.Tex.2003); see also Ramos, 2006 WL 20780, at *1; Mohamed, 90 F.Supp.2d at 771. A motion to transfer venue under § 1404(a) ......
-
Asevedo v. NBCUniversal Media, LLC
...is challenged, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish that the district he chose is a proper venue. Langton v. Cbeyond commc'n, L.L.C., 282 F.Supp.2d 504, 508 (E.D.Tex.2003); Smith v. Fortenberry, 903 F.Supp. 1018, 1020 (E.D.La.1995) (citing 15 Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice......
-
Ray Mart, Inc. v. Stock Building Supply of Texas
...litigants' convenience and (2) the public interest in the fair and efficient administration of justice." Langton v. Cbeyond Commc'n, L.L.C., 282 F.Supp.2d 504, 509 (E.D.Tex.2003); see also Ramos, 2006 WL 20780, at *1; Mohamed, 90 F.Supp.2d at 771. A motion to transfer venue under § 1404(a) ......
-
Raytheon Co. v. Cray, Inc.
...of proof in venue disputes. Even courts in this District have rendered conflicting opinions. Compare Langton v. Cbeyond Commc'n, L.L.C. , 282 F.Supp.2d 504, 508 (E.D. Tex. 2003) ("[T]he burden of sustaining venue lies with the plaintiff."), with Sanders v. Seal Fleet, Inc. , 998 F.Supp. 729......