Lapsley v. Twp. of Sparta
| Citation | 249 N.J. 427,266 A.3d 413 |
| Decision Date | 18 January 2022 |
| Docket Number | 085422,A-68/69 September Term 2020 |
| Parties | Diane S. LAPSLEY, Petitioner-Respondent, v. TOWNSHIP OF SPARTA and Sparta Public Library, Respondents-Appellants, and Paul Austin and Sparta Department of Public Works, Intervenors-Appellants. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court (New Jersey) |
William G. Johnson argued the cause for appellants Paul Austin and Sparta Department of Public Works (Johnson & Johnson, attorneys; William G. Johnson, of counsel and on the briefs).
John R. Tort, Jr. argued the cause for appellants Township of Sparta and Sparta Public Library (Leitner, Tort, DeFazio & Brause, attorneys; John R. Tort, Jr., of counsel and on the briefs).
Christine M. McCarthy argued the cause for respondent (Einhorn, Barbarito, Frost & Botwinick, attorneys; Christine M. McCarthy, Christopher L. Musmanno, and Matheu D. Nunn, on the brief).
In this appeal, defendants Township of Sparta, Paul Austin, and Sparta Department of Public Works (collectively, defendants) challenge a denial of workers’ compensation benefits to plaintiff Diane Lapsley under the Workers’ Compensation Act, N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 to -147. The Act authorizes workers’ compensation benefits to an employee injured in an "accident arising out of and in the course of employment." N.J.S.A. 34:15-7.
Lapsley was injured in a parking lot owned and maintained by her employer, the Township, and adjacent to her place of work. However, the Township did not control where Lapsley parked, did not restrict how employees entered and exited the building where she worked, and allowed both employees and the general public to use the parking lot. The Division of Workers’ Compensation awarded benefits to Lapsley. The Appellate Division reversed, finding that Lapsley's injuries did not arise "out of and in the course of" her employment because the Township exercised no control over her use of the parking lot.
We find that Lapsley's injuries arose out of and in the course of her employment because the parking lot where she was injured was owned and maintained by the Township, adjacent to her place of work, and used by Township employees to park. We therefore conclude that Lapsley was entitled to benefits under the Act, and we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division.
Lapsley was employed by the Township as a librarian for the Sparta Public Library. The library is in a municipal complex with athletic fields, offices, and three common-use parking lots. The Township owns and maintains the parking lots, which are open to Township employees and the general public alike. The Township did not direct employees to park in the parking lots, assign parking spaces for employees, or require permit or paid parking. Nor did the Township restrict employees’ manner of traveling between the parking lots and the library.
On February 3, 2014, Lapsley closed the library early due to a snowstorm. Lapsley's husband, Donald, arrived to drive her home and parked his car in one of the parking lots. The parking lot he used is adjacent to the library and is commonly used by employees for library purposes. As the Lapsleys walked from the library to the car, they stepped off the curb, walked approximately eighteen and a half feet into the parking lot, and were suddenly struck by a snowplow owned by the Township and operated by Paul Austin, a Township employee. As a result, Lapsley suffered injuries to her leg requiring multiple surgeries and leaving her permanently disfigured.
Lapsley filed a complaint against the Township, the library, Austin, and the Sparta Department of Public Works in the Law Division. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer, arguing that Lapsley's claim was barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Act. The Law Division denied the motion.
The next day, Lapsley filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that her injuries were not compensable under the Act. Defendants filed a cross motion for a stay and transfer of the matter to the Division of Workers’ Compensation for a determination of compensability under the Act or, alternatively, for summary judgment.
Lapsley then filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits against the Township in the Division of Workers’ Compensation. The Township filed an answer to the claim conceding that Lapsley was employed by the Township and that her injuries were compensable under the Act. Austin and the Sparta Department of Public Works moved to intervene in the matter, which the Division of Workers’ Compensation granted. Meanwhile, the Law Division denied the parties’ motions for summary judgment but granted a stay to allow the Division of Workers’ Compensation to decide the issue of compensability.
The Division of Workers’ Compensation ultimately found that Lapsley's injuries arose out of and in the course of her employment and were therefore compensable under the Act. Relying on Hersh v. County of Morris, 217 N.J. 236, 245, 86 A.3d 140 (2014), the compensation judge determined that the dispositive factors were the site of the accident and the employer's control of that location. Accordingly, the judge noted that the parking lot was adjacent to the library and that the Township owned, maintained, and had the right to control the lot. Therefore, the judge found Lapsley's injures to be compensable.
Lapsley appealed and, in a published opinion, the Appellate Division reversed, finding Lapsley's injuries were not compensable under the Act. Lapsley v. Township of Sparta, 466 N.J. Super. 160, 173, 245 A.3d 1019 (App. Div. 2021).
Relying in part on this Court's decision in Novis v. Rosenbluth Travel, 138 N.J. 92, 649 A.2d 69 (1994), the Appellate Division determined that the critical factor in workers’ compensation matters for an off-premises parking lot is the degree of control the employer exercised over the employee's use of the lot. Id. at 170-71, 245 A.3d 1019. Considering that factor, the Appellate Division found that the Township did not exercise control over Lapsley's use of the common-use parking lot because employees were not instructed on where to park or how to enter and exit the complex and because they shared the parking lot with the public. Ibid. Moreover, because the Township owns and maintains multiple properties and roadways including the municipal complex, the Appellate Division concluded that to find that Lapsley's injuries were compensable "would be an unwarranted and overbroad expansion" of liability for public employers. Id. at 173, 245 A.3d 1019.
Defendants then petitioned for certification, which we granted. 246 N.J. 448, 251 A.3d 756 (2021) ; 246 N.J. 450, 251 A.3d 758 (2021).
The parties advance the following arguments with respect to whether Lapsley is entitled to workers’ compensation benefits under the Act.
Defendants first argue that the Appellate Division erred in concluding that the premises rule requires a finding that the Township exercised control over Lapsley's use of the parking lot to find compensability under the Act. Instead, defendants maintain that the premises rule looks to the site of the accident and the employer's right to control the parking lot, not the degree of control exercised, in determining compensability. Accordingly, defendants claim that because the accident occurred in a parking lot owned and maintained by the Township, Lapsley's injuries arose out of and in the course of her employment and are therefore compensable. Defendants further argue that the Appellate Division's decision would improperly expand public employers’ exposure to potential tort liability and restrict employees’ eligibility for workers’ compensation benefits.
Lapsley, on the other hand, argues that the degree of control exercised over an employee's use of a parking lot is routinely analyzed and required in applying the premises rule to determining compensability. Lapsley maintains that the parking lot is not part of the Township's premises because the Township exercised no control over her route to or from the library and because the parking lot where she was injured was shared with the public. Lapsley further argues that if ownership and maintenance of the parking lot is sufficient to find compensability, the premises rule would be abrogated because the Township owns and maintains many properties and roadways within its boundaries, thus inviting expansive, unwarranted interpretations of the Act.
"Deference must be accorded [to] the factual findings and legal determinations made by the Judge of Compensation unless they are ‘manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with competent relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice.’ " Lindquist v. City of Jersey City Fire Dep't, 175 N.J. 244, 262, 814 A.2d 1069 (2003) (quoting Perez v. Monmouth Cable Vision, 278 N.J. Super. 275, 282, 650 A.2d 1025 (App. Div. 1994) ). However, we are not "bound by [an] agency's interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue."
Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85, 93, 312 A.2d 497 (1973). Instead, we review an agency's interpretation of a statute de novo. Russo v. Bd. of Trs., PFRS, 206 N.J. 14, 27, 17 A.3d 801 (2011).
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