Lanquist v. City of Chicago

• Decision Date: 16 December 1902
• Citation: 200 Ill. 69,65 N.E. 681
• Parties: LANQUIST v. CITY OF CHICAGO.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

200 Ill. 69

65 N.E. 681

LANQUIST

v.CITY OF CHICAGO.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 16, 1902.

Appeal from circuit court, Cook county; Frank Baker, Judge.

Condemnation proceedings by the city of Chicago against Andrew Lanquist. From a judgment on a verdict assessing the compensation to be paid for the condemned property, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

George P. Merrick, for appellant.

Daniel J. McMahon and Angus Roy Shannon, for appellee.

MAGRUDER, C. J.

This is an appeal from a judgment in a proceeding to condemn, under the eminent domain act, two vacant lots, to wit, lots 37 and 38 in block 2 in Central Park Secondaddition to Chicago, located near the corner of Kedzie avenue and West Adams street, in the city of Chicago, for a school site. The petition for condemnation recites that the board of education in the city of Chicago reported its failure to agree with the owners of said property as to the compensation to be paid them to the city council, and that the city council, by resolution, concurred in the request of the board to acquire title to the lots in question as provided by the law of eminent domain. Upon the trial of the case the jury returned a verdict, finding the compensation to be paid to the owner of lots 37 and 38 to be the sum of $5,350. Motion for new trial was overruled, and judgment was entered in accordance with the verdict. The petitioner was required to pay to the county treasurer, for the benefit of the owners of the several lots sought to be condemned, certain sums, and, among others, to the owner of and parties interested in said lots 37 and 38, the sum of $5,350. Exception was taken by the respondent below, the present appellant, to the judgment.

After the jury had visited the premises, appellee, the petitioner below, called three expert real estate brokers, who placed the value of the lots at $100 per front foot; that is to say, at $5,000 for both lots. Appellant also called three experts, one of whom placed the value of the lots at $150 per front foot, and two of whom placed the value of the lots at $145 per front foot. It thus appears that the evidence in the case is conflicting, and that there was a personal view by the jury of the premises sought to be condemned. The conclusions drawn by the jury from their view are in the nature of evidence. What they learn from their examination of the premises may be considered by them in passing upon the testimony of the witnesses; and, where the evidence is conflicting, they may resort to the results of their examination in determining the weight to be given to the conflicting estimates of the various witnesses, so that their verdict, if supported by the testimony, will not be disturbed merely because it is contrary to what appears to be a preponderance of the evidence. ‘It is the settled doctrine of this court that the damage awarded by a jury in a condemnation proceeding will not be disturbed where the evidence is conflicting, and the jury viewed the premises.’ Rock Island & P. Ry. Co. v. Leisy Brewing Co., 174 Ill. 547, 51 N. E. 572. It cannot be said, therefore, that the verdict and judgment are not supported by the evidence, as appellant contends.

It is insisted by counsel for appellant that the trial judge made improper remarks in the presence of the jury. Whether the remarks made were proper or improper, the question as to their propriety or impropriety cannot now be raised in this court, because no objection or exception was taken thereto during the trial. In Mulliner v. Bronson, 114 Ill. 510, 2 N. E. 671, we said (page 514, 114 Ill., and page 673, 2 N. E.): ‘The remarks which were made by the circuit court were uncalled for by any question which arose in the case, but whether they should be regarded as error for which the judgment should be reversed, it will not be necessary to determine, for the reason that the record shows no exception whatever taken to the remarks so made. If the appellant desired to raise the question as to the right of the circuit judge to make the remarks, he should have excepted at the time; but, under our practice, if he made no objection at the time, his silence will be regarded as a waiver of all objection that might have been made to what was said by the court.’ See, also, Cab Co. v. Havelick, 131 Ill. 179, 22 N. E. 797;Hall v. Bank, 133 Ill. 234, 24 N. E. 546.

The only material objection insisted upon by counsel for appellant in his brief is that the court below refused to allow the appellant to prove what he paid originally for the lots sought to be condemned. The offer of appellant's counsel upon the trial below was as follows: ‘I make the offer to show by this witness that he bought these lots at a certain price, for a portion of which he received and satisfied a debt, and the balance of it he paid cash for.’ Appellant's offer, taken in connection with the statement of his counsel made at the time, was objectionable upon three grounds: First, the time of the alleged purchase of the lots was in 1895, seven years before the present petition for condemnation was filed, and therefore was too remote; second, the purchase when made was of the two lots here in controversy, and of another lot adjoining them, numbered 36, and the purchase price was paid, so far as it was paid, for the three lots together, and, as there was some difference in the testimony as to the value of the lots, the total cost could not be apportioned to the different lots;...