Ranck v. City of Cedar Rapids
| Decision Date | 20 May 1907 |
| Citation | 111 N.W. 1027,134 Iowa 563 |
| Parties | C. RANCK, Appellee, v. THE CITY OF CEDAR RAPIDS, Appellant |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Linn District Court.-- HON.W. G. THOMPSON, Judge.
Affirmed.
Deacon & Good and H. E. Spangler, for appellant.
Jamison & Smyth and S. K. Tracy, for appellee.
OPINION
THE opinion states the case.-- Affirmed.
On April 6, 1905, the plaintiff was, and for some years had been, the owner of a lot bordering upon the west shore of the Cedar river, in the city of Cedar Rapids. About this date the city instituted proceedings to condemn the entire lot for public use as a street and landing for a new bridge to be thrown across the river at that point. The sheriff's jury having assessed the plaintiff's damages at $ 7,500, he appealed from said award to the district court, where a verdict was returned in his favor for $ 11,000. A motion for new trial was overruled, and judgment rendered in plaintiff's favor for costs and attorney's fees. The defendant appeals.
As the city seeks to appropriate the entire lot, it is conceded that the one question to be determined by these proceedings is the fair market value of the property so taken, and exceptions argued by counsel go to the correctness of the rulings of the trial court upon the admission of testimony and of certain instructions given to the jury.
I. Several witnesses on part of plaintiff were asked and permitted to testify as to the value of the improvements on the lot and the value of the lot with and without the improvements. Plaintiff was also allowed to show that he had fitted up a livery stable and undertaking rooms on the property, and had carried on such business there for a long time, and that the situation was well adapted to and valuable for these purposes. It is the contention of the appellant that the true measure of damages was the value of the property as a whole in its condition as it stood at the date of the condemnation, and that the inquiry into the details here referred to tended to confuse the jury concerning this rule and unduly enhance the plaintiff's recovery. It is true that the defendant's liability is to be measured by the value of the property as it stood at the date of its appropriation; but it does not follow from this proposition that evidence of the kind here in question is not material and competent to aid the jury in finding what in fact that value was. On the contrary, while there is some confusion in the holdings of the courts along this line, it seems to be fairly well established that proof of such facts is admissible -- not as affording a measure of recovery, but as tending to disclose the real character and condition of the property -- and support the estimates of value given by the witnesses. Generally speaking, the true rule seems to be to permit the proof of all the varied elements of value; that is, all the facts which the owner would properly and naturally press upon the attention of a buyer to whom he is negotiating a sale and all other facts which would naturally influence a person of ordinary prudence desiring to purchase. Spring V. W. Co. v. Drinkhouse, 92 Cal. 528 (28 P. 681); Snouffer v. Railroad Co., 105 Iowa 681; Railroad Co. v. Woodruff, 49 Ark. 381 (5 S.W. 792, 4 Am. St. Rep. 51); Railroad Co. v. Braham, 79 Pa. 447; Lewis on Eminent Domain, sections 408, 478; Johnson v. Railroad Co., 111 Ill. 413; Railroad Co. v. Gearhart, 81 Pa. 260.
In this estimation the owner is entitled to have the jury informed of all the capabilities of the property, as to the business or use, if any, to which it has been devoted, and of any and every use to which it may reasonably be adapted or applied. And this rule includes the adaptation and value of the property for any legitimate purpose or business, even though it has never been so used, and the owner has no present intention to devote it to such use. Railroad Co. v. Ryan, 64 Miss. 399 (8 So. 173); Johnson v. Railroad Co., 111 Ill. 413; Railroad Co. v. Bishop, 119 Ill. 525 (10 N.E. 372); Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403 (25 L.Ed. 206); Cochrane v. Com., 175 Mass. 299 (56 N.E. 610, 78 Am. St. Rep 491); Sherman v. Railroad Co., 30 Minn. 227 (15 N.W. 239). To this end it has been held proper for the owner to prove the presence and value of undeveloped mineral deposits in the land taken, Doud v. Railroad Co., 76 Iowa 438; Railroad Co. v. Forbis, 15 Mont. 452 (39 P. 571, 48 Am. St. Rep. 692); Haslam v. Railroad Co., 64 Ill. 353; Cameron v. Railroad Co., 51 Minn. 153 (53 N.W. 199); Seattle v. Roeder, 30 Wash. 244 (70 P. 498, 94 Am. St. Rep. 864); the cost and value of the house and other improvements on the premises, Railroad Co. v. White, 28 Neb. 166 (44 N.W. 95); Briggs v. Railroad Co., 56 Kan. 526 (43 P. 1131); Van Jusen v. Railroad Co., 118 Iowa 366; Haggard v. District, 113 Iowa 486, 85 N.W. 777; Orleans R. Co. v. Jefferson R. Co., 51 La.Ann. 1605 (26 So. 278); Railroad Co. v. Hock, 118 Ill. 587 (9 N.E. 205); Warden v. Phila., 167 Pa. 523 (31 A. 928); Dupuis v. Railroad Co., 115 Ill. 97 (3 N.E. 720); Beale v. Boston, 166 Mass. 53 (43 N.E. 1029); Maynard v. Northampton, 157 Mass. 218 (31 N.E. 1062); Colusa v. Hudson, 85 Cal. 633 (24 P. 791); Grand Rapids & I. R. Co. v. Weiden, 70 Mich. 390 (38 N.W. 294); Plank Road v. Thomas, 20 Pa. 91; Railroad Co. v. Trimmer (31 A. 310); the cost of a well on the premises, Foote v. Railroad Co., 11 Ohio Cir. Dec. 685, (Foote v. Railroad Co., 21 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 319); the value of a salt well, though not being utilized, Kossler v. Railroad Co., 208 Pa. 50 (57 A. 66); the value of trees growing on the land, Adkins v. Smith, 94 Iowa 758, 64 N.W. 761; Walker v. Sedalia, 74 Mo.App. 70; Parks v. Railroad Co., 33 Wis. 413; the value of growing crops lost by the condemnation, Lance v. Railroad Co., 57 Iowa 636; Gilmore v. Railroad Co., 104 Pa. 275; Railroad Co. v. Scheike, 3 Wash. 625 (29 P. 217, 30 P. 503); Haislip v. R. R. Co., 102 N.C. 376 (8 S.E. 926); the kind and value of crops produced in other years, Hosmer v. Warner, 81 Mass. 46; the income which might be derived from the property, Weyer v. Railroad Co., 68 Wis. 180 (31 N.W. 710); Sanitary Dist. v. Loughran, 160 Ill. 362 (43 N.E. 359); and the fact that the owner has an established and lucrative business on the premises, Kennebec W. District v. Waterville, 97 Me. 185 (54 A. 6, 60 L. R. A. 856); Grand Rapids R. Co. v. Weiden, 70 Mich. 390 (38 N.W. 294); Covington T. Co. v. Piel, 87 Ky. 267 (8 S.W. 449); Dupuis v. Railroad Co., 115 Ill. 97 (3 N.E. 720); Railroad Co. v. Johnson, 24 Neb. 707 (40 N.W. 134); King v. Railroad Co., 32 Minn. 224 (20 N.W. 135). The price paid for the property has been held a pertinent fact for the consideration of the jury. Memphis v. Kimbrough, 59 Tenn. 133; 10 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d Ed.) 1155; Whipple v. Walpole, 10 N.H. 130; Mills on Eminent Domain, section 168; Lewis on Eminent Domain, section 444; Thompson v. Anderson, 94 Iowa 554, 63 N.W. 355. Concerning evidence of cost of improvements as affecting estimates of value of property of the kind we are here considering, see Faust v. Hosford, 119 Iowa 97, 93 N.W. 58; Richmond v. R. R. Co., 40 Iowa 264. In some cases the loss and inconvenience which must be incurred by the interruption of business or its enforced removal to another location have been recognized as material facts bearing upon the value of the property. Railroad Co. v. Chamblin, 100 Va. 401 (41 S.E. 750); Railroad Co. v. Capps, 67 Ill. 607; Railroad Co. v. Hock, 118 Ill. 587 (9 N.E. 205); Railroad Co. v. Weiden, 70 Mich. 390 (38 N.W. 294); Commissioners v. Moesta, 91 Mich. 149 (51 N.W. 903); Ehret v. Railroad Co., 151 Pa. 158 (24 A. 1068); Railroad Co. v. Getz, 113 Pa. 214 (6 A. 356); Seattle v. Roeder, 30 Wash. 244 (70 P. 498, 94 Am. St. Rep. 864); Patterson v. Boston, 20 Pick. 159, (Patterson v. Boston, 23 Pick. 425; Jubb v. Hall Dock, 9 Q.B. 443; Railroad Co. v. Heisel, 47 Mich. 393 (11 N.W. 212); Railroad Co. v. Siegel, 161 Ill. 638 (44 N.E. 276).
The cases we have thus far cited may not all be of controlling authority in this State but they serve well to illustrate the marked tendency of the courts to liberality in the admission of proof of any and all facts having any legitimate tendency to aid the jury in arriving at the value of the property appropriated under power of eminent domain. The fact that the owner is denied the ordinary right to refuse to sell his property, except at his own price and on his own terms, affords no reason for awarding him more than a just compensation; but it does afford good reason why he should be given every opportunity to disclose to the jury the real character of the property -- its location; its surroundings; its use; its improvements, if any, and their age, condition, and quality; its adaptability to any special use or purpose; its productiveness and rental value; and, in short, everything which affects its salability and value as between buyers and sellers generally. Though acting under legal compulsion, the owner stands in some degree in the attitude of a seller of property, the price of which is to be fixed and settled by the jury, and, so far as he can do so within the bounds of truth and fairness, he is entitled to display all the attractive and desirable features of such property which may tend to enhance its value in the market, and thus secure the highest obtainable compensation therefor.
The party condemning has, of course, the correlative right to rebut the showing thus made by disputing its truth and by proof of other facts which affect the value of the property unfavorably. It is true that market value and intrinsic value are not necessary equivalents, but proof of the latter is often competent evidence for...
To continue reading
Request your trial