Lantz v. Maffett
| Decision Date | 11 March 1885 |
| Docket Number | 11,728 |
| Citation | 26 N.E. 195,102 Ind. 23 |
| Parties | Lantz v. Maffett et al |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
W. H Martin, for appellant.
J. H Mellett, W. S. Denton, I. P. Poulson and W. F. McBane, for appellees.
The material facts stated in the special finding, exhibited in a somewhat abridged form, are these: On the 25th day of November, 1875, John W. Maffett died intestate, the owner of the land described in the pleadings. He left surviving him his widow, Caroline Maffett, and his children, John W. and Sarah L. Maffett. Subsequently the widow married Charles Niles, and died during coverture seized of one-third of the land described. The interest of which she died seized vested in her by virtue of her rights as the widow of John W. Maffett, her first husband. Daniel Morford became the administrator of her estate, and petitioned for an order to sell her land to pay debts due from her estate; to this petition the children of the intestate and John W. Maffett, her first husband, were made parties, and they answered by a guardian ad litem. It was alleged in the petition that the intestate, Caroline Niles, was the owner in fee of the one-third part of the land. The proceedings were in due form, and sale was made pursuant to the order of the court, and the land was bought and paid for by the appellant.
The contention of the appellant is, that, as it appeared on the face of the petition that the intestate owned the land in fee simple, and as the manner in which she acquired her title did not appear, the judgment is valid on its face and can not be overthrown by a collateral attack. In support of this position, counsel invoke the rule that unless the record on its face shows that the judgment is void, it can not be assailed collaterally. The appellees oppose to this position the argument that the court had no jurisdiction to order the sale of the land, and that they are not estopped by the judgment, for the reason that they were required to defend only in the capacity of heirs.
The appellees rely on the cases of Armstrong v. Cavitt, 78 Ind. 476, and Elliott v. Frakes, 71 Ind. 412. These cases are representatives of two different classes, and it is necessary to examine them separately and ascertain their bearing upon the present controversy.
Armstrong v. Cavitt, supra, has been followed in several subsequent cases, and must be regarded as correctly expressing the law. Slack v. Thacker, 84 Ind. 418; Hendrix v. McBeth, 87 Ind. 287; Compton v. Pruitt, 88 Ind. 171; Flenner v. Benson, 89 Ind. 108; Flenner v. Travellers Ins. Co., 89 Ind. 164; Nutter v. Hawkins, 93 Ind. 260; Matthews v. Pate, 93 Ind. 443; Pepper v. Zahnsinger, 94 Ind. 88. If the principle declared in these cases rules here, the discussion is at an end. The debatable question, however, is not what principle those cases declare, but whether the case in hand falls within it. The principle declared by these cases is, that the widow's interest in the real estate vested in her by virtue of her marital rights can not be sold to pay the husband's debts, and that it is beyond the power of the jurisdiction of the court to order it sold. That principle can not apply here, for the reason that it was the wife's estate that was ordered sold, and the order was made to sell it for the payment of her own debts, and not for the payment of the debts of the husband. The petition in this case proceeded upon the theory that the wife owned the land, and that her estate was the debtor; while in the cases cited the petition proceeded upon the theory that the land belonged to the husband and was liable to sale for the payment of his debts. The issue tendered by the petition in this case was that the wife's estate was the debtor and she the owner of the land at the time of her death. In the cases cited the issue tendered was, that the husband owned the land and his estate was the debtor. In the cases referred to the controlling questions as they appeared upon the face of the record were, did the husband own the land, and was it liable for his debts? While here the questions disclosed by the record were, did the wife die the owner in fee of the land, and was it liable for her debts? In the cases cited the rights of the wife appeared upon the face of the record, and a purchaser was bound to know that he could not secure her estate in the land upon a sale made under an order directing its sale for the payment of her husband's debts; while in the case under discussion the face of the record showed the wife to be the owner in fee, and that it was her estate that owed the debts for which the land was ordered sold. In the one case the material inquiry is as to the rights of the widow against the creditors of the husband. In the other the important inquiry is as to the rights of the creditors of the deceased woman in land of which she died the owner in fee, as against her surviving children. This is necessarily so, for the petition avers that she died the owner in fee of the land, and that she died in debt. The controlling issue which the petition challenged the surviving children to meet was whether she was in fact the owner in fee of the land, and did in fact die leaving creditors. We have ascertained that the principle deducible from Armstrong v. Cavitt, supra, and cases of that class, does not rule such a case as this, and we now proceed to ascertain whether the principle declared in the other class of cases governs here.
Elliott v. Frakes, supra, decides, as does Armstrong v. Cavitt, supra, that the widow's interest can not be sold to pay the husband's debts, and decides, also, that children made parties to a petition to sell lands of their deceased father are not estopped from claiming the estate which descends to them from their mother. The court, in the course of the opinion, said, in speaking of the appearance of the children, that It is obvious that the decision in the case cited proceeds upon the theory that persons sued in one capacity can not be estopped as to rights vested in them in another. The court referred to a page in a text-book, where it is said: "As a general rule, judgments conclude the parties only in the character in which they sue or are sued." Bigelow Estop., p. 65. In order to make this principle applicable here, it must be assumed that the appellees were not made parties in the character of heirs of their deceased mother, and this assumption can not be justly made. They were made parties in that character. The petition alleged that the land belonged to their mother in fee, and that they were interested in it as her heirs. They were, therefore, sued, not in the character of the heirs of their deceased father, but in their character as heirs of their deceased mother. Their rights as her heirs were put in issue, and when they appeared to try that issue, they appeared in the character of her heirs. It was not possible for them to assume any other character under the answer filed for them by their guardian ad litem. The issue joined affected them as the...
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