Lantz v. Chamberlain Independent School Dist. No. 1

Decision Date02 June 1977
Docket NumberNo. 11829-,11829-
Citation254 N.W.2d 155
PartiesClifford LANTZ, Appellant, v. CHAMBERLAIN INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT # 1, by and through its Board of Education, Richard Kirsch, Superintendent of Schools and Richard Lloyd, Richard Reuer, Jerome Feltman, Joellen Roxworthy, Dr. William Olsen, Terry Casey and Henry Schelle, Jr., Individually and as Members of the Board of Education of the Chamberlain Independent School District # 1, Respondents. a-LJZ.
CourtSouth Dakota Supreme Court

Michael E. Sebastian, Miller, Miller & Sebastian, Kimball, for appellant.

Leonard E. Andera, Andera, Margadant & Erickson, Chamberlain, for respondents.

ZASTROW, Justice.

This appeal challenges the assignment of the fourth and fifth grades of the Pukwana attendance center to the Chamberlain attendance center as being (1) a violation of SDCL 13-6-9 and (2) an arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory act by the Board of the Chamberlain Independent School District # 1. We affirm.

The Pukwana Common School District (Pukwana Common) became part of the Chamberlain Independent School District # 1 (Chamberlain Independent) as a result of the compulsory school reorganization law (Ch. 38, S.L.1967), which required that all territory or land area within South Dakota become a part of an independent school district before July 1, 1970. During the 1968-1969 school year, Pukwana Common had operated an elementary school in Pukwana consisting of grades one through eight. (The record does not reflect whether the kindergarten class was operated during 1968-1969.)

Following reorganization, Chamberlain Independent continued to operate the attendance center for grades one through eight at Pukwana. Apparently, in 1973 the school board assigned the Pukwana seventh and eighth grades to the Chamberlain attendance center. In 1974, the board assigned the Pukwana sixth grade to the Chamberlain attendance center. These assignments, though undoubtedly unpopular with the patrons of the former Pukwana Common, were apparently not challenged by appeal to the circuit court.

At the February 24, 1975 school board meeting, Superintendent Richard Kirsch presented a recommendation to the board for reassignment of students in the district. He recommended that the kindergarten, first, second, fourth and fifth grades at the Pukwana attendance center be transported to the Chamberlain and Oacoma attendance centers, and that the third grade students at Chamberlain be transported to Pukwana. That recommendation was adopted at the March 10, 1975 school board meeting over the objection of the patrons of the former Pukwana Common present at the meeting. At the March 31, 1975 school board meeting, a petition protesting that action was presented to the board by the Pukwana patrons. On April 14, 1975, the Pukwana patrons were accompanied to the school board meeting by their attorney. He advised the board that he had requested an attorney general opinion on the legality of its action. At the April 28, 1975 meeting, he presented to the board the attorney general's opinion (AGO 75-70) that he had received. That opinion concluded that an "elementary school" as defined by SDCL 13-6-9 contemplated at least grades one through five and that the action taken by the Chamberlain Independent board on March 10, 1975, was, therefore, illegal.

Upon motion, the board rescinded its action of March 10, and a substitute motion was made and adopted. Under the new plan, only grades four and five from Pukwana would be assigned to the Chamberlain and Oacoma attendance centers.

The appellant, Clifford Lantz, appealed the action of the board to the Fourth Judicial Circuit Court. The circuit court upheld the action of the school board under the authority of Choal v. Lyman Independent Sch. Dist. No. 12 Bd. of Ed., 1974, 87 S.D. 682, 214 N.W.2d 3.

The statutes which were interpreted in Choal and around which the controversy centers here are SDCL 13-6-9 which provides:

"The school board of a school district shall continue to operate an attendance center or elementary school operated by a former common school district during the 1968-69 school year until such time as only the resident voters of the former common district area which operated said elementary school shall vote to cease operating said school or schools. Such election shall be called by the school board of the school district by resolution or upon a petition by twenty per cent of the electors residing in such area and shall be conducted in accordance with the laws governing elections in school districts, provided, however, that the provisions of this section shall not apply to any elementary school which by its continued operation would make the district ineligible for state aid under the provisions of §§ 13-13-10 to 13-13-41, inclusive. The board shall have the authority to close such a school when the average daily membership does not exceed three and bus service is provided within two and one-half miles of pupils' residence. When a rural school has been closed for two consecutive years by board action but no election has been held, such school shall be considered to have been closed by the electors, but may be reopened at the option of the board."

and SDCL 13-28-15 which provides:

"Every school board shall have the power and duty to make assignment and distribution of all elementary students with school residence within the district. The board shall take into consideration in assigning and distributing students its duty to provide equal educational facilities, the wishes of the patrons, and the best interests of the students in the district. Any patron who is aggrieved by a decision of the school board may appeal such decision within thirty days to the superintendent of elementary and secondary education, whose decision shall resolve the matter unless appealed to the courts."

The question involves the conflicts between the duty of the school board to assign and distribute the students and the requirement that the board continue to operate the attendance centers or elementary schools previously operated by the former common school districts.

This court in Choal, supra, held that the "elementary school" which must be operated need not include all eight grades, and, by inference, the "elementary school" need not have all of the grades which were provided by the former common school district.

After the Choal decision, the legislature enacted an...

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5 cases
  • Hicks v. Gayville-Volin School Dist.
    • United States
    • South Dakota Supreme Court
    • 30 Julio 2003
    ...the Board's decision to overcome the presumption that the Board was acting in good faith. Id. (citing Lantz v. Chamberlain Independent School District # 1, 254 N.W.2d 155 (S.D.1977)). Here, Hicks has failed to meet that burden. Hicks did not sign a document which she admits receiving; she d......
  • Iversen v. Wall Bd. of Educ., 18152
    • United States
    • South Dakota Supreme Court
    • 31 Agosto 1993
    ...Collins v. Wakonda Indep. School Dist., 252 N.W.2d 646 (S.D.1977) (method of offering teaching contract); Lantz v. Chamberlain Ind. School Dist. # 1, 254 N.W.2d 155 (S.D.1977) (reassignment of students). In addition, in Mortweet v. Ethan Board of Educ., 241 N.W.2d 580, 582 (S.D.1976). Davis......
  • Maasjo v. McLaughlin School Dist. No. 15-2
    • United States
    • South Dakota Supreme Court
    • 22 Abril 1992
    ...the board acted unreasonably or arbitrarily, or whether the board manifestly abused its discretion." Lantz v. Chamberlain Indep. Sch. Dist. # 1, 254 N.W.2d 155, 158 (S.D.1977). In this case, the circuit court entered Conclusion of Law IV, which stated: "Insofar as the Board decided not to r......
  • Nordhagen v. Hot Springs School Dist. No. 23-2, 17304
    • United States
    • South Dakota Supreme Court
    • 21 Mayo 1991
    ...person challenging a board's decision to overcome the presumption that the board was acting in good faith. Lantz v. Chamberlain Independent Sch. Dist. # 1, 254 N.W.2d 155 (S.D.1977). Under the facts, Board at its first hearing in this matter listened to three and one-half hours of testimony......
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