LaPorto v. Village of Philmont

Decision Date19 February 1976
Citation382 N.Y.S.2d 703,39 N.Y.2d 7,346 N.E.2d 503
CourtNew York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
Parties, 346 N.E.2d 503 Joseph La PORTO et al., Appellants, v. VILLAGE OF PHILMONT, Respondent, and Town of Claverack, Intervenor-Appellant.

Matthew H. Bowcock, Craryville, for appellants and intervenor-appellant.

John W. Rehfuss, Albany, for respondent.

GABRIELLI, Judge.

The Village of Philmont, in 1911, was required to file a map and description of its territorial limits with the Secretary of State pursuant to chapter 64 of the Laws of 1909, as amended by chapter 205 of the Laws of 1911. This statute specifically directed the president of the village to 'cause to be prepared an outline map and description of the corporate limits of * * * (the) village, * * * which map and description shall be certified by him as true and correct.' It is conceded by respondent village that the lands of appellants and others similarly situated are outside the boundaries of the village as delineated by the map and description filed with the Secretary of State. Uncontroverted also is the fact that none of the lands in question have been carried in the village tax rolls, nor have the owners of these lands received village services, for at least 45 years. Indeed, there is no claim that any of the properties beyond the limits of the 1911 map and description were ever subject to village taxation or were ever accorded essential village services such as police and fire protection or street maintenance.

Suddenly, in February, 1973, appellants were notified that, commencing June 1, 1973, their properties would be added to the village tax rolls. It appears that this action was occasioned by the entirely inadvertent and fortuitous discovery of the New York State Department of Audit and Control that the boundaries established by the inhabitants of Philmont at the time of its incorporation in 1892 (pursuant to the provisions of L.1870, ch. 291) encompassed appellants' lands. It should be reiterated, emphatically, that there is no evidence whatsoever that the Village of Philmont exercised dominion of any nature over the disputed lands at any time during the more than 80-year period since its 'incorporation'.

The question posed by this controversy, therefore, is whether a lengthy period of acquiescence in certain boundaries and the failure to exercise jurisdiction over particular properties operates to preclude a village from asserting at the present time that such properties are within its territorial limits. Appellants, suing on their own behalf, and on behalf of other landowners similarly situated, and intervenor Town of Claverack, claim that the more than 80-year period of acquiescence estops respondent Village of Philmont from including appellants on its tax rolls. The Town of Claverack further contends that allowing Philmont to include the subject properties within its territory would adversely affect the town by decreasing the land area under its direct control, decreasing its tax income and seriously undermining the bond issue of the Mellenville Fire District. * Respondent was victorious in the Appellant Division which held that the original 1892 boundaries of the village must control and that acquiescence by the village in differe boundaries was of no consequence. We do not agree.

Although we have not previously had occasion to pass upon the question, it is well settled and has been the rule in other jurisdictions that '(l)ong acquiescence in the location of municipal boundaries by the corporation and the inhabitants thereof where all municipal action and improvements have been done under the assumption that such are the boundaries will support the conclusion that such are the true boundaries notwithstanding they were not originally so located' (2 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d ed.), § 7.09, p. 305; see, e.g., Thomas v. Parsley, 283 Ky. 393, 141 S.W.2d 302; Village of Elberta v. City of Frankfort, 347 Mich. 173, 79 N.W.2d 616; State ex rel. Columbia Bridge Co. v. City of Columbia, 27 S.C. 137, 3 S.E. 55; Scotch Plains Twp. v. Town of Westfield, 83 N.J.Super. 323, 199 A.2d 673; Starry v. Lake, 135 Cal.App. 677, 28 P.2 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 40). We hold that the doctrine of acquiescence is applicable in the instant case where, by custom, usage and the passage of time, disputed territory has been assumed by all interested persons to be beyond the boundaries of one entity of local government and within those of another, and where property owners or adjacent units of local government have relied to their detriment upon the inaction and passivity of a municipal corporation to which knowledge of the original boundaries at the time of incorporation may be imputed.

The doctrine of acquiescence is of particular importance in, and indeed, is predicated upon, the situation in which 'personal, civil and political rights have become fixed according to the boundaries established by usage' (2 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d ed.), § 7.09, p. 306; Thomas v. Parsley, 283 Ky. 393, 141 S.W.2d 302, Supra). In this case, appellants and intervenor have relied upon the boundaries so established. In the purchase of land outside corporate village limits, it is generally of paramount concern to the purchaser that the property not be subject to the village tax, and we may assume that appellants and their predecessors in title took this factor into consideration in purchasing their properties. For a period of several decades appellants or their predecessors have been required either to install their own wells or to personally bear the expense for the extension of water lines from the village water system to their premises and pay a higher water rate than that enjoyed by residents of the village. Furthermore, the interests of the Town of Claverack, which has provided all municipal services for the property owners here, are also at stake since it too has relied upon the boundaries established by custom and usage through the years. In particular, the fiscal integrity of the bond issue of the Mellenville Fire Department may be jeopardized since, if the village is successful here, the Mellenville Fire District area will be reduced and bonding obligations may be imperiled. As far as can be ascertained from the record, since 1892, the Town of Claverack has borne all the capital and maintenance costs for the disputed area. The exercise of corporate power on the part of the Town of Claverack over the disputed area was obviously within the knowledge of the Village of Philmont which has acquiesced in this state of affairs. In adopting the doctrine of acquiescence in this case, we hasten...

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    • August 17, 1984
    ...however, this case does not present a mere technical failure to meet statutory requirements. 55 La Porto v. Philmont, 39 N.Y.2d 7, 12, 346 N.E.2d 503, 506, 382 N.Y.S.2d 703, 706 (1976). 56 Granada Buildings, Inc. v. City of Kingston, 58 N.Y.2d 705, 708, 444 N.E.2d 1325, 1326, 458 N.Y.S.2d 9......
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    ...equitable estoppel see K. Davis, Administrative Law of the Seventies §§ 17.01 and 17.06 (1976); e. g., LaPorto v. Village of Philmont, 39 N.Y.2d 7, 382 N.Y.S.2d 703, 346 N.E.2d 503 (1976); Bender v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 662, 382 N.Y.S.2d 18, 345 N.E.2d 561 (1976......
  • Moritz v. Board of Ed., Gowanda Central School Dist.
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    ...accorded to full-time teachers. The doctrine of equitable estoppel applies to municipal corporations (see LaPorto v. Village of Philmont, 39 N.Y.2d 7, 382 N.Y.S.2d 703, 346 N.E.2d 503; Bender v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 662, 382 N.Y.S.2d 18, 345 N.E.2d 759; Planet Cons......
  • Miracle Mile Associates v. Yudelson
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • May 22, 1979
    ...from asserting a right it has; but this bar is to be used sparingly and only in truly unusual cases (LaPorto v. Village of Philmont, 39 N.Y.2d 7, 382 N.Y.S.2d 703, 346 N.E.2d 503; Bender v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 662, 382 N.Y.S.2d 18, 345 N.E.2d 561; Gordon v. Holt, ......
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