Platt v. City of Payette

• Decision Date: 04 March 1911
• Parties: W. H. PLATT, Appellant, v. THE CITY OF PAYETTE, a Municipal Corporation, Respondent
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

114 P. 25

19 Idaho 470

W. H. PLATT, Appellant, v. THE CITY OF PAYETTE, a Municipal Corporation, Respondent

Supreme Court of Idaho

March 4, 1911

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-ORDINANCE FOR MUNICIPAL BOND ELECTION-SUFFICIENCY-NOTICE OF ELECTION-VALIDITY OF BONDS-COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTE.

(Syllabus by the reporter.)

1. The word "any," as used in sec. 2315 of the Rev. Codes of Idaho as amended by Sess. Laws 1909, at p. 174, and sec 2316, Rev. Codes, should be considered in connection with the entire body of existing statutory law relating to municipal improvements, keeping in mind the purpose of such legislation and the object to be attained, and should not receive a technical or limited construction, but should be construed in harmony with the evident intention of the law-making body in enacting such legislation.

2. Sec 2316, Rev. Codes, does not require a separate election ordinance for each proposed issue of municipal bonds. Different propositions for different objects may be embodied in one ordinance, provided that each proposition is so clearly and distinctly submitted to the electors of the municipality that they may adopt or reject it, independently of the others. Whether several such propositions are submitted in one ordinance or in separate ordinances is immaterial, so long as the voters are not deceived or misled or prevented from voting upon each proposition separately. (Sommercamp v. Kelly, 8 Idaho 712, 71 P. 147 approved and followed.)

3. Held, that the election proclamation and the notices of the holding of the special election with reference to the bond issues in controversy substantially complied with the statutory requirements.

4. Held, that Ordinance No. 154 of the city of Payette, giving notice of intention to create a local sewerage improvement district, sufficiently describes the property sought to be charged with the cost of the improvement, and the general character of the proposed sewer system and sewerage disposal works, and the estimated cost of such improvement.

5. Sec. 2353, Rev. Codes, providing for what shall be contained in an ordinance giving notice of intention to construct a sewer system, must be liberally construed, and a substantial compliance with the provisions of the statute is all that is required of the council, in view of the fact that its passage constitutes merely a preliminary step leading up to the final issue of the bonds, in case the voters should decide at the special election in favor of such improvement being undertaken.

6. Held, that the compliance with statutory provisions affecting the validity of the bond issue in controversy was sufficient to make said bond issue a binding obligation against the city, enforceable against the property against which special assessments have been made.

APPEAL from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, for Washington County. Hon. Ed. L. Bryan, Judge.

Action to determine the validity of sewer and waterworks bonds of the city of Payette. Judgment for defendant and plaintiff appealed. Affirmed.

Judgment of the lower court affirmed, and costs awarded against the appellant.

Richards & Haga, for Appellant.

Sec. 2316, Rev. Codes, empowers the council to issue bonds "for any of the purposes aforesaid." Does that section use the word "any" in the singular or the plural, especially when construed with the provision in sec. 2315, Amended Session Laws of 1909, page 174, "for any or all of the following purposes"?

If the derivative meaning of the word "any" is taken as the basis for answering the question, "any" must be taken to mean one or any one of several; or, taking another use of the word "any," it may mean, especially when used with a plurality of subjects, every one of them (see Davidson v. Dallas, 8 Cal. 239); or if taken in its distributive meaning, it might be taken in the sense of all, as, for instance, "any of the purposes" might mean "all of the purposes." (See County of Chicot v. Lewis, 103 U.S. 167, 26 L.Ed. 495.) But we contend that the use of the word is extremely strained if the latter meanings are taken.

In the sense that it is used in sec. 2316, Rev. Codes, "for any of the purposes aforesaid," it would seem clearly to mean any one out of the number, and not mean "all" or "every" of the number specified.

If the word is used in the meaning that we suggest, it was clearly invalid that all of these issues were submitted in the same ordinance, and, therefore, the bonds issued would be invalid and not binding obligations against the city and against the property upon which special assessments had been made. The proper use of the word is defined in the following cases: Fisk v. Henarie, 32 F. 417, 13 Saw. 38; Mullin v. Spangeberg, 112 Ill. 140; United States v. Morse, F. Cas. No. 15,820, 3 Story, 87; Trumbo v. Finley, 18 S.C. 305; Thurston v. State, 43 Tenn. 115.

The statutes of this state do not directly permit or prohibit the submission of more than one issue of municipal bonds in the same ordinance. A few cases from other states may be cited, but an examination of such cases shows that the question is governed by statute or ordinance, and that the statutory or ordinance requirements must be strictly complied with. (Leavenworth v. Wilson, 69 Kan. 74, 76 P. 400, 2 Ann. Cas. 367; Seymour v. Tacoma, 6 Wash. 150, 32 P. 1077.)

Several bond issues relating to several distinct purposes cannot be submitted in the same proceedings, and the ordinance so submitting the several questions is invalid, and, therefore, all proceedings thereunder would be invalid and the bonds unenforceable. (Stern v. City of Fargo (N. D.), 122 N.W. 408; Village of Hempstead v. Seymour, 34 Misc. 92, 69 N.Y.S. 462; State v. Allen, 186 Mo. 674. 85 S.W. 531; State v. Allen, 178 Mo. 555, 77 S.W. 868; Truelson v. Mayor of Duluth, 61 Minn. 48, 63 N.W. 715; Cain v. Smith, 117 Ga. 902, 44 S.E. 5; Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Sioux Falls, 131 F. 890; Denver v. Hayes, 28 Colo. 110, 63 P. 311.)

The notice of the election was not sufficient under the statutes to give the qualified electors and taxpayers of the city of Payette sufficient notice of the questions submitted to them. (Abbott, Mun. Corp., p. 424; Seymour v. Tacoma, 6 Wash. 151, 32 P. 1077; 21 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 49; Brown v. Carl, 111 Iowa 608, 82 N.W. 1033; Stern v. City of Fargo (N. D.), 122 N.W. 403.)

Sec. 2316, Rev. Codes, provides the form of ballots to be used at such special election, and the form of ballot provided for by Ordinance No. 155 does not comply with the statute. (21 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 49, and cases cited; Murphy v. San Luis Obispo, 119 Cal. 624, 51 P. 1085, 39 L. R. A. 444; Brown v. Village of Grangeville, 8 Idaho 786, 71 P. 151; Hamilton v. Detroit, 83 Minn. 119, 85 N.W. 933.)

The supreme court of Illinois has held statements as to the character and description of proposed sewerage works which defined the system, character of materials, outlets, drains, and sizes of sewerage pipes infinitely more in detail than Ordinance No. 151, insufficient and not complying with the requirements of the statute. (Hyde Park v. Carton, 132 Ill. 100, 23 N.E. 590; St. John v. East St. Louis, 136 Ill. 207, 27 N.E. 543; Steele v. River Forest, 141 Ill. 302, 30 N.E. 1034; Hull v. Chicago, 156 Ill. 381, 40 N.E. 937. See Rickords v. City of Hammond, 67 F. 383; Rose v. Chicago, 188 Ill. 347, 58 N.E. 933; Willis v. Chicago, 189 Ill. 103, 59 N.E. 543; Connersville v. Merrill, 14 Ind.App. 303, 42 N.E. 1112; Lanphere v. Chicago, 212 Ill. 440, 72 N.E. 426; Fay v. Reed, 128 Cal. 357, 60 P. 927.)

F. H. Lyon, for Respondent.

The word "any," as used in sec. 2316, means any one or more of the entire number of purposes mentioned. Why "total amount for which such bonds shall be issued" if this is not the intent of the legislature? The proper meaning of the word "total" is, being taken together without omitting anything; several sums added, in this case. (Sommercamp v. Kelly, 8 Idaho 712, 71 P. 147.)

The question is: Was the voter misled by the three propositions being provided for in the same ordinance? And if this can be answered in the negative, then the bonds should be held to be legal and binding. (Lewis v. County of Bourbon, 12 Kan. 186-213; McBryde v. Montesano, 7 Wash. 69, 34 P. 559; Truelsen v. Mayor of Duluth, 61 Minn. 48, 63 N.W. 715; Law v. San Francisco, 144 Cal. 384, 77 P. 1014; Geer v. Commissioners, 97 F. 435, 38 C. C. A. 250; Carlson v. Helena, 39 Mont. 82, 102 P. 39, 17 Ann. Cas. 1233; Gas & Water Co. v. Elyria, 57 Ohio St. 374, 49 N.E. 335; Gray v. Mount, 45 Iowa 591; Thompson etc. Co. v. Newton, 42 F. 723.)

The notice of election and the election held thereunder complied with the laws of this state and especially sec. 2316, Rev. Codes. (Sommercamp v. Kelly, supra; State ex rel. Utah Savings & Trust Co. v. Salt Lake City, 35 Utah 25, 99 P. 255, and cases there cited; Cheyenne v. State, 17 Wyo. 90, 96 P. 244; Seymour v. Tacoma, 6 Wash. 427, 33 P. 1059; Dishon v. Smith, 10 Iowa 212; Packwood v. Kititas County, 15 Wash. 88, 55 Am. St. 875, 45 P. 640, 33 L. R. A. 673; Hamilton v. Village of Detroit, 83 Minn. 119, 85 N.W. 933; State v. Carroll (R. I.), 24 A. 835; R. R. Co. v. Commissioners, 116 N.C. 563, 21 S.E. 205; Santa Barbara v. Davis, 6 Cal.App. 342, 92 P. 308; State v. Carbon County (Utah), 104 P. 222; Bowen v. Mayor of Greensboro, 79 Ga. 709, 4 So. 159; Cartwright v. City of Sing Sing, 46 Hun, 548; 11 Cyc. 557; 21 Ency. Law, 2d ed., 47.)

BUDGE, District Judge. Ailshie, Presiding J., and Sullivan, J., concur.

OPINION

BUDGE, District Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment rendered in the district court of the seventh judicial district in favor of the respondent and against the appellant. Said action was brought in the district court upon an agreed statement...