Lanphier v. Tracy Consol. School Dist.
| Decision Date | 15 February 1938 |
| Docket Number | 44243. |
| Citation | 277 N.W. 740,224 Iowa 1035 |
| Parties | LANPHIER v. TRACY CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DIST. et al. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Mahaska County; J. G. Patterson, Judge.
Frank Lanphier, who lives in the Tracy Consolidated School District and has children of school age, commenced this action in mandamus to compel the Tracy School District, its officers and directors, to provide suitable transportation for his children. A motion to dismiss the petition for writ of mandamus was filed by the school district and sustained by the lower court. Lanphier has appealed. Opinion states the facts.
Affirmed.
McCoy & McCoy, of Oskaloosa, for appellant.
Harold J. Fleck, Co. Atty., of Oskaloosa, and Joe H. Johnson, of Knoxville, for appellees.
This is an action in mandamus brought by Frank Lanphier against the Tracy Consolidated School District, its officers and directors. All the facts, for the purpose of this case appear in the petition and amendment thereto, which allege that the Tracy Consolidated School District is duly organized under the laws of the state of Iowa, located in Marion and Mahaska counties; that Frank Lanphier resides in said school district, and has five children of school age who are entitled to attend school in that district; that his residence is situated more than a mile from said school and is located upon a public highway and is not within the limits of any city, town, or village; that under the provisions of section 4179 of the Code of 1935 it is mandatory upon the school board of every school district to provide suitable transportation for every child of school age living within said corporation; that the Tracy Consolidated School District, through its officers and directors, has failed and refused to provide transportation for the Lanphier children that demand has been made of the school district and its officers that transportation be furnished.
To the petition was filed a motion to dismiss, on the grounds: (1) That the plaintiff has a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law and there is no showing that he has used or attempted to use said remedy of appealing to the county superintendent from the decision of the school board; (2) that the school board does not have a mandatory duty under section 4179 of the Code, as alleged in plaintiff's petition. That it has the right under section 4180 of the Code to suspend the transportation of any route when in its judgment it would be a hardship on the children and when the roads to be traveled are unfit or impassable. That the school board also has the discretion under section 4181 of the Code to require children living an unreasonable distance from school to be transported by the parents or guardian a distance of not more than two miles to connect with any vehicle of transportation to and from school. That in determining what an unreasonable distance is, consideration shall be given to the number and age of the children and the condition of the roads and the number of miles to be traveled in going to and from school. That the district has a bus traveling within three-fourths of a mile of plaintiff's home. That mandamus is not the proper procedure when a board of directors, in carrying out the terms of the statute, have power of exercising their judgment and discretion, and the remedy for one aggrieved is to appeal to the county superintendent of the schools and not mandamus.
The court sustained the motion to dismiss. Plaintiff refused to plead further, and judgment was entered against him dismissing the case and assessing the costs. Being dissatisfied with the ruling of the lower court, plaintiff has appealed.
Realizing the importance of education and desiring that every child have the opportunity of attending school, the Legislature of this state passed certain statutes relative to the transportation to and from school of children living in the country.
The appellant in this case bases his entire right of recovery upon section 4179 of the 1935 Code and ignores sections 4180 and 4181, limiting section 4179 and giving the school board the privilege of discretion in the matter of transportation.
Section 4179 is as follows:
This is followed immediately by section 4180, which reads as follows:
Then follows section 4181, which reads:
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