LaPlant v. Schuman

• Decision Date: 11 December 1923
• Docket Number: 35473
• Citation: 196 N.W. 280,197 Iowa 466
• Parties: PHEBE D. LAPLANT, Appellee, v. A. C. SCHUMAN et al., Appellants
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

196 N.W. 280

197 Iowa 466

PHEBE D. LAPLANT, Appellee, v. A. C. SCHUMAN et al., Appellants

No. 35473

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

December 11, 1923

REHEARING DENIED MARCH 7, 1924.

Appeal from Marshall District Court.--JAMES W. WILLETT, Judge.

ACTION in equity, to enjoin defendants from obstructing a driveway over real estate belonging to the defendant A. C. Schuman which is claimed as an easement appurtenant to adjoining property of plaintiff. Decree for plaintiff, and defendants appeal.

Reversed.

F. E Northup, for appellants.

C. H. E. Boardman, for appellee.

VERMILION, J. PRESTON, C. J., STEVENS and DE GRAFF, JJ., concur.

OPINION

VERMILION, J.

The facts are not in serious dispute. It appears that, for some years prior to January 6, 1914, Charles T. LaPlant was the husband of plaintiff, and was the owner of lots 10, 11, and 12 in Block 7 in the city of Marshalltown. The tract so designated is bounded on the south and east by streets, and on the north and west by public alleys. The lots, each 60 feet in width, front on the street to the south, Lot 10 lying on the west, and Lot 11 adjoining it on the east. Charles T. LaPlant erected four dwelling houses on the tract, three on Lot 12, and one on Lot 11, fronting on the street to the south, and a brick flat building on Lot 10, with its east wall upon a portion of the line between Lots 10 and 11. A cinder driveway was constructed on Lot 11, in the space between the dwelling and the adjoining flat building, leading from the street in front and connecting with a circular driveway in the rear of the house. Access could also be had to the circular driveway from the public alleys to the west and north of the tract. A reference to the accompanying plat will make the situation plain.

The portion of the driveway on Lot 10 extending from the street northward, in addition to affording access to the rear of all the houses, was used for putting coal into the east side of the basement of the flat near the north end of the building.

[SEE PLAT IN ORIGINAL]

On January 6, 1914, the plaintiff procured a divorce from Charles T. LaPlant. While the divorce action was pending, and in contemplation of a decree of divorce, the parties entered into a stipulation respecting a division of their property, whereby it was agreed that, in case a divorce should be granted, plaintiff should have Lot 10 and the north half of Lots 11 and 12. The decree of divorce carried out their arrangement, and awarded the last mentioned property to the plaintiff. The result of this was to leave in Charles T. LaPlant the title to the south half of Lot 11, over which ran the driveway in question, and to give to plaintiff the title to Lot 10, upon which stood the flat building. The decree contained these three further provisions, which are also found, to the same effect, in the stipulation:

"It is, however, at all times understood by the parties and agreed to by them, and decreed by the court, that the west line of said C. T. LaPlant's tract is to be the middle line of the wall now located on the west line of said real estate, and that the said wall is to be a party wall, one half (1/2) standing on the property of the other, and that plaintiff and defendant each own an undivided one half (1/2) of said party wall. It is the decree of this court that the real estate thus apportioned is to be the absolute property of the person receiving the same, free and clear of any claim of the other, and free and clear of any home-stead, dower, or other rights. It is further ordered and decreed that, in case there is any real estate not herein enumerated and disposed of, it is decreed the same is to be the exclusive property of the party in whose name the record title now stands."

On January 7, 1914, the plaintiff, by quitclaim deed, which was filed for record on the following day, and duly recorded, conveyed to Charles T. LaPlant the south half of Lots 11 and 12, being the same property the title to which was left in him by the divorce decree. This deed contained the following provisions:

"It is, however, understood that the west line of the above described tract of land is to be the middle line of the wall now located on or near the east line of Lot 10, in Block 7, Marshall, and that said wall is to be a party wall, one half standing on the property of this grantee, and the other half on the property belonging to the grantor. Subject, however, to the right of the grantor to maintain all water, gas, and sewer pipes on said premises and connected with the property abutting conveyed by this grantee to the grantor herein, with the right to repair and renew the same, and the said Phebe.D. LaPlant releases all her right of dower and other interest in and to the above described premises."

Charles T. LaPlant died in about 1916; and in 1920, the defendant Schuman purchased of one Woodward, who acquired title by descent or devise from LaPlant, the west 56 feet of the south half of Lot 11, the conveyance thereof expressly covering the interest of the grantor in the undivided one half of the brick wall constructed on the party line between Lots 10 and 11. During all of the time since its construction, in about 1898, the driveway in question, extending along and over the west side of the property so purchased by defendant, had been plainly visible to the most casual observer, and its use in connection with the flat building open and obvious. The defendants who had occupied the property as tenants, before their purchase of it, were familiar with the situation, and had actual notice that a right was claimed to have the driveway maintained as it was. Indeed, prior negotiations for the purchase of the property from LaPlant, before his death, had been broken off because of such a claim. The defendant Schuman, while denying knowledge that Charles T. LaPlant had once owned all of the property and had arranged and used it as it was, had examined an abstract of title, and appears to have made the purchase relying on what was there disclosed as to the title.

Prior to the commencement of the action, the defendants were about to construct a garage near the rear of the plot of ground owned by them, and upon the driveway in question. It was not proposed to use the party wall of the flat building in so doing, but a space of about two feet was to be left between the two buildings. With this exception, the garage would extend across the driveway, and completely close it. A temporary injunction was issued, enjoining the defendants from obstructing the driveway, and on final hearing, this was made permanent. The plaintiff claims a right to have this driveway remain open, and to use it as appurtenant to her flat building on the west. She bases her claim upon a principle often stated by this and other courts, which, in the head note of a leading case upon the subject, is thus aptly expressed:

"Where the owner of land has, by any artificial arrangement, effected an advantage for one portion, to the burdening of the other, upon a severance of the ownership the holders of the two portions take them respectively charged with the servitude and entitled to the benefit openly and visibly attached at the time of the conveyance of the portion first granted." Lampman v. Milks, 21 N.Y. 505.

This doctrine has been many times announced by this court as applicable, under proper circumstances, to a variety of easements. Marshall Ice Co. v. LaPlant, 136 Iowa 621, 111 N.W. 1016; Kane v. Templin, 158 Iowa 24, 138 N.W. 901; Keokuk. Elec. R. Co. v. Weisman, 146 Iowa 679, 126 N.W. 60; Stephens v. Boyd, 157 Iowa 570, 138 N.W. 389; Carrigg v. Mechanics Bank, 136 Iowa 261, 111 N.W. 329; Teachout v. Duffus, 141 Iowa 466, 119 N.W. 983. Indeed, there is, and could be, no question of the rule. As has often been said, it is elementary.

It is equally plain that an easement by implication does not arise under such circumstances until there is a severance of the land by the owner of the whole. It is axiomatic that no one can have an easement in his own property. He may change at will any artificial arrangement for the use of any part, so long as he owns the whole, and it is only upon a severance by sale or otherwise that an easement is created,...