Lanier v. Johnson
| Decision Date | 10 October 1949 |
| Docket Number | Record No. 3523. |
| Parties | JOHN C. LANIER v. MARTHA JOHNSON, EXECUTRIX, ETC. |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
1. Plaintiff's decedent died as the result of a collision between his and defendant's automobiles at the intersection of a street with the highway on which they were approaching each other. The signal light was green for traffic on the highway. With a clear view of defendant's car decedent negligently, without giving a signal of his purpose to turn and while driving slowly, cut diagonally across the highway and into the lane in which defendant was approaching, before reaching the intersection. The evidence was perhaps sufficient to establish defendant's negligence in driving too fast through the intersection, and that such negligence was a proximate cause of the collision, but the traffic light indicated that he might proceed as he approached the intersection, and if he saw, or should have seen, decedent's car approaching, he saw no signal to indicate that it would turn across his path, and when he saw it proceeding on its diagonal course there was no evidence that decedent did not see him and would not stop. The facts thus failed to establish the applicability of the last clear chance doctrine, for decedent was never in a situation of peril so far as defendant saw, or should have seen, until he failed to stop in the safe place available to him and was proceeding into defendant's lane, and defendant then had no last clear chance to avoid the accident. There was no time, on the other hand, from the beginning of decedent's diagonal journey, when he could not have seen defendant's car and stopped, and his failure to do so was negligence that never ceased to be an efficient proximate cause of his injury.
2. The doctrine of last clear chance does not supersede the defense of contributory negligence, or save a plaintiff from the bar of his own negligence unless he has shown that after the situation of peril created by his previous negligence was discovered, or ought to have been discovered, the defendant had a last clear chance to prevent the accident by using ordinary care, and if opportunity to avoid an accident is as available to the plaintiff as to the defendant, then plaintiff's negligence is not a remote cause of the accident but continues as a proximate cause of it and the defendant is not liable.
Error to a judgment of the Circuit Court of Elizabeth City county. Hon. Frank A. Kearney, judge presiding.
The opinion states the case.
James & Richardson and I. W. Jacobs, for the plaintiff in error.
Ross A. Kearney, A. W. E. Bassette, Jr. and Savory E. Amato, for the defendant in error.
This action grows out of a collision at a street intersection between a car driven by the defendant below, John C. Lanier, and one driven by J. T. Johnson. Johnson subsequently died and his executrix, plaintiff below, alleging that his death was due to Lanier's negligence, recovered a verdict and judgment for $5,000 against Lanier, to whom this writ of error was granted. The controlling issue is whether the judgment can be sustained under the last clear chance doctrine, which was submitted to the jury over defendant's objection.
The collision occurred about 7:45 a.m., May 1, 1948, at the intersection of Mallory avenue and North King street, in the city of Hampton. Mallory avenue runs east and west North King streets runs north and south. On the west of the intersection Mallory avenue is a four-lane highway, 48 feet wide, on the east side it is 69 feet wide but is there divided by a curbed grass plot which begins 51 feet from the east edge of the intersection and extends east. This grass plot is 19 feet wide, dividing the avenue into two driveways, each 25 feet wide. North King street is approximately 33 feet wide on both sides of the intersection. The streets, both of which are hard-surfaced and level, cross each other at right angles and there is nothing to obstruct vision.
There was an overhead traffic light at the intersection, which was located, however, not at the center of the intersection but six feet from its northern edge, or approximately in front of the northern driveway of Mallory avenue. This light was green for east-west traffic on Mallory avenue at the time of the accident.
Lanier was driving east on Mallory avenue and approached the intersection at 30 miles an hour, according to one witness for the plaintiff, or at 25 miles an hour, according to another of her witnesses, and according to defendant's evidence. The speed limit there was 25 miles an hour.
Johnson, who was nearly 75 years old, a minister and also a juvenile officer of the city, approached the intersection from the east, driving west on Mallory avenue, meeting the defendant, and intending to turn south, or to his left, into King street to go to the police station on that street, which would take him across defendant's lane of travel. He gave no signal of his purpose to make a left turn, nor did he drive beyond the center of the intersection before turning, but drove diagonally across Mallory avenue, passing approximately 35 feet east of the center of the intersection, or about half-way between the center of the intersection and the end of the grass plot. He was driving slowly, at a speed estimated by plaintiff's witnesses to be from three to seven miles an hour, and had reached the south lane of Mallory avenue, some eight or ten feet from the southeast corner of the intersection, when his car was struck by Lanier's car.
The Johnson car was struck on its right side, the force of the collision pushing its rear end around so that when it came to rest it was facing west, with its left rear wheel about two feet from the curb at the southeast corner of the intersection. There was evidence for the plaintiff that the rear end of the car was then in Mallory avenue and the front end in King street — that is, in the intersection. One of her witnesses testified that all of the car was then in Mallory avenue and none of it within the intersection. After the collision Johnson got out of his car and walked around it and then got back in. He was later taken to a hospital, where he died some three weeks later as a result, according to the medical testimony, of the effect of the collision on his pre-existing physical condition.
The evidence is without conflict that Johnson was driving diagonally across Mallory avenue, as described, and that he did not enter the intersection until just before reaching the south traffic lane of Mallory avenue, in which defendant was approaching and into which Johnson drove immediately before he was struck. Maps were introduced in evidence, on which plaintiff's witnesses pointed out the course of Johnson's journey and the place where the accident occurred. One of these witnesses, Trainham, had just driven up going north on King street and was sitting in his car at the southeast corner of the intersection waiting for the light to change. He saw both cars approaching and saw the collision. He said that when the Johnson car cut across it was headed straight toward him until he wondered how it was going to miss him, but that it was struck in the south lane of Mallory avenue before it got to him.
In undertaking so to drive across Mallory avenue to enter North King street, without proceeding past the center of the intersection of the two streets, and without giving any signal to indicate his purpose to make such a move, Johnson violated the statutes requiring that he do both (Code, 1942 (Michie), secs. 2154(121)(a) and 2154(122); Code, 1950, secs. 46-231, 46-233, 46-234). He was, therefore, guilty of negligence, which, under the facts of this case, was an efficient cause of his death and bars recovery. Virginia E. & P. Co. Clark, 179 Va. 596, 601, 19 S.E.(2d) 693, 695; Standard Oil Co. Roberts, 130 Va. 532, 107 S.E. 838; Hubbard Murray, 173 Va. 448, 3 S.E.(2d) 397; Hamilton Glemming, 187 Va. 309, 46 S.E.(2d) 438; Powell Virginian Ry. Co., 187 Va. 384, 46 S.E.(2d) 429; Scott Simms, 188 Va. 808, 51 S.E.(2d) 250.
1, 2 The facts proved fail to establish elements of the last clear chance doctrine essential to entitle plaintiff to recover in spite of her decedent's negligence. The evidence is sufficient, perhaps, to establish that the defendant was negligent in driving too fast through the intersection and that such negligence was a proximate cause of the collision, but the negligence of the decedent is...
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