Lanham v. Copeland

• Decision Date: 03 February 1919
• Docket Number: 9302.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court
• Parties: LANHAM v. COPELAND.

178 P. 562

66 Colo. 27

LANHAM v. COPELAND.

No. 9302.

Supreme Court of Colorado

February 3, 1919

Department 3.

Error to District Court, Larimer County; Neil F. Graham, Judge.

Suit by Wilda M. Copeland against J. I. Lanham. Decree for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Affirmed.

L. R. Rhodes, of Ft. Collins, and John H. Simpson, of Loveland, for plaintiff in error.

H. Donzelman, of Cheyenne, Wyo., and Fancher Sarchet, of Ft. Collins, for defendant in error.

ALLEN, J.

The plaintiff below, Wilda M. Copeland, brought this suit against the defendant, J. I. Lanham, to quiet title to a certain tract of 80 acres of land situated in Larimer county. The defendant claimed title under a sheriff's deed which was executed as the result of a levy upon the said property, attached as the property of one W. M. Copeland, the husband of the plaintiff. The execution was dated December 7, 1914. Prior to that time, and on January 20, 1914, the land was deeded by W. M. Copeland to the plaintiff, Wilda M. Copeland. The defendant alleged and sought to prove that the deed was a fraudulent conveyance, while the plaintiff, denying fraud, claimed that the instrument in question was a correction deed, and that the land was her own property during the time the record title stood in the name of W. M. Copeland. The cause was tried to the court, which found and decreed in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant brings the case here for review.

The defendant contends, in effect, that the judgment is manifestly against the weight of the evidence. The testimony was conflicting: but we find, on reading the record, sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding. The contention therefore cannot be upheld, nor can the judgment be reversed on the ground of insufficient evidence. Fuller v. Stapp, 168 P. 653; Davis v. Pursel, 55 Colo. 287, 291, 134 P. 107.

It is next claimed that the court erred in denying a motion for new trial. The motion set forth certain alleged newly discovered evidence. We cannot say that this evidence was of such a character that it would probably have changed the result if a new trial had been granted. The denial of the motion, therefore, cannot be regarded as a reversible error. Specie Payment Co. v. Kirk, 56 Colo. 275, 139 P. 21.

The judgment is affirmed.

Affirmed.

GARRIGUES, C.J., and BAILEY, J., concur.