Lapid-Laurel v. Zoning Bd. of Adj. of Tp. Scotch

• Decision Date: 15 March 2002
• Docket Number: No. 00-3625.,00-3625.
• Citation: 284 F.3d 442
• Parties: LAPID-LAUREL, L.L.C.; John and Jane Doe, Appellants, v. ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF THE TOWNSHIP OF SCOTCH PLAINS; the township of Scotch Plains; Alta A. Rose; Barbara Horev.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

284 F.3d 442

LAPID-LAUREL, L.L.C.; John and Jane Doe, Appellants, v. ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF THE TOWNSHIP OF SCOTCH PLAINS; the township of Scotch Plains; Alta A. Rose; Barbara Horev.

No. 00-3625.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued September 7, 2001.

Filed March 15, 2002.

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Steven C. Rother (Argued), A. Albert Lugo, Hackensack, NJ, Counsel for Appellants.

Stephen Eisdorfer (Argued), Hill, Wallack, Princeton, NJ, Co-Counsel for Appellees, Township of Scotch Plains.

Frank N. Yurasko, Somerville, NJ, Co-Counsel for Appellees, Township of Scotch Plains.

Douglas W. Hansen, Scotch Plains, NJ, Co-Counsel for Appellees, Township of Scotch Plains.

Anthony D. Rinaldo, Jr., Garrubbo, Romakow & Rinaldo, Westfield, NJ, Co-Counsel for Appellees, Zoning Board of Scotch Plains.

Before BECKER, Chief Judge, ALITO and BARRY, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

BECKER, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff Lapid-Laurel, L.L.C. ("Lapid"), a real estate development firm that unsuccessfully sought approval from the Zoning Board of Adjustment of the Township of Scotch Plains, New Jersey ("the Board") to build a 95-bed care facility for the elderly, appeals the District Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Board and the Township, defendants in Lapid's civil case, challenging their actions under the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 ("FHAA"), 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. Lapid based its claims in the District Court primarily on two separate theories under the FHAA. First, Lapid contended that Scotch Plains's zoning system had a disparate impact on the elderly handicapped in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f). Second, Lapid claimed that the Board failed to "make reasonable accommodations" in order to facilitate housing for the elderly handicapped in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B).

Lapid's primary contentions on appeal are that: (1) because the Board failed to engage in the "interactive process" that we have held is required of employers by the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., and because the Board erroneously denied Lapid's request to bifurcate its variance and site plan applications, thereby depriving it of a full enough record, the District Court erred by limiting its review to the administrative record on the reasonable accommodations claim; and (2) it was error for the District Court to grant summary judgment on both the reasonable accommodations and discriminatory impact claims.

We resolve the first claim adversely to Lapid by declining to extend the "interactive process" requirement that exists in the employer-employee context of the Rehabilitation Act to the housing and land use context of the FHAA. We conclude that the process was never intended to apply in this context, and would be especially inappropriate to apply to local land use boards, which already face detailed procedural requirements under state law. We will also affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment on both the reasonable accommodations and disparate impact claims. Before doing so, we must determine which party bears the burden of establishing the various elements of an FHAA reasonable accommodations challenge to a local land use board's decision. We resolve this question by adopting a burden-shifting analysis, in which the plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that its requested accommodations are "necessary to afford [handicapped] person[s] [an] equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling," 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B), at which point the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the requested accommodations are unreasonable.

In the present case, we conclude that the plaintiff has failed to produce sufficient evidence that the accommodations that it requested were "necessary" to afford the handicapped an "equal opportunity" to housing, and that the Board has shown that the requested accommodations were unreasonable, largely because of the problems with traffic safety and emergency vehicle access that the proposed Facility was likely to cause. We therefore affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants on the reasonable accommodations claim. We also affirm the District Court's judgment on the discriminatory impact claim, because we agree that Lapid has failed to establish a prima facie case that Scotch Plains's ordinances have a discriminatory impact on the elderly handicapped.

I. Facts & Procedural History

On June 9, 1998, Lapid applied to the Zoning Board of Adjustment of the Township of Scotch Plains, New Jersey for the variances and site plan approval necessary to build a long-term care facility for the elderly ("the Facility"). The proposed Facility included 35 beds in a skilled nursing section, the license for which Lapid wished to transfer from its nursing home in nearby Plainfield, New Jersey, and 60 "assisted living" beds, for which Lapid had originally received a license in Westfield, New Jersey. Lapid proposed to build the Facility on two contiguous lots, 1290 and 1310 Martine Avenue. At the time it applied to the Board, Lapid owned one of the lots in question and was under contract to purchase the other. The lots, which at the time the suit began held two single-family houses, would together provide 4.17 acres on which Lapid proposed to build a 58,034 square foot building (with a footprint of 27,640 square feet). Approximately 45% of the lots, or 1.9 acres, was covered by freshwater wetlands and wetland transition areas as defined by New Jersey's Freshwater Wetland Protection Act, N.J.S.A. 13:9B-1 et seq., and was therefore not available for construction.

The Martine Avenue lots are located in an area that is zoned R-1 under Scotch Plains's 1976 Master Plan. The R-1 zone is designated to permit only single-family houses on large lots (40,000 square feet or more — about an acre), with wide street frontage (a minimum width of 160 feet). However, several institutional uses exist in the R-1 zone around the lots where Lapid proposed to develop the Facility. These include a synagogue, a high school, a YMCA, and a country club.

In order to get approval to build the Facility, Lapid needed the Board to grant several variances, which it applied for on June 9, 1998. Lapid's application requested three approvals from the Board. First, because the land use that Lapid proposed (i.e., a residential care facility for the elderly), did not fit within the uses permitted in an R-1 zone, Lapid asked for a use variance pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d). Second, Lapid requested three non-use variances pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(c). These sought permission to: (1) construct a parking lot in front of the building; (2) build a fence in excess of four feet in height; and (3) place a freestanding sign in front of the building. All of these are prohibited in residential areas and require a variance. Third, Lapid sought approval for its site plan.

The Board held four public hearings on Lapid's application — on February 4, March 4, March 15, and March 24, 1999. Lapid presented testimony from various experts at these meetings, including Julius Szalay, an engineer; Stephen Crystal, a gerontologist; Peter Steck, a planner; David Horner, a traffic consultant; and Joseph Martin, a real estate appraiser. The Board received written reports from the Township's experts, Susan Kimball, a planner; Paul Ferriero, an engineer; Harold Maltz, a traffic consultant; Fire Chief Jonathan Ellis; Police Chief Thomas O'Brien; and Sergeant James Rau, the head of the police department's traffic safety bureau. Several of these officials also testified at the Board's public hearings.

Lapid's engineer made multiple amendments to the site plan in order to address the concerns that the Board and its experts raised. In particular, these concerns focused on the layout of the parking lot and its effect on traffic safety both within the Facility's lot and at the point of ingress and egress on Martine Avenue, as well as on the access that emergency vehicles would have to the rear of the building. In order to address the issues of emergency vehicle access, Lapid's planner sought to meet with the Township's fire chief beginning on March 10, 1999, but was unable to do so until March 22, two days before the Board's final meeting at which it considered Lapid's variance and site plan applications.¹ Lapid did not address the fire chief's latest concerns in a revised site plan prior to the March 24 meeting, and it requested bifurcation of its applications, i.e., it sought a decision on its variance application on March 24, but requested the Board's approval for an extension on its site plan application. The Board denied Lapid's request to bifurcate, and denied the entire application on the record before it at the March 24 meeting.

The Board then issued a written denial of Lapid's applications. The Board cited the following concerns as its reasons for denying the variances and site plan: (1) a negative impact on the municipal zoning plan (i.e., siting a commercial use in the R-1 zone); (2) traffic safety concerns, including increased traffic on Martine Avenue and hazards resulting from ingress and egress from the Facility's lot; (3) a substantial portion of the site contained wetlands; and (4) insufficient access for emergency and fire vehicles.

Lapid then filed a complaint in the District Court against the Board, the Township of Scotch Plains (together, "the municipal defendants"), Alta Rose, the person from whom Lapid had contracted to purchase the property at 1310 Martine Avenue, and her daughter Barbara Horev, who held a durable power of attorney for Rose's benefit.² The complaint alleged that: (1) the Board's denial of Lapid's application for variances and site plan approval violated the FHAA's requirement that municipalities "make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to...