Hicks v. Gayville-Volin School Dist.

• Decision Date: 30 July 2003
• Docket Number: No. 22579.,22579.
• Citation: 2003 SD 92,668 N.W.2d 69
• Parties: Diana HICKS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. GAYVILLE-VOLIN SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant and Appellee.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

668 N.W.2d 69

2003 SD 92

Diana HICKS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. GAYVILLE-VOLIN SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant and Appellee.

No. 22579.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Argued February 12, 2003.

Decided July 30, 2003.

Scott R. Swier of Doyle, Kennedy & Rokahr, Yankton, for plaintiff and appellant.

Gerald L. Kaufman, Huron, for defendant and appellee.

ZINTER, Justice.

[¶ 1.] Diana Hicks began teaching at the Gayville-Volin school in the fall of 1990. During the course of her employment, various administrators had concerns about her performance. In the spring of 2001, she was informed by the superintendent that her contract would not be renewed for the 2001-2002 school year. After a hearing before the Gayville-Volin School Board of Education (Board), the Board unanimously voted not to renew Hicks's contract. She appealed the Board's decision to circuit court. The circuit court affirmed the Board's decision. We affirm.

FACTS

[¶ 2.] Hicks began teaching in the Gayville-Volin School District in the fall of 1990. During her ten years at Gayville-Volin, Hicks taught health, physical education, and social studies. For the 2000-2001 school year, Hicks taught 7th grade social studies, 6th-8th grade health, and K-8th grade physical education.

[¶ 3.] Throughout Hicks's employment, various administrators documented concerns about her performance. In 1995, Superintendent Dale Waysman was concerned that Hicks: used inappropriate examples; discussed students with other staff members where students could hear the conversation; had favorites in class; and, needed help with strategies concerning student evaluations and student discipline.

[¶ 4.] In the spring of 1997, Principal Nancy Fargo evaluated Hicks and implemented a formal plan of study (plan of assistance). The plan of assistance was instituted because Fargo believed that Hicks needed to improve in the use of instructional objectives, and those objectives needed to be in her lesson plans; she needed to improve her class preparation; she needed to get her grades to teachers as required; and, she needed to take courses for professional growth. Because Hicks was placed on a plan of assistance, Fargo recommended that the Board renew Hicks's employment contract for the 1997-1998 school year.

[¶ 5.] During the 1998-1999 school year, the Board changed its evaluation program and adopted a teacher self-evaluation procedure. Hicks acknowledged that it was the teacher's responsibility to initiate that evaluation procedure. However, Hicks failed to initiate the self-evaluation, and she failed to meet with the principal to discuss the evaluation in order to determine whether the goals had been accomplished. Hicks specifically failed to indicate on the evaluation instrument how her identified goals would be measured in order to determine if those goals had been accomplished; she did not document whether the goals had been accomplished; and she failed to meet Fargo as required at the end of the 1998-1999 school year to discuss the evaluation. Hicks also failed to initiate the self-evaluation procedure for the 1999-2000 school year. Hicks failed to do so even though it had been requested by the administration and even though other staff members completed this requirement.

[¶ 6.] Jason Selchert was hired as the District's CEO for the 2000-2001 school year. He evaluated Hicks's class on January 24, 2001. He also placed Hicks on a plan of assistance. His concerns were that Hicks was not teaching all aspects of developmental activities, she was not sufficiently prepared for her classes, she did not give thorough and definite teaching directions, and she did not challenge students with "higher order thinking." Selchert subsequently opined that Hicks did not satisfactorily complete the plan of assistance, and he recommended that the Board not renew Hicks's teaching contract for the 2001-2002 school year. The Board accepted that recommendation, and Hicks received written notice of the Board's decision not to renew her contract. Hicks was given the following reasons for the Board's decision:

1. Failure to meet the needs of the students,

2. Failure to follow the physical education plan of study,

3. Inability to successfully challenge students,

4. Failure to be prepared for all instructional duties, and

5. Inability to motivate herself in areas of deficiency to facilitate growth.

[¶ 7.] Hicks requested a hearing before the Board. At the conclusion of the hearing on May 24, 2001, the Board did not vote on Hicks's continued employment. The Board met a second time on May 31, 2001, and without making a final decision, invited Hicks and her attorney to meet with the Board in executive session on June 11, 2001. At the conclusion of the June 11 meeting, the Board voted not to renew Hicks's teaching contract. On June 26, 2001, the Board issued written findings of fact and conclusions of law in conformance with its decision.

[¶ 8.] Hicks appealed the Board's decision to the circuit court. The circuit court held a hearing to allow additional evidence concerning the procedure followed by the Board. The circuit court did not, however, hear additional evidence dealing with the merits of the Board's decision. After reviewing the record, the circuit court affirmed the Board's decision.

[¶ 9.] Hicks appeals the circuit court's ruling, raising two issues.

1. Whether the Board acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or abused its discretion in non-renewing Hicks's teaching contract for the 2001-2002 school year.

2. Whether the procedural requirements of South Dakota's continuing contract law were followed, and if not, whether reinstatement is required.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 10.] SDCL 13-46-6 allows a party to appeal a school board decision. That statute provides for a de novo trial to the circuit court.

The trial in the circuit court shall be de novo according to the rules relating to special proceedings of a civil nature so far as such rules are applicable and not in conflict with the provisions of this chapter and the court shall enter such final judgment or order as the circumstances and every right of the case may require and such judgment or order may be enforced by writ of execution, mandamus, or prohibition, or by attachment as for contempt.

Id. Despite the "de novo" language of this statute, this Court has long held that the standard of review is not that traditionally used in an ordinary trial de novo. Instead, great deference is given to the good faith determinations of school boards whether to renew a teacher's contract. Wuest v. Winner School Dist. 59-2, 2000 SD 42, ¶ 12, 607 N.W.2d 912, 915; Jager v. Ramona Bd. of Educ., 444 N.W.2d 21, 25 (S.D.1989). Consequently, we have repeatedly stated:

[T]he circuit court's review is not a trial de novo in the ordinary sense of the phrase. School boards are creatures of the [L]egislature and the judiciary may not interfere with their decisions unless the decision is made contrary to law. Therefore, "[a]s long as the school board is legitimately and legally exercising its administrative powers, the courts may not interfere with nor supplant the school board's decision making process." Only the legality of the decision, not the propriety of the decision, may be reviewed by the courts. The legality of a school board's decision is determined by a two-prong review. First, the procedural regularity of the decision is reviewed. This review includes whether the school board was vested with the authority to act and whether all procedural requirements required by law were followed. Second, the school board's decision is reviewed to determine whether the decision was arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion.

Gauer v. Kadoka School Dist. No. 35-1, 2002 SD 73, ¶ 5, 647 N.W.2d 727, 730 (further citations omitted).

[¶ 11.] An arbitrary or capricious decision is one that is: "based on personal, selfish, or fraudulent motives, or on false information, and is characterized by a lack of relevant and competent evidence to support the action taken." Coyote Flats, L.L.C. v. Sanborn County Com'n, 1999 SD 87, ¶ 14, 596 N.W.2d 347, 351 (quoting Tri County Landfill Ass'n, Inc. v. Brule County, 535 N.W.2d 760, 764); see also Hendriks v. Anderson, 522 N.W.2d 499 (S.D.1994)

; Iversen v. Wall Bd. of Educ., 522 N.W.2d 188 (S.D.1994); Riter v. Woonsocket School Dist., # 55-4, 504 N.W.2d 572 (S.D.1993). "An abuse of discretion refers to a discretion exercised to an end or purpose not justified by, and clearly against reason and evidence." In re South Dakota Microsoft Antitrust Litigation, 2003 SD 19, ¶ 5, 657 N.W.2d 668, 671 (quoting Black v. Class, 1997 SD 22, ¶ 27, 560 N.W.2d 544, 551). "In applying the abuse of discretion standard, `we do not determine whether we would have made a like decision, only whether a judicial mind, considering the law and the facts, could have reached a similar decision.'" Id. (quoting State v. Wilkins, 536 N.W.2d 97, 99 (S.D.1995)). "Under such a standard of review we must be careful not to substitute our reasoning for that of the [lower tribunal]." Id. (quoting State v. Larson, 512 N.W.2d 732, 736 (S.D.1994)).

[¶ 12.] Although Gauer and some of our other decisions¹ have also included a reference to the "clearly erroneous" standard of review in discussing this second prong, we clarify that the clearly erroneous standard only applies to the facts determined by the school board. As we have noted on other occasions, the clearly erroneous standard of review applies when the question is one of fact. Wuest, 2000 SD 42, ¶ 12, 607 N.W.2d at 916; Hughes v. Stanley County School Board, 1999 SD 65, ¶ 15, 594 N.W.2d 346, 351; Maasjo v. McLaughlin Sch. Dist. No. 15-2, 489 N.W.2d 618, 621 (S.D.1992); Aman v. Edmunds Cent. School Dist. No. 22-5, 494 N.W.2d 198, 199 (S.D.1992); Kellogg v. Hoven Sch. Dist. No. 53-2, 479 N.W.2d 147, 150 (S.D.1991); Jager, 444 N.W.2d at 26. Therefore, notwithstanding language to the contrary, we do not apply the clearly...