de Lara v. Confederation Life Ass'n

• Citation: 257 So.2d 42
• Decision Date: 01 December 1971
• Docket Number: No. 70--258,No. 40957,40957,70--258
• Parties: Hector de LARA, Jr., et al., Petitioners, v. CONFEDERATION LIFE ASSOCIATION, a Canadian corporation, Respondent. Supreme Court of Florida
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 42

257 So.2d 42

Hector de LARA, Jr., et al., Petitioners, v. CONFEDERATION LIFE ASSOCIATION, a Canadian corporation, Respondent.

No. 40957.

District Court No. 70--258.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Dec. 1, 1971.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 15, 1972.

Shalle Stephen Fine, Miami, for petitioner.

Shutts & Bowen, Thomas H. Anderson and Phillip G. Newcomm, Miami, for respondent.

ERVIN, Acting Chief Justice.

We have for review on petition for writ of certiorari a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District. Confederation Life Association v. de Lara, Fla.App.1971, 244 So.2d 539. We have jurisdiction under Article V, Section 4(2) of the Florida Constitution, F.S.A. because this decision conflicts with Confederation Life Association v. Vega y Arminan, Fla.App.1968, 207 So.2d 33, which opinion was adopted by this Court in Confederation Life Association v. Vega y Arminan, Fla.1968, 211 So.2d 169.

This is another case arising out of attempts to recover in the United States in United States dollars the face amount of life insurance policies sold in Havana, Cuba, to Cuban nationals.

In 1938, Respondent, a Canadian life insurance company authorized to do business in Cuba and in Florida, insured for $10,000 the life of one German Lopez Sanchez, a Cuban national living in Havana. The insurance policy was applied for, and delivered, in Cuba. It contained the following pertinent provisions:

'PLACES OF PAYMENT.--All sums payable or exigible under this policy shall be paid at the principal office of the Association in the City of Havana, Republic of Cuba, but the insured may, with the assent of the Association, make his payments elsewhere.

'CURRENCY.--All sums payable or exigible under this policy shall be paid in lawful currency of the United States of America.'

Following the enactment of a new Cuban law on July 1, 1951, the Association notified its insured that:

'All premiums payable in accordance with this policy as well as all other liabilities contracted under the same and in which a reference is made to American currency, will from now on be payable in Cuban National currency, at par, in accordance with Law No. 13 of 1948 and Decree No. 1384 of April 1951.'

The insured died on June 8, 1962, leaving Petitioners as his beneficiaries under the policy. All the Petitioners with the exception of Rosalia Lopez Orue now live in the United States. Petitioner Orue has assigned her rights to the proceeds to the other beneficiaries. After the insured's death, Petitioners filed their claim for the policy's benefits, requesting payment in the United States in United States dollars. Respondent advised them it would only pay them in Cuba in Cuban pesos.

Petitioners filed suit in the Dade County Circuit Court for the face amount of the policy plus interest and bonuses. In his Final Judgment, the trial judge concluded:

'This case is governed by the principles laid down in Confederation Life Assoc. v. Vega (citation omitted) And this Court in equity has the power to grant to the Plaintiffs recovery in United States dollars. . . .'

On appeal, the Third District Court reversed. That court said:

'The complaint sought relief which could be characterized as 'equitable' and 'legal.' The final decree found that the equities were with the plaintiffs and under the principles of Confederation Life Association v. Vega y Arminan (citation omitted) ordered the insurance company to pay plaintiffs the sum of Ten Thousand Dollars plus bonuses and interest from October 31, 1963.

'On appeal there is a difference of opinion between the parties as to whether plaintiffs were seeking legal or equitable relief in the trial court. Plaintiffs argue that they were seeking and obtained specific performance of the insurance contract in question.

'An examination of the complaint shows that it did not contain any allegation that plaintiffs were without a plain adequate and complete remedy at law. See 29A Fla.Jur. Specific Performance § 14. Neither is there proof that plaintiffs had...