Lapsley v. Twp. of Sparta

• Decision Date: 29 January 2021
• Docket Number: DOCKET NO. A-0958-19T3
• Parties: Diane S. LAPSLEY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. TOWNSHIP OF SPARTA and Sparta Public Library, Respondents-Respondents, and Paul Austin and Sparta Department of Public Works, Intervenors-Respondents.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

466 N.J.Super. 160

245 A.3d 1019

Diane S. LAPSLEY, Petitioner-Appellant,

v. TOWNSHIP OF SPARTA and Sparta Public Library, Respondents-Respondents,andPaul Austin and Sparta Department of Public Works, Intervenors-Respondents.

DOCKET NO. A-0958-19T3

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

Argued October 28, 2020

Decided January 29, 2021

Christine M. McCarthy argued the cause for appellant (Einhorn, Barbarito, Frost & Botwinick, PC, attorneys; Matheu D. Nunn, of counsel and on the briefs; Christopher L. Musmanno and Christine M. McCarthy, on the briefs).

William G. Johnson, Dover, and John R. Tort, Jr., Edison, argued the cause for respondents (Johnson & Johnson, attorneys for intervenors Paul Austin and Sparta Department of Public Works; Leitner, Tort, DeFazio, Leitner & Brause, PC, attorneys for respondents Township of Sparta and Sparta Public Library; William G. Johnson and John R. Tort, Jr., of counsel and on the joint brief).

Before Judges Sumners, Geiger, and Mitterhoff.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

MITTERHOFF, J.A.D.

Petitioner Diane Lapsley appeals from a November 25, 2016 order entered by a judge of compensation concluding that injuries she sustained in a February 3, 2014 accident arose out of and in the course of her employment as a Sparta Township librarian pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act (the Act), N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 to -146. After clocking out and exiting the library premises, petitioner was struck by a snowplow in an adjacent parking lot that happened to be owned by the township. The compensation judge concluded that petitioner's injuries were compensable pursuant to the premises rule, N.J.S.A. 34:15:36, which provides that "[e]mployment shall be deemed to commence when an employee arrives at the employer's place of employment to report for work and shall terminate when the employee leaves the employer's place of employment, excluding areas not under the control of the employer ...." Having reviewed the record and the applicable legal principles, we conclude that a mechanical application of the premises rule in the context of a public-entity employer deviates from well-settled principles applicable to private employers and invites an overbroad and unwarranted expansion of public-entity liability for workers' compensation claims. We therefore reverse.

Petitioner was employed as a librarian at the Sparta Township Library.¹ Her duties included supervising staff, ordering books, and creating marketing materials for library events. The library is located within a municipal complex that also includes three common-use parking lots, a baseball field, and Sparta Township Board of Education offices. The common-use parking lots are free for use both by township employees as well as the general public. None of the parking areas within the common-use lot contain designated spots for petitioner or any other township employees. Thus, the township imposed no restrictions on petitioner in terms of paths of ingress or egress to and from the public parking lot and the library. Id.

On February 3, 2014, the library closed early due to inclement weather. Id. Petitioner's husband came to pick her up and parked in one of the common-use parking lots. Id. After stepping off the library curb and walking about eighteen feet into the lot, the couple was hit by a snowplow driven by a Sparta Township Department of Public Works employee. Petitioner sustained injuries to her leg that required multiple surgeries and have left her permanently disfigured.

On August 8, 2014, petitioner filed a complaint in the Law Division alleging negligence against Sparta Township, Sparta's Department of Public Works, Sussex County, and the driver of the snowplow. On September 29, 2014, Sparta Township filed a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer, arguing petitioner's claim was barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Act. The motion was denied and Sparta Township was ordered to file an answer.²

On January 19, 2016, petitioner moved for summary judgment requesting a ruling that she did not sustain a compensable injury encompassed by the Act. Sparta Township cross-moved for a stay and requested the matter be transferred to the Division of Workers' Compensation (Division), or in the alternative, for summary judgment.

While the motions were pending, in order to toll the statute of limitations, petitioner filed a protective claim petition in the Division and requested a stay pending resolution of the Law Division matter. The Township of Sparta filed an answer to the claim petition on January 28, 2016. Sparta's Department of Public Works and the snowplow driver successfully moved to intervene as co-respondents in the Workers' Compensation matter. Meanwhile, on February 19, 2016, the trial judge denied petitioner's motion for summary judgment and granted defendants' request for a stay of the Law Division matter, to allow the compensability issue to be resolved in the Division.

On November 25, 2016, a Workers' Compensation judge found petitioner's injuries were compensable under the Act. Relying on Brower v. ICT Group, 164 N.J. 367, 753 A.2d 1045 (2000), the compensation judge determined that Sparta Township's ownership, maintenance, and right to control the parking lot were sufficient to find that the injury occurred on the employer's premises.³ The facts that petitioner had clocked out, and that her employer had not actually exercised any degree of control over the parking lot, did not preclude compensability under the Act. Id.

Following the finding of compensability, the parties executed a consent order staying matters in both the Law Division and Division pending this appeal. The Law Division matter was dismissed without prejudice on April 20, 2018. On October 22, 2018, the compensation judge issued an order approving settlement subject to petitioner's appeal.

On appeal, petitioner argues the compensation judge erred by determining her injuries arose out of her employment because she was not engaged in a task for her employer's benefit when the injury occurred. She further contends that it was error to find the injury occurred during the course of her employment because she was off the clock and no longer within the confines of the library when the injury occurred. Petitioner urges that public policy and legislative intent would not be served if we found that a public employer's right to control the situs of an employee's injury satisfied the premises rule.⁴

Respondent argues that the compensation judge correctly found the injury compensable. Respondent further contends the Act's exclusive remedy provision is applicable, because petitioner was injured by a co-employee immediately after leaving work, while on property owned, maintained, and used by her employer.

We review final decisions from the Division in accordance with a deferential standard of review. "An administrative agency's final quasi - judicial decision will be sustained unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record." Russo v. Bd. of Trustees, Police, 206 N.J. 14, 27, 17 A.3d 801 (2011). We are not, however, "bound by [an] agency's interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue," Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85, 93, 312 A.2d 497 (1973), particularly when "that interpretation is inaccurate or contrary to legislative objectives." Russo, 206 N.J. at 27, 17 A.3d 801 (quoting G.S. v. Dep't of Human Servs., Div. of Youth & Family Servs., 157 N.J. 161, 170, 723 A.2d 612 (1999) ). Instead, this court reviews an agency's interpretation of statutes and case law de novo. N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 – 146; Mayflower Sec. Co., 64 N.J. at 93, 312 A.2d 497.

The Act has been described as "humane social legislation designed to place the cost of work-connected injury on the employer who may readily provide for it as an operation expense." Livingstone v. Abraham & Straus, Inc., 111 N.J. 89, 94-95, 543 A.2d 45 (1988) (quoting Hornyak v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 63 N.J. 99, 101, 305 A.2d 65 (1973) ). The Act entitles an employee to recover for injuries "arising out of and in the course of his employment ...." N.J.S.A. 34:15-1.

Whether a particular accident arose out of and in the course of employment raises a two-part question. Acikgoz v. New Jersey Tpk. Auth., 398 N.J. Super. 79, 87-88, 939 A.2d 805 (App. Div. 2008) ; Stroka v. United Airlines, 364 N.J. Super. 333, 339, 835 A.2d 1247 (App. Div. 2003). First, there must be a causal connection between the employment and the accident itself. Acikgoz, 398 N.J. Super. at 87-88, 939 A.2d 805 ; Stroka, 364 N.J. Super. at 339, 835 A.2d 1247. Second, there must be a time-and-place nexus between the injured worker's employment and the accident. Acikgoz, 398 N.J. Super. at 87-88, 939 A.2d 805 ; Stroka, 364 N.J. Super. at 339, 835 A.2d 1247. "That the injured employee may have been ‘off the clock’ does not automatically preclude compensability because the situs of the accident is a dispositive factor." Acikgoz, 398 N.J. Super. at 88, 939 A.2d 805 (citing Valdez v. Tri-State Furniture, 374 N.J. Super. 223, 232-33, 863 A.2d 1123 (App. Div. 2005) ).

Although the Act has been broadly interpreted to bring as many cases as possible within its coverage, Silagy v. State, 105 N.J. Super. 507, 510, 253 A.2d 478 (App. Div. 1969), it was amended by the Legislature in 1979 to "reduce costs by, among other things, ‘sharply curtail[ing compensability for] off-premises accidents.’ " Stroka, 364 N.J. Super. at 338-39, 835 A.2d 1247 (quoting Jumpp v. City of Ventnor, 177 N.J. 470, 477, 828 A.2d 905 (2003) ). Prior to the amendments, courts applied the going and coming rule, "a doctrine that prevented awarding workers' compensation benefits for accidental injuries that occurred during routine travel to or from the employee's place of work." Hersh v. Morris, 217 N.J. 236, 243, 86 A.3d 140 (2014). The going and coming rule drew a distinction...