Lanzas v. Astrazeneca Pharm.
| Decision Date | 08 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | B294779 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | IVONNE LANZAS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ASTRAZENECA PHARMACEUTICALS et al., Defendants and Respondents. |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC599703)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Deirdre H. Hill, Judge. Affirmed.
Arkin Law Firm and Sharon J. Arkin; Doumanian & Associates and Nancy P. Doumanian for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Barbara A. Fitzgerald, Kathryn T. McGuigan, Thomas M. Peterson and Zachary W. Shine for Defendants and Respondents.
Ivonne Lanzas (appellant) appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court granted two motions for summary adjudication in favor of appellant's former employers, Amylin Pharmaceuticals ("Amylin"), Bristol-Meyers Squibb (BMS), and AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP (AZ), as well as four individuals (collectively "respondents"), in this disability discrimination action.1
Appellant challenges the trial court's decision that she did not demonstrate that the continuing violations doctrine was applicable to her Fair Housing and Employment Act (FEHA) claims. She further challenges the trial court's ruling summarily adjudicating the following causes of action: second cause of action for failure to accommodate; third cause of action for failure to engage in the interactive process; her discrimination claims, including the first cause of action for discrimination on the basis of physical disability and medical condition; fourth cause of action for disparate treatment in violation of FEHA; and fifth cause of action for unlawful and disparate treatment and discrimination on the basis of sex, gender, pregnancy or pregnancy related medical condition in violation of FEHA; the tenth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED); and her punitive damages claim.
We find no error in the trial court's decision summarily adjudicating these claims. Therefore, we affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The parties
Appellant began working for Amylin in 2011 as a pharmaceutical sales representative specializing in diabetes treatments. In 2012, Amylin's diabetes treatment division was purchased by BMS, although appellant continued to be paid by Amylin until January 2014. Shortly thereafter (February 1, 2014) the same division was acquired by AZ. The acquisitions included all former Amylin sales representatives. Appellant's allegations crossed over all of these times. Appellant maintained her position throughout the corporate transitions.
Appellant's job duties included visiting physicians' offices and educating physicians on products by discussing the drugs and providing both samples and literature. Appellant was not required to report to an office, instead she was based at home and set her own hours. On a typical day appellant would call on approximately eight doctors from a target list. As part of her duties, appellant had to carry a laptop, medical literature, and a cart with medical samples that she provided to doctors she visited. The roller bag also contained ice packets. When full of ice packs and medication samples, it weighed nearly 20 pounds.
John Frank (Frank), BMS Senior District Business Manager, supervised appellant from spring 2013 until he left on leave before October 2013. From approximately April 2013 to January 2014, Dr. Cynthia Vona (Vona), BMS Executive Medical Director, was involved with discussions with appellant regarding her work restrictions, accommodations and worker'scompensation claim relating to appellant's knee injury. Vona was never employed by AZ and did not interact with appellant after January 2014. Kimberlynne Coppom (Coppom), Commercial Business Director for BMS and AZ, was the regional director from approximately summer 2012 until January 2015. Kelly Hardesty (Hardesty), District Business Manager for BMS and AZ, was appellant's interim manager from approximately October 2013 until February 2014.
Appellant's knee injury
On October 1, 2012, while at a sales event in Texas, appellant injured her knee when she slipped and fell in a convention center bathroom. Appellant suffered a torn meniscus and sprain of the ACL. Her then employer, Amylin, granted her nearly seven months of leave to undergo knee surgery and recover, from October 2012 through approximately May 30, 2013. Appellant turned in all of her work status reports and medical reports to her employer. Appellant admits that her employer provided her with reasonable accommodations under FEHA during this time period.
Appellant's doctor released her to return to work at BMS with restrictions beginning April 30, 2013. Her restrictions included no lifting more than 10 pounds, a six-hour workday, limited use of her right leg, limited standing, walking and stooping.
From May 2013 through July 2013 appellant returned to active employment, but did not work in the field, as she was required to undergo training about BMS products and sales practices. This was unsupervised home-study training. During this period, appellant was not required to visit physicians or carry samples. She controlled how many hours she studied eachday. Appellant did not recall ever studying for more than six hours per day.
On May 1, 2013, appellant met with her newly assigned supervisor, Frank, whom she informed of her doctor-imposed work restrictions and asked about how the company planned to accommodate her. Frank provided no response, instead, he referred her to "HR."
Vona, the Executive Medical Director for BMS, assisted employees with accommodation requests. If an employee had such a request, the employee could go to Vona who would assist in understanding the request from the doctor and presenting the information to "HR." Vona and appellant exchanged telephone calls and e-mails regarding appellant's accommodation requests. Vona requested permission to speak with appellant's doctor, so that she could clearly communicate the restrictions and the length of time for which the restrictions were being sought. Vona also filed a worker's compensation claim on behalf of appellant for the knee injury. Vona received work duty status reports submitted by appellant, who found Vona to be "judgmental" and "concerned" about why about her doctor requested the accommodations. Appellant was concerned that Vona was questioning appellant's need for the restrictions. Appellant felt that she was being discriminated against because Vona was "not believing" or "questioning" her restrictions. Vona had no recollection of telling anyone that she disagreed with appellant's doctor or the work restrictions.
When appellant returned to work, her territory had been changed from Valencia to East Los Angeles. The job was strenuous as she had to stand for long periods of time and carry weight. Appellant was approved to travel for training to NewJersey from June 3 to June 14, 2013. Appellant was advised that the training sessions were eight hours per day and classroom-based. Appellant did not inform anyone that she did not want to attend the training, however, she stated that she was concerned about exceeding her six hour workday requirement. Appellant was also required to attend an orientation in Orange County where she was required to attend for more than six hours per day. Nevertheless, she did not ask anyone if she could leave early.
Appellant's first day working in the field was scheduled for June 17, 2013, with continued work restrictions, including a 10-pound lifting restriction and a work day not to exceed six hours per day. However, when appellant returned from the training in New Jersey, she went on a four-week medical leave until approximately July 15, 2013 due to a miscarriage.2
After appellant returned to work on July 16, 2013, she was able to set her hours so that she could work six hour days. She was never told by any manager that she could not work a six-hour day. However, there were days when she was required to work more than six hours. Appellant was not able to go through her workday without lifting more than 10 pounds. At that time, appellant had begun sales details and had a bag that contained all her samples and all the literature for physicians. Although appellant communicated with Vona about this problem, Vona expressed that she could not understand why appellant still required restrictions. Vona had appellant fill out a form askingappellant's opinion as to how she could be accommodated. Appellant suggested that the company limit her sample allocation.3
Eventually BMS came up with a plan to manage her weight restriction by offering her two sample bags. She could keep an empty one in her car, and filled it with the samples she needed for each visit from the full bag. On October 7, 2013, appellant received a letter from the human resources department suggesting this accommodation, to which she responded that she still had to lift more than 10 pounds.
On November 6, 2013, appellant's doctor changed her disability status to "not disabled."
Appellant had a second surgery on her knee in August 2015, and her understanding was that the second surgery was necessary due to continuous strain.
Ethics investigation and 2013 year-end review
Frank left BMS prior to October 2013. Coppom then commenced an investigation into the team's poor performance. The investigation included reviewing all sales data for Frank's team, including appellant. In November 2013, Coppom met with Hardesty and asked her to help with the investigation of sales call data, including review of fuel logs and activity reports. During this initial meeting, Coppom did not mention...
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