Lanphere v. City of Chicago
| Decision Date | 24 October 1904 |
| Citation | 72 N.E. 426,212 Ill. 440 |
| Parties | LANPHERE v. CITY OF CHICAGO. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Cook County Court; O. N. Carter, Judge.
Proceedings by the city of Chicago against Hattie M. Lanphere to confirm a special assessment. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.
F. A. Johnson and F. W. Becker, for appellant.
Robert Redfield and William M. Pindell (Edgar Bronson Tolman, Corp. Counsel, of counsel), for appellee.
This is a proceeding to confirm a special assessment for curbing, grading, and paving Monroe avenue from the south curb line of Sixtieth street to the north curb line of Sixty-Seventh street, in the city of Chicago. Appellant appeared and filed objections to the confirmation of said assessment, which were overruled, and she has appealed.
It is first contended that the estimate of the engineer was not made a part of the record of the first resolution, inasmuch as the preamble and the signature of the engineer were omitted from the record of said resolution. The estimate of the engineer was made a part of the record of the first resolution by reciting the same therein in full, with the exception of the preamble thereto and the engineer's signature. This was a substantial compliance with the provisions of the statute that ‘said board shall also cause an estimate of the cost of such improvement * * * to be made in writing by the engineer of the board * * * over his signature, which shall be itemized to the satisfaction of said board, and which shall be made a part of the record of such resolution.’ Hurd's Rev. St. 1903, c. 24, par. 513. The requirements of the statute are for the protection of the owner of property to be assessed (Bickerdike v. City of Chicago, 203 Ill. 636, 68 N. E. 161), and it ‘can only be complied with by incorporating in the record the estimate as a part of the record of such resolution’ (Kilgallen v. City of Chicago, 206 Ill. 557, 69 N. E. 586). The information as to the description of the improvement, street to be improved, etc., contained in the preamble to the estimate, was all contained in the record of the resolution immediately preceding the estimate as recorded, and the resolution recites that the estimate was made by the engineer. A substantial, and not a literal, compliance with the statute is all that was required. In the record, as made up, the owner whose property was sought to be assessed could find all the information which the statute provides shall be given to him to enable him to determine the character of the improvement and its estimated cost; and the fact that the information contained in the preamble to the estimate was not twice repeated, or the engineer's signature recorded, is not such a substantial deviation from the requirements of the statute as to avoid the assessment, and to require the court to refuse a judgment of confirmation.
It is next contended that the engineer's estimate, as well as the certificate thereof, presented to the city council with the ordinance providing for the improvement, did not contain the item ‘lawful expenses attending the same,’ found in section 10 of the local improvement act of 1897 (Laws 1897, p. 105). That act was amended in 1901, and it was provided by the amendment (Hurd's Rev. St. 1903, c. 24, par. 600) that the expenses attending a special assessment proceeding shall be paid by cities out of their general funds; and in Gage v. City of Chicago, 195 Ill. 490, 63 N. E. 184, and Thompson v. City of Chicago, 197 Ill. 599, 64 N. E. 392, it was held that, since the amendment of 1901, it was error to include in the confirmation judgment the cost of making and levying the assessment. It being unlawful to include the expenses of making and levying the assessment in the judgment of confirmation, it was not necessary, and would have been improper, to include the same in the engineer's estimate of the cost of the improvement, or the certificate of such estimate presented to the city council with the ordinance...
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