Lanham v. Jennings

• Decision Date: 04 October 1922
• Docket Number: 11021.
• Citation: 113 S.E. 791,122 S.C. 461
• Parties: LANHAM v. JENNINGS. SCHOOL DIST. OF SPARTANBURG v. HALL.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

113 S.E. 791

122 S.C. 461

LANHAM v. JENNINGS.

SCHOOL DIST. OF SPARTANBURG v. HALL.

No. 11021.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

October 4, 1922

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Spartanburg County; H. F Rice, Judge.

Foreclosure proceedings by the School District of Spartanburg against R C. Hall, in which S. T. Lanham, as master of Spartanburg County, secured a rule to show cause why L. K. Jennings, a purchaser at the original sale, should not have judgment entered against him for the difference between the amount of his bid and the resale price. From a decree discharging the rule, the master appeals. Affirmed.

The decree of the circuit judge follows:

The matter above stated came up for hearing before me at the winter 1922 term of court for said county. The following, in a general way, is a statement of the facts and the issues involved:

On July 25, 1921, his honor, Judge Mauldin, issued a decree of this court in the case of the above named School District v. R. C Hall, adjudging the foreclosure of a certain mortgage covering several lots of land in the city of Spartanburg, and ordering the sale of same by the master for said county. The said decree contained a provision to the effect that, in case a purchaser at such sale should fail or refuse to comply with the terms of his bid, then the master should resell on the same or some subsequent sales day the said property at the risk of the defaulting purchaser, the terms of the second sale to be the same as at the first. Pursuant to said decree the master, after complying with all the requirements of the law pertaining to judicial sales, offered the said lots for sale at public outcry on October 3, 1921, in front of the courthouse door in Spartanburg, according to the usual custom of public sales. The auctioneer "knocked down" to the respondent Jennings two of the said lots, he being the highest bidder, announced the sale to him and entered upon his book of sales the lots as sold to Jennings. The terms of sale not being complied with, the master readvertised the said lots for sale "at the risk of the former purchaser." At the second sale the lots brought $1,200 less than at the first. Upon the petition of the master setting forth substantially the above facts, I issued a rule against the respondent Jennings, on January 18, 1922, requesting him to show cause before me why judgment should not be entered up against him for said deficiency and the costs of said sale. In due time the respondent made the return to the rule, under oath, setting up that he was not liable for the said deficiency nor for any costs, because he had bid at the first sale as attorney for his client, R. C. Hall and not for himself, and had so announced to the auctioneer at the sale. A good many affidavits in support of the facts contended for on both sides of the controversy were submitted at the hearing. The question was also raised and argued as to whether or not the master had followed the proper procedure for holding a defaulting purchaser liable for a deficiency at a second sale.

The decree is the chart which governs the master in making a judicial sale like the one in question. In the case at bar he followed strictly the terms of the decree, and in doing so he committed no error. When, however, we come to the question as to who was the bidder at the sale of the property October 3, 1921, we face a more difficult proposition. All of the parties making affidavits in substantiation of the facts on both sides are men of high standing, the respondent being a member of the Spartanburg bar. The policy of the law is to encourage bidding at judicial sales to the end that property so sold may bring its full market value. At the same time the courts will not countenance any trifling with such sales by any person who may be so inclined. In the present controversy the Master assumes the burden of satisfying the court by the greater weight of the evidence that Jennings bid for himself at the sale and made no announcement to the contrary to the auctioneer, and this he has failed to do. I can see no reason for analyzing the different affidavits in support of my conclusion. They must all be filed with this record and speak for themselves. Under the showings made, I feel satisfied that Jennings did bid at the sale as attorney for his client Hall and did so announce to the auctioneer, but that the latter, in the noise and confusion, did not hear him, and honestly entered the sale on his book to Jennings individually. In any view there is very grave doubt about it, and in such case he should not be held liable.

The above findings no way reflect upon the sincerity and honesty of any person who has made an affidavit. As to master, he was simply performing a duty required of him by the order of this court.

The rule must be discharged, and it is so ordered.

Bomar, Osborne & Brown, of Spartanburg, for appellant.

Nicholls & Wyche, of Spartanburg, for respondent.

MARION J.

At a foreclosure sale...