Lannon v. Lannon
| Decision Date | 04 December 1957 |
| Docket Number | No. 9782,9782 |
| Citation | 136 A.2d 608,86 R.I. 451 |
| Parties | Florence LANNON v. Thomas LANNON, Jr. Ex. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Goodman & Gorin, Pawtucket, for petitioner.
Thomas F. Kelleher, Francis A. Kelleher, Providence, for respondent.
This is a petition for divorce wherein the only ground alleged was extreme cruelty. The matter was heard by a justice of the superior court who thereafter granted the petition. The case is before this court on the respondent's exception to that decision.
The parties were married on February 14, 1942. There is much conflicting evidence relating to their conduct during their married life, both petitioner and respondent adducing testimony as to the commission of violent assaults upon each other. Three children were born of the marriage. The petitioner testified that in February 1956, after what she described as a particularly violent assault upon her by respondent, she left him and filed this petition for divorce on March 2, 1956.
The trial justice, after a hearing thereon, held the case under consideration for some weeks and on June 27, 1956 granted the wife's petition stating: 'The petition of Florence Lannon is granted on the ground of extreme cruelty.' The trial justice then gave custody of the minor children to petitioner, reserved a right of visitation to respondent, and ordered him to pay $30 weekly for the support of petitioner and the minor children.
The respondent makes much of the fact that the trial justice made no express findings of fact in stating her decision. He argues that because she failed to set out findings of fact the decision is not entitled to the persuasive force we usually accord such decisions on review. In our opinion it is highly desirable that a trial justice, sitting as a court of domestic relations, make express findings of fact pertinent to his decision in granting or denying a petition for divorce. This is true also in the case of civil suits. McFarland v. Lynch, 60 R.I. 125, 197 A. 202.
However, where such findings of fact are not set out expressly we will not, for that reason alone, refuse to accord the decision the persuasive force usually accorded such decisions on review. This is for the reason that implicit in a decision there are such findings of fact as are necessary to support it. In the instant case implicit in the decision of the trial justice are findings that respondent was guilty of extreme cruelty and that petitioner was without fault.
In these circumstances we see no reason why the case should not fall within our well-established rule that the findings or decision of a justice of the superior court, sitting as a court of domestic relations, will not be disturbed unless he was clearly wrong. Castelli v. Castelli, 82 R.I. 232, 107 A.2d 284.
The respondent further contends that the trial justice was clearly wrong in the decision, inasmuch as she either overlooked or misconceived material evidence bearing on the question of petitioner's freedom from fault in the premises. It is well established in this state that a petitioner for divorce must show, speaking broadly, that he is without fault in matters relating to the marriage relation and the grounds relied upon. Comery v. Comery, 76 R.I. 191, 194, 68 A.2d 93.
The freedom from fault that a petitioner for divorce is required to show by affirmative convincing evidence is not limited to recriminatory offenses of such character on his part as would entitle a respondent to a divorce. A petitioner is precluded from obtaining a divorce if he is guilty of an offense which constitutes a ground for divorce under our statute. Thomas v. Thomas, 83 R.I. 251, 115 A.2d 526. But in this state conduct not amounting to a recriminatory offense may be sufficient to cause relief to be withheld from a petitioner on the ground that he did not come into court with clean hands. Standish v. Standish, 48 R.I. 179, 136 A. 484.
In Comery v. Comery, s...
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Poirier v. Poirier
...to the marriage covenant or provocative of marriage discord within the meaning of the words 'without fault.' Lannon v. Lannon, 86 R.I. 451, 454-455, 136 A.2d 608, 609-610, 137 A.2d In subdivision (C) of her brief respondent makes the bare statement that petitioner did not corroborate his ch......
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Smith v. Smith
...the decision. A trial justice should state, however briefly, the reasons upon which his ultimate conclusions are based. Lannon v. Lannon, 86 R.I. 451, 136 A.2d 608 (1957). In the Lannon case the trial justice issued a one-sentence decision which read: "The petition of Florence Lannon is gra......
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Rogers v. Rogers
...this court may go beyond the findings enumerated by a trial justice if such findings are challenged as insufficient. In Lannon v. Lannon, 86 R.I. 451, 136 A.2d 608 (1957), we determined that when "findings of fact are not set out expressly we will not, for that reason alone, refuse to accor......
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Duke v. Duke
...are such findings of fact necessary to support it. Kenney v. Hickey, 486 A.2d 1079, 1082-83 (R.I. 1985) (citing Lannon v. Lannon, 86 R.I. 451, 454, 136 A.2d 608, 609 (1957) ). In the instant case although the trial justice did not make specific findings of fact, the record indicates that he......